Obgleich die Ausdrücke ‚moralische Pflicht’ und ‚moralische Verantwortung’ auf den ersten Blick nahezu austauschbar scheinen, ist in einigen Debatten dennoch fast ausschließlich von moralischer Verantwortung die Rede. Dies gilt insbesondere für die moralische Beurteilung von individuellen Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten. Hier scheint die Rede von einer ‚kollektiven Verantwortung‘ besonders attraktiv zu sein. In diesem Aufsatz setze ich mich diesem Trend entgegen und argumentiere dafür, dem Pflichtbegriff in kollektiven Kontexten gegenüber dem Begriff der Verantwortung den Vorrang zu geben. Mein Fokus liegt (...) hierbei auf einer bestimmten Art von Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten, nämlich auf Handlungen in sogenannten Aggregatkollektiven. Von Aggregatkollektiven verursachte Schäden sind häufig kumulative Schäden, bei denen die Handlungen der Mitglieder eines Aggregatkollektivs einzeln betrachtet keinen merklichen Unterschied für das Auftreten des Schadens machen. Die Rede von Verantwortung legt ein Haftbarkeitsmodell moralischer Verantwortung nahe, welches sich in Bezug auf Handlungen in Aggregatkollektiven als problematisch erweist. Ich zeige, dass Kants Konzeption unvollkommener Pflichten eine vielversprechende Alternative zu dem kausal gefärbten Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung darstellt. Durch den Spielraum, den unvollkommene Pflichten Akteuren lassen, bieten sie eine ähnliche Offenheit wie der Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung. Anders als die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung vermeidet die Rede von unvollkommenen Pflichten jedoch die in kollektiven Kontexten oft inadäquate und kontraproduktive Assoziation von Haftung und Schuld. (shrink)

Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the (...) other hand, which events we happen to preserve in memory very much depends on how we affectively reacted to them when they took place. Emotions are relevant to the nature and causation of memory in this and many other ways. Key issues regarding these relations are surveyed in § 2. (shrink)

The notions of “ideal theory” and “nonideal theory” have become widely accepted in political philosophy. Recently, several philosophers’ have urged that ideal theory systematically produces practically irrelevant theories. Such philosophers argue that political philosophy ought move away from ideal theory in order to make the discipline more germane to the unjust real world. Call this tactic of eliminating ideal theory “Strategy.” In this paper, I argue that political philosophy would do well to abandon the ideal/nonideal distinction. Though the use of (...) INID is widespread, philosophers do not have one uniform way of drawing the distinction; of the several common ways of drawing the distinction, none is categorical. As a consequence of this ambiguity, the role that INID plays in our political philosophical theorizing has become pernicious. (shrink)

Globalisation involves both promising potentials and risks. It has the potential – through the spread of human rights, the migration of people and ideas, and the integration of diverse economies – to improve human wellbeing and enhance the protection of human rights worldwide. But globalisation also incurs risks: global environmental risks (such as global warming), the creation of new centres of power with limited legitimacy, a ‘race to the bottom’ regarding workers’ safety and rights, risky journeys of thousands of migrants (...) and not least growing global inequalities. Globalisation, therefore, is a key factor for today’s discussions of justice. -/- As globalisation connects people, it also raises associated responsibilities between them. Until recently, the interest in justice among political philosophers and social ethicists was mainly focused on the nation state. However, this is no longer feasible. Since economic globalisation affects how wealth and power are distributed globally it has become indispensable to discuss social ethics in a global context and to develop principles of global justice. Global justice, therefore, entails an assessment of the benefits and burdens of the structural relations and institutional arrangements that constitute and govern globalisation. -/- The academic discussion of global justice is vibrant and expanding. In my introduction I provide an overview of the discussions on global poverty, justice, cosmopolitanism and statism, migration, the capability approach and different dimensions of global justice. (shrink)

Extreme poverty and tremendous inequality are an evil of our times, but do they constitute injustice? The article discusses different types of global moral obligations and criticizes those that 1) reject obligations of justice in a global context, 2)systematically prioritize special obligations, and 3) reduce the main obligations ofglobal justice to negative duties. Without necessarily defending global egalitarianism, it is possible to justify the redistribution of wealth in the world on the basis of a wide interpretation of the duty to (...) help and the right to survival. (shrink)

The 2008 housing and financial crisis brought to light many ethically questionable lending and borrowing practices. As we learn more about what caused this crisis, it has become apparent that we need to think more carefully about the conditions under which can loans be ethically offered and accepted, but also about when it might be morally permissible to default on debts. I critique two distinct philosophical approaches to assessing the ethics of debt, arguing that both approaches are too simplistic because (...) they focus only on individual borrowers and lenders. As a result, neither approach can adequately grasp the moral implications of the social and economic failures that frame actual dilemmas of debt facing many individuals today. (shrink)

This paper presents a reconstruction of and some constructive comments on Thomas Pogge’s conception of global justice. Using Imre Lakatos’s notion of a research program, the paper identifies Pogge’s “hard core” and “protective belt” claims regarding the scope of fundamental principles of justice, the object and structure of duties of global justice, the explanation of world poverty, and the appropriate reforms to the existing global order. The paper recommends some amendments to Pogge’s program in each of the four areas.

