Does epistemic justification aim at truth? The vast majority of epistemologists instinctively answer 'Yes'; it's the textbook response. Joseph Cruz and John Pollock surprisingly say no. In 'The Chimerical Appeal of Epistemic Externalism' they argue that justification bears no interesting connection to truth; justification does not even aim at truth. 'Truth is not a very interesting part of our best understanding' of justification (C&P 2004, 137); it has no 'connection to the truth.' A 'truth-aimed ... epistemology is not entitled to (...) carry the day' (C&P 2004, 138, emphasis added).Pollock and Cruz's argument for this surprising conclusion is of general interest for it is 'out of step with a very common view on the .. (shrink)

Pollock is developing, and testing computationally a theory of rationality. I endorse his claim that the structure of argument is not always linear, his replacement of the deductive-inductive distinction with a deductive-defeasible distinction, and hi s distinction between rebutting defeaters, and undercutting defeaters. I question the absence of pragmatic constraints in his acceptance rule, an absence which fits ill with his criterion of interruptibility, that it is reasonable to act on the conclusions drawn at any point. I also wonder about (...) building a model of a rational agent in which there is no place for interpersonal argumentative discussion. (shrink)