In biology the idea of matter as something passive has been abandoned in favour of the idea that matter has the capacity of self-activity. In modern physics too matter functions more as an agent, with which the experimenter has a relation, than as passive material which he can handle as he likes. So in both fields of study the antithesis between idealism and materialism has been given up, so that the relation instead of the difference between man and nature became (...) the starting point of scientific inquiry. (shrink)

The Ramsey-sentence H* of any hypothesis H is shown to be a synthetic proposition containing mathematics as a finite component. Far from being quasi-tautological, H* proves to have as much physical content as H itself.

Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H* of a theory H, is defended against the view that H* reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinality of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam’s theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H* and hence be shown to be finitely (...) axiomatisable; this is done in the Appendix, which is the most important part of the paper. (shrink)

The paper discusses the invariance view of reality: a view inspired by the relativity and quantum theory. It is an attempt to show that both versions of Structural Realism (epistemological and ontological) are already embedded in the invariance view but in each case the invariance view introduces important modifications. From the invariance view we naturally arrive at a consideration of symmetries and structures. It is often claimed that there is a strong connection between invariance and reality, established by symmetries. The (...) invariance view seems to render frame-invariant properties real, while frame-specific properties are illusory. But on a perspectival, yet observer-free view of frame-specific realities they too must be regarded as real although supervenient on frame-invariant realities. Invariance and perspectivalism are thus two faces of symmetries. Symmetries also elucidate structures. Because of this recognition, the invariance view is more comprehensive than Structural Realism. Referring to broken symmetries and coherence considerations, the paper concludes that at least some symmetries are ontological, not just epistemological constraints. (shrink)

Structural Realism (SSR), as embodied in the Ramsey-sentence H of a theory H, is defended against the view that H reduces to a trivial statement about the cardinally of the domain of H, a view which arises from ignoring the central role of observation within science. Putnam's theses are examined and shown to support rather than undermine SSR. Finally: in view of its synthetic character, applied mathematics must enter into the formulation of H and hence to be shown axiomatisable; this (...) is done in the Appendix, which is the most important part of the paper. (shrink)

Studie s příznačným názvem "O Planckově víře, nejen v soulad vědy s náboženstvím" se zabývá především otázkou, zda je reálně možné bezesporné fungování vědy a náboženství. Max Planck tomuto problému věnoval celou přednášku, jež se stala zdrojem této studie, jejímž cílem je kriticky posoudit Planckovy jednoznačně vyznívající závěry, totiž že vzájemné fungování vědy s náboženstvím není ani nemůže být ničím narušeno. Stručně je nastíněno i historické pozadí, jež provázelo Planckův život, neboť i to se jistě podílelo na Planckově postoji ke (...) kontroverzní otázce "náboženství a věda". (shrink)

The method of Ludwig Boltzmann (1844 – 1906), a great Austrian physicist-philosopher, for solving philosophical problems was described. This brilliant method can be a guiding stray in philosophy. His method is not restricted to philosophy of science (scientific philosophy), and indeed it can be used as well in pure philosophy. Theoretical pluralism developed by Boltzmann can be used as a basic assumption in philosophizing the epistemological problems. The Boltzmann’s method also saves philosophy from dogmatism. It shows the usefulness of philosophy (...) as well as progress of science, and calls for collaboration of philosophy and science. This collaboration can lead the human to better understanding of the Nature. Boltzmann states how both science and philosophy can go astray in the absence of this collaboration, since they are indeed unit. (shrink)