The most promising way of responding to arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom (in one way or another) invokes a claim about the order of explanation: God knew (or believed) that you would perform a given action because you would, in fact, perform it, and not the other way around. Once we see this result, many suppose, we'll see that divine foreknowledge ultimately poses no threat to human freedom. This essay argues that matters are not so (...) simple, for such reasoning threatens also to reconcile divine prepunishment with human freedom. The question here is this: if you have already been ( justly) punished by God for doing something, how then could you avoid doing that thing? As we'll see, there is a strong argument that seems to show that you couldn't. However, this essay argues that if divine prepunishment rules out human freedom, then so does divine foreknowledge. The arguments are exactly parallel in certain crucial respects. At any rate, investigating the issues surrounding prepunishment can help to throw into relief the various different strategies of response to the foreknowledge argument and can bring out what their costs and commitments really are. In particular, investigating prepunishment can help to bring out the inadequacy of the “Ockhamist” reply to the argument, as well as the sense in which God's past beliefs need to depend on what we do, if we are plausibly to have a choice about those beliefs. (shrink)

There is a longstanding argument that purports to show that divine foreknowledge is inconsistent with human freedom to do otherwise. Proponents of this argument, however, have for some time been met with the following reply: the argument posits what would have to be a mysterious non-causal constraint on freedom. In this paper, I argue that this objection is misguided – not because after all there can indeed be non-causal constraints on freedom (as in Pike, Fischer, and Hunt), but because the (...) success of the incompatibilist's argument does not require the real possibility of non-causal constraints on freedom. I contend that the incompatibilist's argument is best seen as showing that, given divine foreknowledge, something makes one unfree – and that this something is most plausibly identified, not with the foreknowledge itself, but with the causally deterministic factors that would have to be in place in order for there to be infallible foreknowledge in the first place. (shrink)

The cause of an event must continue over a period at which the effect is not occurring and the whole period at which it is occurring. It follows that simultaneous causation and backward causation are metaphysically impossible. I distinguish among events said to occur at a time, ‘hard’ events which really occur solely at that time and ‘soft’ events which occur partly at another time. God’s beliefs at a time are hard events at that time. It follows that if God (...) is a temporal being, he cannot know infallibly what either we or he will do freely at a future time; and if God is timeless, he cannot know what happens in time. Hence we must define God’s ‘omniscience’ in such a way as to exclude any knowledge of future free actions. I discuss in an Appendix how far this view is compatible with Scripture and Church tradition. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to capture the essence of Nelson Pike’s contribution to the philosophy of religion. My summary of his insights will revolve around three general topics: omniscience (and in particular its relation to human freedom), omnipotence (and in particular its relation to the existence of human suffering), and mysticism (with a focus on the question of whether and in what sense mystic visions can be sources of knowledge). Although the details vary in interesting ways, his work on (...) these topics largely consists of recognizing an important challenge to the viability of the relevant doctrine or framework, sharpening that challenge by presenting it in a more forceful way, and then offering and assessing potential responses. Pike’s writings are characterized by exemplary rigor and relentless clarity, and together they constitute a rich (and under-appreciated) source of insight. (shrink)

According to most Muslim philosophers, the Divine foreknowledge, on the one hand, is so inclusive that encompasses each and every minor and timed action of moral agents, and because of the perfection of God in essence and attributes, any defects in His essence and attributes including any errors in His foreknowledge are impossible. On the other hand, these philosophers, like other defenders of free will, claim that significance of any kind of free will and responsibility of a moral agent depends (...) on their access to alternate possibilities (PAP (and, consequently, their ability to do and not to do an action simultaneously. This paper aims to deal with this highly debated and rooted question that whether these two views are essentially in conflict with each other. To answer this pivotal question briefly based on a modified version of Frankfurt cases and Muslim philosophers’ definition of free will, we attempt to defend their initial approach to eliminating the conflict between Divine foreknowledge and free will or moral responsibility and show that, firstly, this infallible knowledge is contingent on the agent’s voluntary action and, secondly, despite the principle of alternate possibilities, moral responsibility of the agent does not depend on the person’s avoidance of the forthcoming action. (shrink)

