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Mind uploading: a philosophical counter-analysis

In Russell Blackford & Damien Broderick (eds.), Intelligence Unbound: The Future of Uploaded and Machine Minds. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 119-130 (2014)

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  1. Transhumanist immortality: Understanding the dream as a nightmare.Pablo García-Barranquero - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (1):177-196.
    This paper offers new arguments to reject the alleged dream of immortality. In order to do this, I firstly introduce an amendment to Michael Hauskeller’s approach of the “immortalist fallacy”. I argue that the conclusion “we do not want to live forever” does not follow from the premise “we do not want to die”. Next, I propose the philosophical turn from “normally” to “under these circumstances” to resolve this logical error. Then, I review strong philosophical critiques of this transhumanist purpose (...)
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  • Classification of Approaches to Technological Resurrection.Alexey Turchin & Chernyakov Maxim - manuscript
    Abstract. Death seems to be a permanent event, but there is no actual proof of its irreversibility. Here we list all known ways to resurrect the dead that do not contradict our current scientific understanding of the world. While no method is currently possible, many of those listed here may become feasible with future technological development, and it may even be possible to act now to increase their probability. The most well-known such approach to technological resurrection is cryonics. Another method (...)
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  • Metaphysical Daring as a Posthuman Survival Strategy.Pete Mandik - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):144-157.
    I develop an argument that believing in the survivability of a mind uploading procedure conveys value to its believers that is assessable independently of assessing the truth of the belief. Regardless of whether the first-order metaphysical belief is true, believing it conveys a kind of Darwinian fitness to the believer. Of course, a further question remains of whether having that Darwinian property can be a basis—in a rational sense of being a basis—for one’s holding the belief. I’ll also make some (...)
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  • Mind-upload. The ultimate challenge to the embodied mind theory.Massimiliano Lorenzo Cappuccio - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (3):425-448.
    The ‘Mind-Upload’ hypothesis, a radical version of the Brain-in-a-Vat thought experiment, asserts that a whole mind can safely be transferred from a brain to a digital device, after being exactly encoded into substrate independent informational patterns. Prima facie, MU seems the philosophical archenemy of the Embodied Mind theory, which understands embodiment as a necessary and constitutive condition for the existence of a mind and its functions. In truth, whether and why MU and EM are ultimately incompatible is unobvious. This paper, (...)
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  • El doble efecto de la pandemia en el discurso transhumanista.Pablo García-Barranquero & Antonio Diéguez - 2022 - Recerca.Revista de Pensament I Anàlisi 27 (2).
    The covid-19 pandemic has revealed a partially forgotten vulnerability. This very hostile period has made us more aware of the finitude of our life as well as the dangers to which we are exposed as the biological organisms that we are. Faced with such a panorama, transhumanism has taken advantage of this situation to claim, more forcefully than ever, the benefits that the application of technologies on human beings could have. Yet, at the same time, opponents of this movement have (...)
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