This article examines, through a theoretical lens, two issues concerning equality under international law thrown up by the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian War: the equal treatment of belligerents on different sides under international humanitarian law (IHL), which is being contested by revisionist just war theorists, and the unequal treatment of Ukrainians with different genders assigned at birth who are trying to flee Ukraine, which is being contested under international human rights law (IHRL). By examining different conceptions of equality through the lens of (...) social ontology, this article distinguishes between the regulatory focus of IHL on individual agency and the regulatory focus of IHRL on social structures, which directly influence how ‘difference’ and ‘sameness’ are recognized and determined for the purpose of conceptualizing equality. Because of IHL’s focus on individuals, whose agency is limited in war, only highly agential conduct (e.g. targeting civilians) makes a ‘difference’ under IHL. Meanwhile, outside IHL’s regulatory focus, the different causes of states’ participation in war are evened out as the ‘same’ structured positions occupied by different individuals, warranting their same treatment according to belligerent equality. On the other hand, because of IHRL’s focus on social structures, which heavily condition the individuals, structural arrangements make a ‘difference’ under IHRL. Outside IHRL’s regulatory focus, individuals’ different innate characteristics such as sexual characteristics are evened out as the ‘same’ agential quality of being human, warranting their same treatment according to sex equality. The article argues that the contestations about these equality principles find deeper roots in their divergent social ontological visions, the revelation of which can open up new spaces for dialogue on and inquiry into a common social world that grounds the legal conceptions of equality. (shrink)

In criminal proceedings, offenders are sentenced based on doctrines of culpability and punishment that theorize why they are guilty and why they should be punished. Throughout human history, these doctrines have largely been grounded in legal-policy constructions around retribution, safety, deterrence, and closure, mostly derived from folk psychology, natural philosophy, sociocultural expectations, public-order narratives, and common sense. On these premises, justice systems have long been designed to account for crimes and their underlying intent, with experience and probabilistic assumptions shaping theoretical (...) discourses on the nature of crimes and offenders’ punishability. As scientific discoveries, inventions, and methodologies progressively developed to refine such doctrines and displace long-held assumptions, criminal courtrooms have increasingly witnessed counsels and judges relying on scientific evidence to submit, dispute, or validate claims. For instance, over the last century, criminal courtrooms have selectively admitted neuroscientific models, exams, and insights claiming to revolutionize our understanding of who is culpable and deserving of punishment. Most recently, advancements in epigenetics have promised even more profound challenges to long-standing criminal law doctrines. This article examines the reasons reversibility and inheritability of epigenetic markers might warrant revising culpability and punishment and concludes that epigenetic findings are not yet robust enough to justify such revisions. (shrink)

While Latour criticises the tautologies of the ‘sociologists of the social’ as an intellectual shortcut, here sociology in the broadest sense is reconsidered as informed by unrecognised theological ideas, inter alia. Durkheim’s classic account of religion, wherein ‘society is God’ is taken as a starting point to explore the intersection of sociology and theology. Thereafter the article examines three social theorists, Elias, Giddens and Boltanski, each of whom attempt a re-casting of sociology, yet rearticulate theological models. In particular, this includes (...) an ontological conception of society, structure or system in terms of over-arching and invisible forces which is derived – inter alia – from religious models of divine will and providential order, which incorporates human choice – or agency in contemporary parlance. Accompanying this ontology is an epistemology of deciphering ‘deeper’ or ‘structural’ or ‘transcendent’ aspects of society by observing trends, cases or culture, akin to divining the providential will by observing its manifestations, which can be conducted in a more critical or forgiving manner. By examining these theological strands which persist in sociology, this aim is not to critically repudiate them, but to recognise the productive contribution of these models of thinking to imagining the ‘social’. (shrink)