This paper offers a novel interpretation of Hans Jonas’ analysis of metabolism, the centrepiece of Jonas’ philosophy of organism, in relation to recent controversies regarding the phenomenological dimension of life-mind continuity as understood within ‘autopoietic’ enactivism (AE). Jonas’ philosophy of organism chiefly inspired AE’s development of what we might call ‘the phenomenological life-mind continuity thesis’ (PLMCT), the claim that certain phenomenological features of human experience are central to a proper scientific understanding of both life and mind, and as such central (...) features of all living organisms. After discussing the understanding of PLMCT within AE, and recent criticisms thereof, I develop a reading of Jonas’ analysis of metabolism, in light of previous commentators, which emphasizes its systematicity and transcendental flavour. The central thought is that, for Jonas, the attribution of certain phenomenological features is a necessary precondition for our understanding of the possibility of metabolism, rather than being derivable from metabolism itself. I argue that my interpretation strengthens Jonas’ contribution to AE’s justification for ascribing certain phenomenological features to life across the board. However, it also emphasises the need to complement Jonas’ analysis with an explanatory account of organic identity in order to vindicate these phenomenological ascriptions in a scientific context. (shrink)

This article discusses Hans Jonas’ argument for teleology in living organisms, in light of recently raised concerns over enactivism’s “Jonasian turn.” Drawing on textual resources rarely discussed in contemporary enactivist literature on Jonas’ philosophy, we reconstruct five core ideas of his thinking: 1) That natural science’s rejection of teleology is methodological rather than ontological, and thus not a proof of its non-existence; 2) that denial of the reality of teleology amounts to a performative self-contradiction; 3) that the fact of evolution (...) makes it implausible that only humans actualize purpose; 4) that the concept of metabolism delimits and gestures towards beings performing purposive activity; and 5) that concrete encounters with living organisms are indispensable for the judgment that they are purposive. Lastly, we draw attention to how Jonas’ understanding of teleology and inwardness in nonhuman life in terms of degrees of identity with human life poses a problem for his view. In this way, we hope to clarify what Jonas, as an important source of inspiration for the enactivist project, is proposing. (shrink)

La fenomenología de la vida de Hans Jonas aúna su posición ontológica y ética. En ella, usa el concepto de libertad dialéctica como base fenomenológica para superar el dualismo cartesiano, estableciendo una continuación ontológica entre los seres-vivos, resignificando la experiencia corpórea de la vida. El presente trabajo sugiere que esta interpretación termina por recaer en una historia metafísica de la libertad que encumbra ontológicamente al ser-humano. Para evitarlo, se propone un nuevo desarrollo de la libertad para alcanzar una alternativa ontológica (...) que se funde en la consustancialidad de la experiencia corpórea y la consiguiente imposibilidad de una gradación ontológica. (shrink)

Pretende-se nesse artigo apresentar as linhas gerais do que seria a filosofia da vida desenvolvida por Hans Jonas a partir da sua obra The Phenomenon of Life, de 1966. Para tanto, recuperar-se-á os elementos ontológicos, biológicos e fenomenológicos para promover uma análise que parta da crítica jonasiana à interpretação tradicional da vida no âmbito filosófico e científico, à qual se opõe a sua revolução ontológica, baseada na concepção de um monismo integral. A partir daí, analisar-se-á o conceito de unidade psicofísica (...) e de liberdade como fio condutor dessa interpretação, que alcança a recuperação da teleologia como ação autoafirmativa da própria vida. (shrink)