Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Survey article. Verisimilitude: the third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.
    The modern history of verisimilitude can be divided into three periods. The first began in 1960, when Karl Popper proposed his qualitative definition of what it is for one theory to be more truthlike than another theory, and lasted until 1974, when David Miller and Pavel Trichý published their refutation of Popper's definition. The second period started immediately with the attempt to explicate truthlikeness by means of relations of similarity or resemblance between states of affairs (or their linguistic representations); the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   46 citations  
  • Verisimilitude: The third period.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1):1-29.
    The modern history of verisimilitude can be divided into three periods. The first began in 1960, when Karl Popper proposed his qualitative definition of what it is for one theory to be more truthlike than another theory, and lasted until 1974, when David Miller and Pavel Trich published their refutation of Popper's definition. The second period started immediately with the attempt to explicate truthlikeness by means of relations of similarity or resemblance between states of affairs (or their linguistic representations); the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   93 citations  
  • The Virtues of Pursuit-Worthy Speculation: The Promises of Cosmic Inflation.William J. Wolf & Patrick M. Duerr - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Verisimilitude Framework for Inductive Inference, with an Application to Phylogenetics.Olav B. Vassend - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1359-1383.
    Bayesianism and likelihoodism are two of the most important frameworks philosophers of science use to analyse scientific methodology. However, both frameworks face a serious objection: much scientific inquiry takes place in highly idealized frameworks where all the hypotheses are known to be false. Yet, both Bayesianism and likelihoodism seem to be based on the assumption that the goal of scientific inquiry is always truth rather than closeness to the truth. Here, I argue in favour of a verisimilitude framework for inductive (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):139--159.
    According to influential accounts of scientific method, such as critical rationalism, scientific knowledge grows by repeatedly testing our best hypotheses. But despite the popularity of hypothesis tests in statistical inference and science in general, their philosophical foundations remain shaky. In particular, the interpretation of non-significant results—those that do not reject the tested hypothesis—poses a major philosophical challenge. To what extent do they corroborate the tested hypothesis, or provide a reason to accept it? Popper sought for measures of corroboration that could (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Popper’s Shifting Appraisal of Evolutionary Theory.Elliott Sober & Mehmet Elgin - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):31-55.
    Karl Popper argued in 1974 that evolutionary theory contains no testable laws and is therefore a metaphysical research program. Four years later, he said that he had changed his mind. Here we seek to understand Popper’s initial position and his subsequent retraction. We argue, contrary to Popper’s own assessment, that he did not change his mind at all about the substance of his original claim. We also explore how Popper’s views have ramifications for contemporary discussion of the nature of laws (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Probabilistic support, probabilistic induction and bayesian confirmation theory.Andres Rivadulla - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):477-483.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • The Critique of Social Reason in the Popper-Adorno Debate.Iaan Reynolds - 2023 - History of the Human Sciences 36 (3-4):260-282.
    This paper examines the differences and affinities between Karl Popper’s critical rationalism and Theodor Adorno’s critical theory through renewed attention to the original documents of their 1961 debate. While commentaries often describe the Popper-Adorno encounter as a theoretical disappointment, I reveal a confrontation between conceptually opposed programs of social research. Though both theorists are committed to critique as a political and epistemological struggle for human freedom, their conceptions of this struggle are starkly different. In the original seminar papers, we find (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Une antinomie dans l'épistémologie de K. Popper.Erik Oger - 1983 - Bijdragen 44 (4):415-427.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Induction before Hume.J. R. Milton - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):49-74.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Epistemic Justification and Methodological Luck in Inflationary Cosmology.C. D. McCoy - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1003-1028.
    I present a recent historical case from cosmology—the story of inflationary cosmology—and on its basis argue that solving explanatory problems is a reliable method for making progress in science. In particular, I claim that the success of inflationary theory at solving its predecessor’s explanatory problems justified the theory epistemically, even in advance of the development of novel predictions from the theory and the later confirmation of those predictions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Understanding induction.John Macnamara - 1991 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 42 (1):21-48.
    The paper offers a new understanding of induction in the empirical sciences, one which assimilates it to induction in geometry rather than to statistical inference. To make the point a system of notions, essential to logically sound induction, is defined. Notable among them are arbitrary object and particular property. A second aim of the paper is to bring to light a largely neglected set of assumptions shared by both induction and deduction in the empirical sciences. This is made possible by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Against Reflexivity as an Academic Virtue and Source of Privileged Knowledge.Michael Lynch - 2000 - Theory, Culture and Society 17 (3):26-54.
