The article revisits the debate between the positivists and non-positivists currents in sociology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, concluding that it is actually a false debate, due to the fact that, beyond their differences, both shared some of the basic principles of the paradigm of modernity. From this historical analysis the article seeks to draw lessons for the social sciences in the present, at a time when these seem to have reached a certain synthesis between the modern (...) and postmodern epistemologies. The article shows us that such a synthesis was already prefigured in the writing of classical theorists as it is, in fact, an ineluctable structural law of science itself if it wants to escape from the trap of skepticism and epistemological nihilism. The article also explores how, as a consequence of the pervasiveness of the modern paradigm, a common ethnocentric bias can be traced in all the fathers of sociology and wonders whether sociology today has actually got rid of this problem. (shrink)

This article treats the intellectual problem of revolution, agency, and the advent of liberal democracy from the standpoint of mid-nineteenth century France in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions. After a discussion of the theoretical and historiographical problem—in particular the relevance for this period in history of science studies—the article discusses the views of former Saint-Simonian and political economist, Michel Chevalier, eventually turning to the debate over the free market of goods and labor between the early French socialist Louis Blanc (...) and Chevalier in Chevalier’s new role of liberal free trade activist who trumpeted the ideology of the mass marketplace. Chevalier’s engagement of the social question turned on a distinctively moral, ideological, and, ultimately, technocratic defense of the free market—this free market utopianism became both starker and more ideologically refined as a result of Chevalier’s engagement with Blanc, especially in regard to worker-education. Both referred to the new mass marketplace of cheap, retail goods created by the rapid advance of mass transport, modern logistics, as le bon marché. French political economists went so far as to invoke a new way of life: la vie a bon marché (literally, “life on the cheap”). This notion of work and life was opposed by Blanc on the grounds of fraternal social solidarity. Finally, and potently, the moral virtues of the free market were conceived by Chevalier as a direct answer to social revolution, a means for affording social stability. (shrink)

French abstract: L’article étudie la relation de Peirce à Comte, en partant des critiques formulées dans ses écrits de jeunesse. Son enjeu est double : il relève d’abord d’une question d’histoire de la philosophie étonnamment peu traitée, alors même que Peirce lit, commente et critique Comte. Le second enjeu est épistémologique et métaphysique : Peirce voit dans la théorie comtienne des hypothèses une position proche du pragmatisme qu’il développe, mais grevée de présupposés nominalistes qui la rendent finalement intenable, à moins (...) que l’on n’en adopte une lecture « charitable ». La confrontation avec Comte semble alors être l’occasion privilégiée d’une explicitation de son propre pragmatisme. -/- English version (see link below on Cairn international) This article discusses Peirce’s relationship to Comte, based on criticisms made by Peirce in his early writings. It has a twofold purpose : firstly, addressing an important question in the history of philosophy that is surprisingly overlooked, even if Peirce reads, comments and criticizes Comte. The second issue is epistemological and metaphysical : Peirce sees in Comte’s theory of hypotheses a position close to the pragmatism he develops, but burdened with nominalist presuppositions that ultimately make it untenable, unless one adopts a “charitable” reading of it. The confrontation with Comte then seems to be a privileged opportunity, for Peirce, to clarify his own pragmatism. (shrink)

La considération de « l’élément germanique » chez Comte participe d’un projet de réorganisation européenne. Madame de Staël avait légué l’image d’une Allemagne rêveuse et métaphysicienne. Comte développe une autre représentation : celle d’un pays marqué par l’esprit protestant (négatif et critique) et la philosophie de la nature (un panthéisme philosophique). Ces caractéristiques incitent Comte à dégrader le rang de l’Allemagne dans le classement des cinq nations européennes susceptibles de participer à la construction d’une république occidentale positiviste. Toutefois, Comte a (...) hésité avant de déclasser l’Allemagne, car celle-ci possède aussi un formidable atout : le sens des généralités et de la systématisation, indispensable à la philosophie positive. C’est la « situation » de l’Allemagne qui est jugée, et non la nation allemande. Ainsi est-ce à travers l’histoire, et la loi qui en règle le cours, qu’il convient d’étudier cette question. (shrink)

The classification of the sciences is one of the most discussed and analysed aspects of Peirce’s corpus of work. I propose that Peirce’s attempt at systematising the sciences is characterised by a distinctive historicity, which I construe in two complementary senses. First, I investigate Peirce’s classification as part of a broader nineteenth-century move toward classifying the sciences, a move that was at the same time motivated by social and epistemological goals. I claim that this re-contextualisation adds an entirely new layer (...) to the otherwise distinctively internalist readings of Peirce’s classification. I then look at how Peirce’s scheme, especially in the form it displayed in the early 1890s, relates to his own historical writings, particularly his history of science. Looking at Peirce as a historical actor in his own right through the lens of his classification, I claim, is indispensable to understand the contemporary relevance of his contributions to the history and historiography of the sciences. (shrink)