Straipsnio tikslas atkreipti dėmesį į Thomo S. Kuhno paradigmos sąvokos daugiaprasmiškumą jo knygoje Mokslo revoliucijų struktūra bei įvertinti T. S. Kuhno komentatorės Margaret Masterman išdėstytą paradigmų klasifikaciją. Ji išskiria tris šios sąvokos aspektus: sociologinį, konstrukcinį ir metafizinį. Mokslo revoliucijų struktūroje M. Masterman įžvelgia bent 21 skirtingą šios sąvokos formuluotę. Dėl tokio sąvokos neapibrėžtumo daug kritikų koncentravosi tik ties metafiziniais aspektais. Šiame straipsnyje išdėstoma pirminė T. S. Kuhno formuluotė, jos išsklaida M. Masterman klasifikacijoje ir konstrukcinės paradigmos sukuriama galimybė naujai aiškinti mokslo (...) kilmę. (shrink)

Championed by Whitehead (1979), a process metaphysics has been forwarded as one way of conceptualizing the fundamental nature of our existence. On an applied level, we might use the notion of process within the framework of scientific method to advance our knowledge of how we might take steps to create particular outcomes or states that we desire within organizations. We discuss both forward and backward looking approaches to developing process theory. Ultimately, though, in this paper, we present discussion of the (...) limits of Mohr’s (1982) conceptualization of process theory and show (1) how his discussion focuses on a subset or limited view of process (and would render invisible other alternatives) and (2) how such limitation of view retards the accumulation of knowledge regarding individuals and organizations as a storehouse of process approaches toward achieving specified results. (shrink)

Strengths of Mealey's target article are its implementation of results from game-theoretic analyses and its potential links with other formal developments. In recent dynamic decision/choice models, reduced salience of avoidance tendencies, said to typify primary sociopaths, has quantifiable consequences for response latencies and choices. Also, formal models of stress effects on information processing predict selected effects of hypoarousability.

ABSTRACTWhile conspiracies have always been with us, conspiracy theories are more recent arrivals. The framing of conspiracy theories as rooted in erroneous or delusional belief in conspiracies is characteristic of “positive” approaches to the topic, which focus on identifying the causes and cures of conspiracy theories. “Critical” approaches, by contrast, focus on the historical and cultural construction of the concept of conspiracy theory itself. This issue presents a range of essays that cut across these two broad approaches, and reflect on (...) the problematic relationship between conspiracy theory and democratic politics. (shrink)

Some of the early‐modern changes in the social framing of science, while often believed to be essential, are shown to be contingent. They contribute to the flawed public narrative around science today, and especially to the misconceptions around science and religion. Four are examined in detail, each of which contributes to the demise of the contemplative stance that science both requires and offers. They are: (1) a turn from an immersed subject to the pretense of a pure objectivity, (2) a (...) turn from imagination as a legitimate pathway to knowledge, (3) a turn from shared and participative science to a restricted professionalism, and (4) an overprosaic reading of the metaphor of the “Book of Nature.” All four, but especially the imperative to consider reading nature as poetry, and a deeper examination of the entanglements between poetry and theoretical science, draw unavoidably on theological ideas, and contribute to a developing “theology of science.”. (shrink)

The revival of action based explanations as well as their formal structuring have been two of the most important topics within explanatory sociology since the 1980s. The two newly developed approaches, being structural individualism and analytical sociology based on mechanism models, will be outlined in this article. The article is dedicated to a comparison of the aims and the formal structure of both approaches. It is shown that explanations within analytical sociology tend to be more realistic but also more complex. (...) They do not differentiate between micro and macro levels in analytical terms and use micro mechanisms instead of an analytically strong action theory that makes it difficult to systemize mechanism models. On the other hand, structural individualistic explanations that use a general action law from which social interdependencies are to be interpreted as an opportunity structure can formulate a default-option from which models can be expanded and also worked out to mechanism types. (shrink)

This paper addresses the general problem of how to rationally choose an algorithm for phylogenetic inference. Specifically, the controversy between maximum likelihood (ML) and maximum parsimony (MP) perspectives is reframed within the philosophical issue of theory choice. A Kuhnian approach in which rationality is bounded and value-laden is offered and construed through the notion of a Style of Modeling. A Style is divided into four stages: collecting remnant models, constructing models of taxonomical identity, implementing modeling algorithms, and finally inferring and (...) confirming evolutionary trees or cladograms. The identification and investigation of styles is useful for exploring sociological and epistemological issues such as individuating scientific communities and assessing the rationality of algorithm choice. Regarding the last point, this paper suggests that the values motivating ML and MP perspectives are justified but only contextually; these algorithms also have normative force because they can be therapeutic by allowing us to rationally choose among several competing trees, nonetheless this force is limited and cannot be used in order to decide the controversy tout court. (shrink)

Evolutionary analysis suggests that policies based on deterrence may cope effectively with primary sociopathy if the threat of punishment fits the crime in the cost/benefit calculus of the sociopath, not that of the public. On the other hand, policies designed to offset serious disadvantage in social competition may help inhibit the development of secondary sociopathy, rather than deter its expression.

Jim Mackenzie; Authority, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 57–65, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9752.1988.tb00177.x.

The purpose of this article is to explore the relationship between the thought of Richard Rorty and that of his former teacher, Charles Hartshorne. There are important similarities between the two, but ultimately the differences are more readily apparent, especially in terms of the battle between poetry (in the wide sense of the term conceived by Rorty) and (Hartshornian) metaphysics. Hartshorne is defended against Rorty.

Let me discuss first the principal points raised in the extensive commentaries from the three invited respondents. I shall next turn to the other shorter comments in the second part of this respons...