Este trabajo se propone defender una interpretación moderada de los argumentos de Thomas Pogge sobre justicia y pobreza globales, elaborados en su libro La pobreza en el mundo y los derechos humanos. Para esto, se analizará minuciosamente la reconstrucción que los críticos hacen de los argumentos de Pogge. Con esto, se espera poner de manifiesto que dicha reconstrucción se aleja en muchos casos de una interpretación mínimamente caritativa y malinterpreta los argumentos originales de este autor. Así, en este trabajo, se (...) defenderán una tesis principal y una subtesis. 1. Tesis principal. El deber negativo de no “cooperar en el mantenimiento de instituciones sociales injustas sin hacer una protección que compense y esfuerzos de reforma para sus víctimas” (en adelante, el “deber de no contribuir con la injusticia”) es menos exigente de lo que los críticos de Pogge afirman. Para defender esta tesis, se mostrará la relación entre el deber negativo de no contribuir con la injusticia y las obligaciones positivas de 1) proteger a las víctimas de un orden institucional injusto y de 2) trabajar para reformar los rasgos injustos de ese orden. Asimismo, se tratará de establecer cuáles son las implicancias prácticas de estas dos obligaciones positivas. 2. Subtesis. La violación del deber de no contribuir con la injusticia no convierte a los agentes morales en “violadores” de derechos humanos, tal como los críticos de Pogge sostienen, sino en “contribuyentes”. Para defender esta subtesis, se examinarán las críticas que se le formulan al autor con respecto a la falta de cumplimento del deber de no contribuir con la injusticia y se explicitarán las consecuencias del incumplimiento de este deber y de las dos obligaciones positivas mencionadas. El objetivo general de este trabajo es ofrecer una interpretación consistente de los principales argumentos de Pogge sobre justicia y pobreza globales que esclarezca los puntos incomprendidos o malinterpretados por sus críticos más importantes. Así, este trabajo constituye una contribución valiosa al campo de estudio, ya que, 1) sienta sobre bases más firmes una de las teorías filosóficas contemporáneas más citadas y ampliamente debatidas sobre justicia global y 2) facilita un verdadero intercambio de ideas entre filósofos, filósofas y otros expertos en el tema, mediante un real entendimiento de los argumentos poggeanos. (shrink)

Knowledge is one of the most important factors determining the development of global economy and overcoming the present existing inequalities. Humankind needs a fair distribution of the potential of knowledge because its big social problems and difficulties today are due to the existence of deep‐going differences in its possession and use. This paper is an attempt to analyze and present certain philosophical arguments and conceptions justifying cooperative decision‐making in the searching for fair distribution of the benefits of knowledge in the (...) globalized world. Made individually or collectively, these decisions do not worsen the status of anyone ‐ rather they can lead to the use of benefits of knowledge in the interest of all people. A fair distribution of resources and achievements of a knowledge‐based economy is of key importance for the future of humankind. There exist three significant roads to justification of cooperative decisionmaking in a global aspect. The main problem here is that of how to ensure equal access of all members of the global society to benefits of knowledge.In this paper are considered communitarianism, J. Habermas` theory of communicative action and public choice theories. The right to participate in activities of the knowledge society and to share in its wealth is related to the use of social and economic benefits. A distributive justice, including such right, could be based on communitarian political and moral values and principles. Any violation of such principles means existence of social injustice, with lasting consequences, including loss of access to natural goods, such as food and water. (shrink)

Modern democracy attempted to solve the dilemmas posed by opposing features from various traditions through two strategies: representation, which allowed it to incorporate citizens’ conflicting interests within a restricted collegiate group that permitted deliberation and agreement, on one side, and universal choice of representatives and governments for limited periods of time, on the other. Since the first decades of the 20th century, this notion of democracy within the framework of a republican constitution was opposed by another one that rejected all (...) forms of parliamentarianism, discussion and public deliberation in the name of a “democracy” based on the identity and homogeneity of a mass of people under the hegemonic leadership of a party, centered around the will and decisions of a managing elite and a charismatic leader, viewed as the sole representative of the people themselves. Both forms of democracy –strict and perverted – are being harassed by the powers unleashed by globalization and transnationalisation that are becoming alien oligarchies, opposed to the notion of citizenship and restrictive of its rights. In liberal parliamentary democracies the functional imperative issued by the financial sector is channeled through a crisis cabinet that assimilates demands and transforms them by managing an ever-changing budget whose aim is to add new sufferings to the bulk of the population that can only counteract through protest. Given the constitutional backdrop of these societies, with their deep democratic network, the gradual transformation of the European Union into a transnational arena fuelled by “a club of chiefs of state” has only made yet more patent the oligarchic turn of its post-crisis evolution. In plebiscite democracies the turn was operated through a sovereign entrenchment of the power of the oligarchy on the pretext of resistance to the pressure set by globalization. Since the onset of the 90s, Latin America as well as countries in Eastern Europe have witnessed a gradual turn toward what O’Donnell has termed “delegative democracies”, or neo-populism, according to other authors. These regimes are characterized by exalting a populist leader, upholding him as a savior who will gauge the needs and wishes of the mass of individuals without intermediaries, focusing mainly on those who feel excluded from the mainstream of institutionalized democracy. This ensures feedback to populist regimes supported by a hegemonic political party that lives on State resources and on the rampant corruption it protects in order to finance ‘clientelism’ among those excluded from the system by the policies of the State itself. (shrink)

