C.H. Waddington’s concepts of ‘chreods’ (canalized paths of development) and ‘homeorhesis’ (the tendency to return to a path), each associated with ‘morphogenetic fields’, were conceived by him as a contribution to complexity theory. Subsequent developments in complexity theory have largely ignored Waddington’s work and efforts to advance it. Waddington explained the development of the concept of chreod as the influence on his work of Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy, notably, the concept of concrescence as a self-causing process. Processes were recognized (...) as having their own dynamics, rather than being explicable through their components or external agents. Whitehead recognized the tendency to think only in terms of such ‘substances’ as a bias of European thought, claiming in his own philosophy ‘to approximate more to some strains of Indian, or Chinese, thought, than to western Asiatic, or European, thought.’ Significantly, the theoretical biologist who comes closest to advancing Waddington’s research program, also marginalized, is Mae-Wan Ho. Noting this bias, and embracing Whitehead’s and Waddington’s efforts to free biology from assumptions dominating Western thought to advance an ontology of creative causal processes, I will show how later developments of complexity theory, most importantly, Goodwin’s work on oscillations, temporality and morphogenesis, Vitiello’s dissipative quantum brain dynamics, Salthe’s work on hierarchy theory, biosemiotics inspired by Peirce and von Uexküll, Robert Rosen’s work on anticipatory systems, together with category theory and biomathics, can augment while being augmented by Waddington’s work, while further advancing Mae-Wan Ho’s radical research program with its quest to understand the reality of consciousness. (shrink)

The purposes of this paper are twofold: first, I wish to correct a systematic bias in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. This bias is in favor of intuition of essences of meaning and against the intuition of essences of sensation. This bias is explained as a product of Husserl's mind-body dualism. Second, I suggest the possibility of a neurophenomenology from a biogenetic structural point of view. This neurophenomenology merges the knowledge of essences derived from mature contemplation with knowledge of the structures of (...) experience derived from neuroanthropology. After addressing these two issues I proceed to describe the sensorium from a neurophenomenological perspective, and the constituent element of perception, the dot. I hypothesize fat experience arises in the dialogue between prefrontal cortical processes and sensorial processes, that experience is constituted within a field of sensorial dots that arise and dissolve in temporal frames. I conclude that Husserl's view of the phenomenology of time is essentially correct and is both in keeping with findings from current neurophysiology, and amenable to a modem scientific view of consciousness and to many of the religious traditions encountered by ethnographers. The implications of a neurophenomenology for the anthropological study of consciousness are suggested. (shrink)

The usage of social media in education is increasing as a result of perceived pedagogical benefits. The literature emphasizes the importance of teachers continuing to build their social media capabilities, experiences, and values. Critical thinking, problem-solving, and the ability to contextualize social media require intellectual, social, and ethical talents regardless of operational proficiency. We performed a semi-structured interview with 13 high school teachers who expressed their thoughts and experiences using social media in the classroom. The interviews’ recorded videos were transcribed (...) into text and coded inductively and deductively for analysis. The study’s findings agreed with a proposed conceptual framework that claims that regular interactions with social media enable teachers to better understand and teach with it. The paper presents a framework to assist education facilitators, educational technologists, teachers, and other affiliated agencies in refocusing their efforts on technology-assisted context training. It also emphasizes the significance of engaging with technology regularly. (shrink)

In the aftermath of the modern science world scientists are still searching for some kind of ontological and epistemological common ground. In this paper I try to show that we, by the aid of Michael Polanyi’s concepts of knowledge, of personal as well as objective knowledge, and his descriptions of the tacit dimensions in the process of knowing, can take some substantial steps toward a better understanding of the contemporary scientific conduct.

La concepción de la tecnología como ciencia aplicada constituyó, desde mediados del siglo XX, la visión hegemónica respecto a la cuestión del conocimiento tecnológico. Si bien, a partir de la década de 1970, han surgido propuestas alternativas a este planteamiento más clásico, aún no se ha estudiado con suficiente profundidad la naturaleza del conocimiento requerido para diseñar y producir bioartefactos. Este artículo trata el problema del conocimiento tecnológico con el objetivo de proponer una caracterización epistemológica general de la biotecnología. Los (...) resultados muestran que el conocimiento biotecnológico está constituido por diferentes tipos de conocimiento que incorporan, por una parte, un contenido prescriptivo y, en alguna medida, tácito y, por otra, un conocimiento representacional que no viene necesariamente proporcionado por la investigación de las ciencias naturales. Se concluye que el análisis del conocimiento prescriptivo de la biotecnología que no se limita a un conjunto de reglas tecnológicas, su carácter tácito fundamental en contextos de innovación en el diseño y el conocimiento representacional que pueda proceder de la investigación de los propios biotecnólogos hace posible una caracterización de la naturaleza del conocimiento biotecnológico que sobrepasa la concepción estándar de la tecnología como ciencia aplicada. (shrink)

The purposes of this paper are twofold: first, I wish to correct a systematic bias in Husserlian transcendental phenomenology. This bias is in favor of intuition of essences of meaning and against the intuition of essences of sensation. This bias is explained as a product of Husserl's mind-body dualism. Second, I suggest the possibility of a neurophenomenology from a biogenetic structural point of view. This neurophenomenology merges the knowledge of essences derived from mature contemplation with knowledge of the structures of (...) experience derived from neuroanthropology. After addressing these two issues I proceed to describe the sensorium from a neurophenomenological perspective, and the constituent element of perception, the dot. I hypothesize fat experience arises in the dialogue between prefrontal cortical processes and sensorial processes, that experience is constituted within a field of sensorial dots that arise and dissolve in temporal frames. I conclude that Husserl's view of the phenomenology of time is essentially correct and is both in keeping with findings from current neurophysiology, and amenable to a modem scientific view of consciousness and to many of the religious traditions encountered by ethnographers. The implications of a neurophenomenology for the anthropological study of consciousness are suggested. (shrink)