Uma análise metodologicamente correta da profundidade e escopo da influência de Schiller sobre o pensamento maduro de Peirce requer três passos: uma análise preliminar das passagens que poderiam sustentar a hipótese de uma influência prolongada e, assim, poderá também indicar seus vetores sistemáticos. No caso de tal análise dar resultados positivos, tornar-se-ia necessário explorar as juvenilia que documentam a recepção inicial de Peirce de Schiller, para tentar identificar aquelas ideias que tornam inteligibilidade à re-emergência de Schiller no pensamento de Peirce (...) após 1900. Com base nos resultados que nossa contextualização arquitetônica preliminar das reminiscências de Peirce de seu estudo juvenil das Cartas Estéticas resultaram em um artigo duplo. O presente artigo foca nos segundo e terceiro passos. Logo, nosso propósito é mostrar que a tríplice aparência das categorias de Schiller fazem em seu disfarce – ora como momentos de determinação lógica, ora como estados mentais coletivo e individual de mentes socializadas moldadas pelas relações de unidades psíquicas elementares, e ora como estágios de processos históricos – primeiro agindo como o catalizador para o entendimento inicial de Peirce das deficiências da categoriologia de Kant e, consequentemente, foi ‘fadado’ à re-emergência posterior em consideração a determinar desafios arquitetônicos que Peirce encontrou-se confrontado enquanto trabalhava no redesenho da cenoscopia das ciências filosóficas nos anos de 1900 a 1903. A influência de Schiller exercida sobre Peirce, portanto, origina em sua prefiguração do conceito de Peirce de categorialidade e a coerência dos usos arquitetônicos que ela permite, em especial, como um meio para a estratificação prescisiva dos componentes – fenomenal, normativa e metafísico-entelequial –da experiência comum e os modos de racionalidade ali incorporadas. (shrink)

This paper compares Peirce’s and Hintikka’s logical philosophies and identifies a cross-section of similarities in their thoughts in the areas of action-first epistemology, pragmaticist meaning, philosophy of science, and philosophy of logic and mathematics.

Peirce believed that his pragmaticism can be conclusively proven. Beginning in 1903, he drafted several attempts, ending by 1908 with a semeiotic proof. Around 1905, he exposes the proof using the theory of Existential Graphs . This paper modernizes the semantics Peirce proposed for EGs in terms of game-theoretic semantics . Peirce's 1905 proof is then reconstructed in three parts, by relating pragmaticism to the GTS conception of meaning, showing that Peirce's proof is an argument for a relational structure of (...) the meaning of intellectual signs that our interpretative and strategic practices give rise to, and bringing out the key links between EGs and pragmaticism. (shrink)

This paper examines the contemporary philosophical and cognitive relevance of Charles Peirce's diagrammatic logic of existential graphs (EGs), the ‘moving pictures of thought’. The first part brings to the fore some hitherto unknown details about the reception of EGs in the early 1900s that took place amidst the emergence of modern conceptions of symbolic logic. In the second part, philosophical aspects of EGs and their contributions to contemporary logical theory are pointed out, including the relationship between iconic logic and images, (...) the problem of the meaning of logical constants, the cognitive economy of iconic logic, the failure of the Frege–Russell thesis, and the failure of the Language of Thought hypothesis. (shrink)

A. N. Prior very much admired the logic and philosophy of C.S. Peirce. In the spring of 1962 Prior went to Chicago to study Peirce's ideas. One of the topics that caught his attention was Peirce's existential graphs. This interest continued when he returned to England. In this paper Prior's grappling with the existential graphs will be discussed.

In this essay, we propose that Peirce’s Existential Graphs can derive the desired uniqueness implication (or in a weaker claim, the definite description readings) of donkey pronouns in conjunctive discourse (A man walks in the park. He whistles), without postulating a separate category of E-type pronouns.

This paper deals with modality in Peirce's existential graphs, as expressed in his gamma and tinctured systems. We aim at showing that there were two philosophically motivated decisions of Peirce's that, in the end, hindered him from producing a modern, conclusive system of modal logic. Finally, we propose emendations and modifications to Peirce's modal graphical tinctured systems and to their underlying ideas that will produce modern modal systems.

L’article examine les raisons philosophiques, plutôt que mathématiques ou logiques, pour lesquelles MacColl a pu vouloir développer une logique propositionnelle. Nous trouvons des éléments de réponse dans le refus discret d’endosser une logique des choses, dans l’anti-psychologisme nuancé de MacColl, et dans une subtile épistémologie de la certitude liée à un usage méthodique de la grammaire.

L’article examine les raisons philosophiques, plutôt que mathématiques ou logiques, pour lesquelles MacColl a pu vouloir développer une logique propositionnelle. Nous trouvons des éléments de réponse dans le refus discret d’endosser une logique des choses, dans l’anti-psychologisme nuancé de MacColl, et dans une subtile épistémologie de la certitude liée à un usage méthodique de la grammaire.