Humanitarian emergencies and natural disasters can overwhelm the capacity of local and national agencies to respond to the needs of affected populations. In such cases, international relief organizations are frequently involved in the provision of emergency assistance. Health care professionals play a key role in these interventions. This practice environment is significantly different from the context of health care delivery in the home countries of expatriate health care professionals. Clinicians who travel from a developed nation to a resource-poor setting where (...) a humanitarian crisis has occurred experience a shift of professional, social, cultural and regulatory environments. In this dissertation I examine the ethics of health care practice in humanitarian work. I evaluate the literature of global bioethics, global health ethics and the ethics of humanitarian assistance, and consider the contributions of various ethics frameworks and normative approaches. I also develop a set of questions to guide health care professionals as they address ethically complex issues arising in clinical practice during humanitarian crises. In the empirical component of this research program I use Interpretive Description methodology to examine the moral experience of health care professionals in humanitarian relief work, and clinician experiences of resources and constraints for addressing ethical issues in humanitarian settings. Building upon the inductively derived findings, I argue for strategies and approaches that humanitarian organizations, project teams, and health care professionals can adopt to respond to the ethics of this field of practice. I also provide a critical review of Interpretive Description methodology. The research presented in this dissertation makes an important contribution to the ethical analysis of health care practice in humanitarian work. (shrink)

World economy has been doing well in recent decades even taking into account the current financial crisis. However, there are even more people suffering from poverty and related issues than earlier. I am going to discuss the issue of helping poor people in the context of ethics. In my thesis, I will firstly state the standard of absolute poverty, which will be the main focus in the remainder of the text. Then, I will present the argument given by a contemporary (...) philosopher, Peter Singer, that urges us to give money to the poor people. I will go through his argument and his analogy between saving a drowning child and giving out our money for charity on poverty relief. Many people may think his theory controversial and difficult to accept. Afterwards, I will present main arguments against Singer. I will assess these arguments and claim that some of them fail as criticisms of Singer’s central claims. However some do successfully point out the flaws of Singer’s argument, and some actually aim at questioning the entire discussion of poverty relief. I will try to present and assess the effectiveness of the alternative arguments by other philosophers that avoid these criticisms and that try to support the aid in a different way. The main question in my thesis in whether we have any moral obligation to help the poor people around the world. And if we have such duties, to what extent we are obliged to do so. I will do the literature review on different arguments and try to give my own opinions in different parts in my thesis. (shrink)

Today’s societies face the minorities that want recognition and respect for cultural differences. Kymlicka names it the challenge of multiculturalism. It is considered that identity and recognition problems have recently come to the fore because of a transformation in the perception of subject, truth, reason caused by postmodernism. Kymlicka claims that even if it is more difficult to live together today, it is not because of the so-called post-truth age. In his opinion, we have never reached absolute common grounds before, (...) either. So, it is not true that we cannot get common grounds by we do not believe metaphysical truths anymore. He already believes that a sense of justice does not count on the metaphysical truths, but it can be based on social identities and a sense of belonging. So, he thinks that an overlapping consensus is possible. However, I will defend a different perspective about pluralism and living together. I think that modus vivendi is an undeniable universal fact. For this reason, an overlapping consensus as a model of living together can only be possible domestically at the expense of a global modus vivendi. (shrink)

Thomas Pogge claims "that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor ... or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed." In other words, he claims that by upholding certain international arrangements we are violating our strong negative duties not to harm, and not just some positive duties to help. I (...) shall argue that even if Pogge were correct in claiming that certain rich states or at least the rich states collectively violate certain negative duties towards the poor and harm the poor, he is far too hasty in concluding that "we," the citizens of those states, are thus harming the global poor or violating our negative duties towards them. In fact, his conclusion can be shown to be wrong not least of all in the light of some of his own assumptions about collective responsibility, the enforceability of human rights, and terrorism. In addition, I will also argue that his view that we share responsibility for the acts of our political "representatives," who allegedly act "on our behalf," is unwarranted. (shrink)