In this paper I take Hempel’s raven paradox as the claim that statements of the form ‘∼Ru v Bu’, ‘u is not a raven or u is black,’ confirm the hypothesis h ‘(x)(Rx → Bx)’, ‘All ravens are black.’ Although Hempel discusses this using a criterion of confirmation expressed wholly in terms of deductive logic (see 1965, pp. 35-9), it has become more common to articulate criteria of confirmation using concepts of probability and, in particular, to employ the positive relevance (...) criterion of confirmation which says that, given background knowledge k, (i) e confirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)>P(h/k); (ii) e disconfirms h if and only if P(h/e.k)shrink)

Im Gegensatz zur verbreiteten Auffassung über die Voraussetzungen zur Ausbildung neuen Wissens entstehen wichtige Umstellungen im Denken häufig nicht durch harte Konfrontation zwischen Hypothesen bzw. Theorien. Vielmehr sind oft allmähliche Deutungsverschiebungen bei der Auffassung einer einzigen Hypothese bzw. Theorie zu beobachten. Derartige Prozesse erstrecken sich in der Regel über vergleichsweise lange Zeiträume und sind nicht wie die erstgenannten Vorgänge von eher kurzfristiger Natur. Verglichen mit dem Ausgangspunkt der jeweiligen Entwicklung tritt uns aber eine oft an ihrem Ende tiefgreifend veränderte Wissenssituation (...) entgegen. Infolge der Langsamkeit der geschilderten Entwicklungen und der damit zugleich gegebenen Gewöhnung ihrer Vertreter an die geänderte Situation sind derartige Veränderungen des Wissens selten in einem Ausmaß vom Bewußtsein der Neuheit begleitet, wie dies bei Vorgängen der zuerst geschilderten Art der Fall ist. Trotzdem können aber gerade diese Veränderungen nachhaltiger und von grundlegenderer Art sein als jene. In der Folge sollen die beiden angedeuteten Wege der Erkenntnis hinsichtlich ihres strukturellen Unterschieds klarer erfaßt werden. Unterschiedliche Annahmen über die zugrundeliegende Ontologie sind für diese beiden Arten der Wissensbildung von besonderem Interesse. Insbesondere wird sich auch zeigen, daß die bereits in der Fristfrage berührten pragmatischen Gesichtspunkte eine wichtige Rolle spielen. Die beiden in dieser Untersuchung herauspräparierten "Wege" sind Aspekte jeweils eines Erkenntnisprozesses. So sind sie nicht gegeneinander auszuspielen. Vielmehr weist jeder derartige Vorgang Charakteristika beider modellhaft erfaßten Typen auf. (shrink)

This essay discusses critically the ways in which different metaphors employed to illustrate the practices of knowledge production and knowledge acquisition as well as scientific and scholarly research shape our understanding of the academic form of life. The essay examines the metaphors of knowledge and their role in academia by means of philosophical analysis and a rhetorical analysis of language, thereby defending the core values of academic freedom. It focuses on two pairs of metaphors highly relevant to the tensions characteristic (...) of contemporary academic work: verticality and horizontality, on the one hand, and change and stability, on the other. The entanglement of perspectives from philosophy and historical rhetoric serves a metaphilosophical goal here: to show that our philosophical understanding of the nature of inquiry will be considerably enhanced if we seriously, and with both historical and literary sensibilities, study the metaphors we use in characterizing our epistemic and cognitive projects. (shrink)

Although serotonin, testosterone, and genes contribute to sociopathy, the relationships are probably indirect and subject to modifiers (e.g., present only under certain conditions of rearing and temperament). Age at menarche may be a marker variable as well as a causal factor. Since the genders differ in all four areas, sex differences in sociopathy represent a very complex interaction of these factors.

Mealey's work has several interesting implications: It refutes the charge that sociobiology paints a cynical portrait of human nature and adopts a one-sided reductionism; it exemplifies a general theoretical scheme for constructing evolutionary biopsychosocial models of human behavior; and it has the practical effect of promoting and informing early intervention in children at risk for psychopathic disorder.

Recent debates about the values and virtues of the sciences have been marked by philosophical errors and misunderstandings among both the supporters and the critics of the value of science. Some authors, such as Wilson defending the ultimate value of science and Appleyard decrying the influence of scientific modes of thinking, both assume the positivistic stance to understanding science. Others, such as Dawkins, Maddox and Wolpert, come through as scientific realists, celebrating the power of science to reach beyond what can (...) be perceived. Yet all three neglect the role of instruments and apparatus and miss the importance of the part that social forces play in the creation of belief. Finally Maddox slips into assuming that the only truly scientific approach to understanding human life scientifically is to follow the pattern of realism and model making as it is exemplified in the physical sciences. Psychology can be scientific without being reductionist. (shrink)

What has science actually achieved? A theory of achievement should define what has been achieved, describe the means or methods used in science, and explain how such methods lead to such achievements. Predictive accuracy is one truth-related achievement of science, and there is an explanation of why common scientific practices tend to increase predictive accuracy. Akaike's explanation for the success of AIC is limited to interpolative predictive accuracy. But therein lies the strength of the general framework, for it also provides (...) a clear formulation of many open problems of research. (shrink)

Perhaps no technological innovation has so dominated the second half of the twentieth century as has the introduction of the programmable computer. It is quite difficult if not impossible to imagine how contemporary affairs—in business and science, communications and transportation, governmental and military activities, for example—could be conducted without the use of computing machines, whose principal contribution has been to relieve us of the necessity for certain kinds of mental exertion. The computer revolution has reduced our mental labors by means (...) of these machines, just as the Industrial Revolution reduced our physical labor by means of other machines. (shrink)