Soul springs from Intellect, Intellect springs from the One. But quite how does the sensible world arise? A pair of almost successive treatises points to the answer. A lower manifestation of soul `makes' or `gives birth to' what is variously described as `non-being', `utterly indefinite' and `utterly dark', before covering what she has made with form, specifically the form of `body', and before `entering rejoicing' into the object that, by its reception of form, has been made ready to receive her (...) and that, as the `dwelling place' of soul, will be none other than the visible cosmos. A pair of earlier, again almost successive treatises, spells out the implication. The matter of the sensible world, covered with at least a minimum of form, is described as a `corpse adorned'. The same object, but prior to its `adornment', prior therefore to its appearance as a `body' that is a `corpse', and prior to any `indwelling' of soul, is specifically said to be `non-being' and the `darkness of matter', a transparent allusion to the product of soul in the two later treatises. The soul's making of `darkness', so we may infer, is a making of `matter', the final act in the drama by which everything that exists, including the material substrate of the world we see and feel around us, stems ultimately from the One. (shrink)

Plotinus argues that materialism cannot explain reflexive cognition. He argues that mere bodies cannot engage in the self-reflexive activity of both cognizing some content and being cognitively aware of cognizing this content. Short of outright denying the cognitive unity underlying this phenomenon of self-awareness, materialism is in trouble. However, Plotinus bases his argument on the condition that material bodies are capable of a spatial unity at most, and while this condition has purchase on ancient materialists, it would be rejected today. (...) After considering objections based on our contemporary understanding of a material body, I amend Plotinus' argument to focus instead on the core materialist commitment to external efficient-causal relations. This amended argument regains its urgency for materialism, while retaining the spirit of Plotinus' view. (shrink)

Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity examines the various ways in which Christian intellectuals engaged with Platonism both as a pagan competitor and as a source of philosophical material useful to the Christian faith. The chapters are united in their goal to explore transformations that took place in the reception and interaction process between Platonism and Christianity in this period. -/- The contributions in this volume explore the reception of Platonic material in Christian thought, showing that the transmission of (...) cultural content is always mediated, and ought to be studied as a transformative process by way of selection and interpretation. Some chapters also deal with various aspects of the wider discussion on how Platonic, and Hellenic, philosophy and early Christian thought related to each other, examining the differences and common ground between these traditions. -/- Platonism and Christian Thought in Late Antiquity offers an insightful and broad ranging study on the subject, which will be of interest to students of both philosophy and theology in the Late Antique period, as well as anyone working on the reception and history of Platonic thought, and the development of Christian thought. (shrink)

At the core of Plotinus’ exploration of human selfhood, lies a reference to the myth of Dionysus-Zagreus and his mirror, one of the toys the Titans used to seduce the young Dionysus. In interpreting the myth within this context, the mirror has been invariably regarded by scholars as a symbol for matter, an external surface on which the soul is projected and becomes embodied as a human individual by dispersing in the material depths. This paper challenges this established view and (...) advances a new interpretation of Plotinus’ allusion to the myth and its philosophical significance. It argues that the mirror is not a symbol for matter, but rather a symbol for the soul itself, for its power to transform itself and retain its identity in the process of becoming a human individual. The function of the mirror is thus both deceptive and protective. While the desire that the soul, deceived by the mirror, feels for its own image guides it to leave behind its original condition and unity, it is this same desire that keeps the soul within itself: protected by the Dionysian mirror, even the most dispersed soul cannot desire anything other than what it takes to be itself, hence rather than disappearing in the radical alterity of matter, soul reaffirms its identity as an individual human self. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to focus on the reception of Plotinus’ concept of matter in the Renaissance philosopher Giordano Bruno and his early Italian dialogue De la causa, principio et uno. I argue that Bruno’s concept of materia in De la causa, principio et uno reflects Plotinus’ theory of intelligible matter in Ennead ii 4 [12] 2–5 as well as Plotinus’ positive view of the perceptible world in Enneads ii 9 [33] and iv 8 [6]. It is suggested (...) that Bruno interprets Plotinus as an ancient philosopher who supported the unity and homogeneity of matter. Giordano Bruno’s reception of Plotinus in De la Causa, principio et uno could enlighten contemporary discussions in Neoplatonic studies concerning the question of matter in the Enneads. (shrink)

Abstract Plotinus did not set out to be obscure. Difficulties of interpretation arise partly from his style of writing, compressed, elliptical, allusive. The allusions, easily enough recognisable by those he was writing for, are often not recognised at all by the modern reader who no longer has at his fingertips the texts of Plato and Aristotle that Plotinus undoubtedly alludes to, but whose authors he has no need to name. So it is pre-eminently with his subtle use of earlier ideas (...) in tackling the difficult question of the nature of matter and its place in the scheme of emanation. The frequent references to matter as `non-being' and as `privation' can be understood only if they are seen as a radical adaptation of the paradoxical definition of a `form that is, of what is not' in Plato's Sophist (258 D 5-7) and as a deliberate correction of Aristotle's unsuccessful attempt at including female desire in an analysis of privation in the Physics (i 9, 192 a 22-25). Only when the debt to Plato and Aristotle has been recognised for what it is are we able to appreciate that matter defined as `non-being' is not therefore `non-existent', and that the `privation' that is matter is not a terminus a quo of change, but a permanent substrate of change. The adaptation and the daring syncretism lead to deliberate paradox in Plotinus' own definition of matter as both `so to speak a form of sorts' and `formless' (I 8 [51] 3). The seeming inconsistency is Plotinus' acknowledgment of the use he has made of earlier ideas when he writes of matter, so defined, as `made' by a lower manifestation of soul, and therefore as the last and the least of the products flowing from, but not created by, the One. (shrink)