We consider academic freedom in the context of broader developments in higher education. We suggest that the tenor of contemporary debates on the subject is a manifestation of pervasive forms of authoritarianism that undermine the university as a home of adventure, a place and space that is conducive to the conduct of free inquiry.It is evident that some champions of academic freedom engage in dangerously polarized forms of spectacle, engendered by a management culture that embraces showmanship and routinely favours talking (...) over listening. As such, they represent a force for conformity rather than dissent; division rather than collective action. These forms of spectacle jeopardize rather than promote the principles of academic freedom by polarizing the terms of the debate for maximum ‘impact’. We explore the implications of conceptualizations of academic freedom that focus on the rights of everyone in the university. We also suggest that the notion might usefully be extended to those on precarious contracts, and to students facing normative expectations about what constitutes ‘progress’ in academic practice. Drawing upon Timothy Snyder’s On Tyranny. Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century and an essay by Vaclav Havel, we reassess the notion of the ‘pursuit of truth’ that underlies conventional definitions of academic freedom.We conclude with a brief vignette, a rousing endorsement of the ineffable and irreducible qualities of friendship. This entails slaying a fictitious, three-headed dragon and embracing a form of spectacle that transcends attempts to capture why it moves us. We leave the reader with warm-blooded traces of energy, curiosity, liveliness, and quiet determination. (shrink)

Trust, as a philosophical concept in education, seems largely taken for granted, either because it is embedded in other discourses, or is self-evidently assumed to be one on which there is general agreement and understanding. Its associated notions, such as confidence and belief, have counters in such concepts as disappointment and betrayal. These various notions come to the fore in interpersonal relations that require openness and self-critique. Critically reflective practice in professional teaching contexts is one such example, where openness means (...) that people involved may experience vulnerability. I will argue that the development of critically reflective practice is impossible in the absence of trust, and will take the position that trust requires the trustor to be vulnerable to betrayal. I draw on some findings of an ongoing research study in a selection of New Zealand schools, during which I have found that many participants attempt to connect reflective practice to appraisal, a move which, in light of what I present in relation to trust, I argue should be resisted. (shrink)