Recognizing the centrality of representation in philosophy and social sciences as constitutive of knowledge concerning the interpretation of social reality, this article highlights on the need to e...

In the first place, I discuss the main papers and books on Durkheim published in recent years, where no attention is given to the phenomenological interpretations of his work. Then I expose different phenomenological readings of Durkheim, some of them positive, some negative, some ambivalent. Later I find that there is in Durkheim an implicit practice of phenomenology, inspired by Descartes’ Meditations on first philosophy. Consequently, I support Tyriakian’s thesis that there is in Durkheim an implicit phenomenological approach, despite his (...) positivism. Then I wonder whether this tacit approach produces a phenomenological ontology of the social world. I find that it actually does, especially in what regards to social facts considered as things. I argue that Durkheim’s conception of social things is consistent with Husserl’s notion of ideal objectivities. I conclude that Durkheim’s rule of considering social facts as things is part of his phenomenological legacy and that it does not contradict the idea that they also are “states lived”. (shrink)

This article traces some of the transformation that the fields of folk psychology and anthropology underwent in the late nineteenth century. Ludwik Fleck, in developing his sociology of knowledge, drew on both of these fields; a legacy that makes it possible to conceive of his epistemology as a theory of communication. Fleck, in grounding his understanding of the relationship between sociality and communication on insights from these two disciplines, proposed the morphological concept of an organic formation of all scientific knowledge. (...) Naturalising knowledge production in this manner, Fleck postulated a program of deciphering, reading, and translation that would relate all forms of knowledge back to the rules and conditions of its making. In this morphological conception of the processes of knowledge production, Fleck’s sociology bears significant similarities with the description of social institutions by French sociologists Marcel Mauss and Emile Durkheim, who also drew on insights from late-nineteenth-century folk psychology and anthropology. (shrink)

Las primeras teorías sociológicas son deudoras de las filosofías ilustradas de la historia, las cuales aparecieron para proporcionar un marco de sentido a la acción moral, una vez que la teoría moral renunció a los compromisos metafísicos de la filosofía moral premoderna. Al tiempo que defendió la autonomía de la sociología frente a la filosofía, Durkheim le prescribió a aquélla una tarea específica: realizar una ciencia moral que atendiendo a dos rasgos con los que los hechos morales se muestra a (...) la conciencia —solidaridad y coerción— pueda dar cuenta del sentido moral de la división del trabajo, hasta entonces considerado un proceso casi natural. El propósito de este artículo es mostrar cómo el enfoque durkheimiano permite descubrir una semejanza estructural entre el análisis sociológico y la tradicional perspectiva filosófico-moral de las obligaciones mutuas. (shrink)

This article presents Durkheim as a Neo-Kantian social thinker and a source of the theory of emotional contagion. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is examined as Durkheim’s paradigm case of Neo-Kantianism. He is first considered among the intellectual context of French Neo-Kantianism and its figures Charles Renouvier, Émile Boutroux, and Octave Hamelin, all whom were influential in his formative years. Durkheim’s Neo-Kantianism in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life is then juxtaposed to the Neo-Kantian legal philosophy of Emil Lask (...) and Hans Kelsen. Agued is that Durkheim’s notions of distortion and emotional contagion are his leading contributions to Neo-Kantianism. (shrink)