I defend the compatibility of the classical theistic doctrine of divine providence, which includes infallible foreknowledge of all future events, with a libertarian understanding of creaturely free will. After setting out the argument for theological determinism, which purports to show the inconsistency of foreknowledge and freedom, I reject several responses as inadequate and then defend the ‚Ockhamist‛ response as successful. I further argue that the theory of middle knowledge or ‚Molinism‛ is crucial to the viability of the Ockhamist response, and (...) proceed to defend Molinism against the most pressing objections. Finally, I argue that a proper understanding of the Creator-creature relationship accounts for why no explanation can be given for how God’s middle knowledge comes about. (shrink)

Summary The possible incompatibility between God’s foreknowledge and the free will of the agent shows that this issue is wide-ranging: if God has infallible knowledge of all of man’s actions before he has performed them, essentially, is there the possibility of the free will of the agent and his choice between alternative actions? According to John Martin Fischer, God, as a person, is absolutely knowledgeable, such that at all times, like t and in all propositions like P, He is completely (...) aware that P will take place in time t; only and only if the proposition P is true at the time of t. Apart from this, God, as a person, in all possible worlds, possesses absolute and universal knowledge. It is clear that in this explanation, the object of God’s fore and essential knowledge has a universal and comprehensive range and, as a result, includes man’s apparently voluntary actions as well. However, wouldn’t such knowledge be inconsistent and contradictory with man’s free will and freedom to act? Reconstructing Fischer’s approach and arranging a notable solution by paying heed to his collection of views and if possible, proving the incompatibility of Divine fore and infallible knowledge with the free will of the moral agent depends on inserting two other premises to his claims regarding God and His fore and universal knowledge. The first is that Fischer believes in our lack of control over the past and more precisely, in the Fixity of the Past Principle and second, according to him, free will and voluntariness of the moral agent is based on the ability to choose and attempt the possibility of an alternative by the person. Regarding the first condition, it is important to note that like Van Inwagen in the Indirect Consequence Argument, Fischer too believes in our lack of control over the past and more precisely, in the Fixity of the Past Principle. According to this view, the past is fixed in the present and is out of our control and as a result, we cannot make changes in its events through our present choices. Therefore, in the event that the performance of a particular act is preceded by a change in a past reality, due to the fixity and establishment of past phenomena, a person would not be able to perform such an action. By accepting the Fixity of the Past Principle, it seems we cannot escape the incompatibility between Divine foreknowledge and the free will of the moral agent. However, in dealing with the second inserted premise, instead of denying the truth value of possible future propositions or the possibility of Divine knowledge over them, he tries to distinguish between two meanings of freedom and in this way, clarifies that in one meaning, freedom necessitates man’s voluntariness in performing or abandoning an act and as a result is a two-way reality and in another meaning, it is only synonymous with freedom in performing an action and is not preceded by man’s control and choice in abandoning an act. According to Fischer’s Frankfurter approach, in some cases there are conditions which do not force a person to perform an act; however, they make abstaining from acting upon them improbable for him and despite all these voluntary factors and from a moral perspective, he is considered responsible. Fischer’s approach, with all its importance in defending free will and moral responsibility and its compatibility with phenomena such as causal necessity and Divine foreknowledge, is faced with two main problems. The first is that in this approach, the interfering Frankfurter essence at the beginning of his interference in the alternative process has not been revised. Therefore, it is still not clear whether we are simply facing an “unreal interferer” whose interference starts as soon as he receives any type of reliable context and sign which indicates the occurrence of choice or an act against the desire and inclination of the interferer or a “conditional interferer” is at work; one who displays physical and even spiritual actions inconsistent with his own inclinations and desires? Another problem is that in the Frankfurter models, the complete and absolute negation of alternatives to the moral agent would result in the lack of his free will and moral responsibility. (shrink)