En este artículo intervengo en la discusión sobre si es posible encontrar en la filosofía política de Kant una fundamentación de los derechos sociales básicos. Me centraré en primer lugar en dar sentido a la idea de una doctrina metafísica del derecho. En segundo lugar, trataré de mostrar dónde se encuentran los límites de la doctrina metafísica del derecho de Kant a la hora de debatir sobre la forma en que la sociedad debe o debía organizarse (en los tiempos actuales, (...) pero también en la época de Kant). Por último, esbozaré rutas alternativas para usar el enfoque metafísico de Kant con el fin de abordar cuestiones de justicia social, en particular, el tema de la pobreza. (shrink)

En este escrito me propongo mantener un diálogo con María Julia Bertomeu a propósito de la lectura sobre la hibridación de liberalismo y republicanismo contenida en una contribución de A. Pinzani y N. Sánchez Madrid y publicada en el volumen Kant and Social Policies. Mi intención principal es esclarecer lo que Kant parece entender en la Doctrina del Derecho como la protección jurídica que el Estado debe conceder a los ciudadanos en su totalidad y señalar la dualidad de perspectivas que (...) este pensador abre para resolver problemas de enorme incidencia social y política como es la pobreza, como un ejemplo de su planteamiento de la injusticia social. Finalmente, se recogen algunas conclusiones sobre la disparidad de ópticas que Kant y nuestro presente adoptan acerca del sufrimiento social y la noción de responsabilidad jurídica y política. (shrink)

Which role can physical proximity play in our thinking about the foundations of political community in a world where, due to political, economic and technological developments, we seem to live side by side with virtually everyone globally? This article interrogates this question in conversation with Kant’s political thought, where proximity makes a prominent appearance both as a foundation of statehood and of cosmopolitan community. I argue that, as a scalar criterion, the idea of proximity cannot serve as a particularisation principle (...) that guides us in carving up the world into peoples or territories. However, as a regulative principle it provides an appealing normative criterion for the internal constitution of existing states. While this is predicated on accepting Kantian conservatism about boundaries, the proximity-based state is structured in a way that deflates the normative significance of the very distinction between insider and outsider. (shrink)

In what follows we introduce and present a translation of Salomon Maimon’s “On the First Grounds of Natural Right”. To begin, we briefly discuss textual issues surrounding the essay. We then...

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] During the last few years, it has become usual to turn to some seventeenth century readings of the traditional idea of an original common possession of the earth for philosophical aid to explain and support the rights of persons in situations of extreme need, including refugees. Hugo Grotius’s conception of this idea is one of the most cited ones. In this paper, I hold that a Grotian reading of the idea of an (...) original common possession of the earth is not a fruitful principle if we want to elaborate a solid defence of the rights of the ones in need. I reconstruct and analyse the role this idea has in Grotius’s theory of private property and present objections to it from a Kantian perspective. (shrink)

Nach einem weit verbreiteten Urteil gibt Kant der Ökonomie in seinem Werk keinen nennenswerten Raum. Die vorliegende Studie widerlegt dies, indem sie Kants Äußerungen zu ökonomischen Themen systematisiert: zur Selbstständigkeit, zum Kaufmann, zum Handel, zum Geld, zur „Staatswirthschaft" sowie zum technischen Fortschritt. Sie erschließt Kants Ökonomie aus der Ergänzung rechtlicher und ethischer Pflichten durch deren anthropologische Ausführungsbedingungen. Dabei geht sie aus von einem zeitgenössischen Verständnis der Ökonomie als Wissenschaft vom Wohlstand. Im deutschsprachigen Raum des 18. Jahrhunderts konkurrieren hier drei Paradigmen (...) miteinander: das aristotelische, das smithianische und das kameralistische. Sie identifizieren jeweils das Haus, den Markt oder den Staat als zentrale Handlungssphäre der Ökonomie. Die Studie kommt zu dem Schluss, dass Kants praktische Philosophie für Ergänzungen aus jeder dieser ökonomischen Handlungssphären offen ist, solange diese freiheitliche Prinzipien erfüllen; sie ist damit nicht, wie gelegentlich behauptet, auf eine einzige Wirtschaftsordnung festgelegt, etwa auf eine rein marktliberale. Relevant ist dies für die Kant-Forschung, für die Wirtschaftsphilosophie sowie für die Ideengeschichte. (shrink)

The rediscovery of Kant’s Doctrine of Right resulted in many attempts to apply Kant’s position to current affairs. This research often faces the problem of defining clear borders of what in Kant’s texts needs to be considered as rational core of his theory and what is merely a theoretically less significant consequence of particular political situation of 18th century. My claim is that in order to be able to adequately apply Kant’s ideas and concepts to the 21st century problems, the (...) process of application of his rational principles to the world of experience must be reconstructed. This will not only bring about the core structure of right but may also determine which elements of Kant’s legal theory are contingent to changing empirical data. I recognise two levels of Kant’s application of the rational principles to human condition, which consecutively determine the rational core of right and secondary structural divisions that emerge from contingent data about political history of mankind. The aim of the article is to investigate the fundamental steps of Kant’s application on the first level, in order to reconstruct the rational core of his legal theory. In the first step I analyse the universal principle of right in order to clarify Kant’s concept of a right. Further, I investigate the axiom of external freedom, which, in conjunction with human condition generates the necessity of using external objects of choice and therefore grounds the emergence of acquired rights. Nevertheless, these rights, as particular legal titles that limit the freedom of others, cannot be reconciled with universal freedom in the state of nature. Therefore, from the establishment of innate and acquired right, there arises the necessity of public right and entering the civil condition. (shrink)

Contra las tesis que sostienen que Kant presenta versiones empobrecidas, poco originales o timoratas de republicanismo, tolerancia e ilustración, aquí se argumenta que tales versiones kantianas son, con todos los matices que se quiera, tendencialmente radicales, y terminan por descansar en la coimplicación entre moralidad y estado constitucional y republicano de derecho.

There exists a longstanding debate over the global institutional implications of Immanuel Kant's political philosophy: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government, or instead only a co...

There exists a longstanding debate over the global institutional implications of Immanuel Kant's political philosophy: does such a philosophy entail a federal world government, or instead only a confederal ‘league of nations’? However, while the systematic nature of Kant's tripartite ‘doctrine of right' is well recognised, this debate has been conducted with all but exclusive focus on ‘international right' in particular. This article, by contrast, brings ‘cosmopolitan right' firmly into view. It proceeds by way of engagement with the two Kantian (...) arguments made in defence of a ‘league of nations’ in discussion of international right, each of which appeals to aspects of states’ supposed ‘personhood’: the first appeals to states’ distinctive moral personality; the second to states’ physical manifestation. The article considers what happens when we assess these arguments not just in light of the demands of international right, but also in light of cosmopolitan right, and thus in light of public right more comprehensively. The answer is that such arguments cannot succeed as full defences of a league of nations. Indeed, when we assess such arguments with cosmopolitan right in view, they point instead – either tentatively or definitively – in the direction of world government. (shrink)