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  1. Leibniz’s Dual Concept of Probability.Binyamin Eisner - 2022 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 4 (1):17.
    Leibniz uses the concept of probability in both epistemic and non-epistemic contexts, as do many of his contemporaries. Some commentators have claimed that this dual-use is inexact or confused. In this paper, I describe Leibniz’s understanding of the concept of probability and discuss its dual usage in his work. Then, building on Leibniz’s creation theory, in conjunction with Russell’s interpretation of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, I endeavor to justify this dual usage and to show that this justification is also (...)
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  • Leibniz on the Grounds of the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Owen Pikkert - 2022 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 104 (3):566-589.
    I examine several alleged grounds of the principle of sufficient reason in Leibniz’s philosophy. These include the nature of a requisite and a sufficient condition, the nature of truth, and the nature of harmony. I argue that Leibniz does not ground the PSR in any of these ways. Instead, he is committed to a value-based grounds of the PSR: God creates the best possible world, and the fact that the PSR obtains in this world contributes to it being the best. (...)
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  • Science and the Principle of Sufficient Reason: Du Châtelet contra Wolff.Aaron Wells - 2023 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 13 (1):24–53.
    I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.
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  • God Can Do Otherwise: A Defense of Act Contingency in Leibniz's Mature Period.Dylan Flint - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (3):235-256.
    This paper locates a source of contingency for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking. This interpretative line has been previously thought to be a dead-end because it appears inconsistent with Leibniz’s own conception of God, as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being (Adams, 1994). This paper points out that the best argument on offer which seeks to demonstrate this inconsistency fails. The paper then argues that the supposition that God does otherwise implies for (...)
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