    Reflexivity is a well-established theoretical and methodological concept in the human sciences, and yet it is used in a confusing variety of ways. The meaning of `reflexivity' and the virtues ascribed to the concept are relative to particular theoretical and methodological commitments. This article examines several versions of the concept, and critically focuses on treatments of reflexivity as a mark of distinction or source of methodological advantage. Although reflexivity often is associated with radical epistemologies, social scientists with more conventional leanings (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Philosophy of science: From justification to explanation.Aharon Kantorovich - 1988 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (4):469-494.
    The paper investigates the implications of a nonaprioristic philosophy of science. It starts by developing a scheme of justification which draws its norms from the prevailing paradigm of rationality, which need not be universal or external. If the requirement for normativity is then abandoned we do not end up with a descriptive philosophy of science. The alternative to a prescriptive philosophy of science is a theoretical explanation of scientific decisions and acts. Explanation, rather than mere description, replaces justification; and the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • One Theory to Fit them All: The Search Hypothesis of Emotion Revisited.Yaniv Hanoch - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):135-145.
    In a recent paper, Dylan Evans proposed that emotions could help solve what has been known as ‘the frame problem’. In the process, he first questioned the utility of using the frame problem as a framework. After tackling this issue, he provided an alternative terminology to the frame problem—termed ‘the search hypothesis of emotion’—in order to re-examine how emotions aid rational agents. His new terminology, however, opens itself to other critiques. While accepting the basic tenets of his analysis, I question (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Refutable Anthropology and Falsified Science.Georges Guille-Escuret & Juliet Vale - 1999 - Diogenes 47 (188):3-15.
    Is anthropology a science? To put the question today amounts to a reply in the negative. The representatives of the ‘true’ sciences are not alone in suggesting a conjunctural or crippling lacuna which would preclude membership by right of the prestigious world, which, however, the name ‘humanistic sciences’ seems to demand. We should remember that some years ago Claude Lévi-Strauss caused a shudder to run through his discipline by describing it as a ‘flattering imposture’. Since then denigration has spread constantly, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Truthlikeness for Quantitative Deterministic Laws.Alfonso García-Lapeña - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (3):649-679.
    Truthlikeness is a property of a theory or a proposition that represents its closeness to the truth. According to Niiniluoto, truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws can be defined by the Minkowski metric. I present some counterexamples to the definition and argue that it fails because it considers truthlikeness for quantitative deterministic laws to be just a function of accuracy, but an accurate law can be wrong about the actual ‘structure’ or ‘behaviour’ of the system it intends to describe. I develop (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Research Problems.Steve Elliott - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1013-1037.
    To identify and conceptualize research problems in science, philosophers and often scientists rely on classical accounts of problems that focus on intellectual problems defined in relation to theories. Recently, philosophers have begun to study the structures and functions of research problems not defined in relation to theories. Furthermore, scientists have long pursued research problems often labeled as practical or applied. As yet, no account of problems specifies the description of both so-called intellectual problems and so-called applied problems. This article proposes (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Popper: Critical Rationalist, Conventionalist, and Virtue Epistemologist.Patrick M. Duerr - 2023 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 13 (1):54-90.
    This article revisits Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology with respect to three tasks. The first is to illuminate and systematize Popper’s methodological views in light of his core epistemological commitments. A second and related objective is to gauge which aspects of falsificationism should be identified as “conventionalist”—a label that Popper himself uses (albeit with qualifications) but that is compromised by and, thus, stands in need of elucidation because of Popper’s idiosyncratic understanding of conventionalism. Third, by elaborating Popper’s virtue-epistemological, dialogical model of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Falsificationist Account of Artificial Neural Networks.Oliver Buchholz & Eric Raidl - forthcoming - The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Machine learning operates at the intersection of statistics and computer science. This raises the question as to its underlying methodology. While much emphasis has been put on the close link between the process of learning from data and induction, the falsificationist component of machine learning has received minor attention. In this paper, we argue that the idea of falsification is central to the methodology of machine learning. It is commonly thought that machine learning algorithms infer general prediction rules from past (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • De L’utilité Des Choix En Matiere Juridique: Guillaume Tusseau: Les normes d’habilitation , 813 p, ISBN 2-247-06632-1.Malik Bozzo-Rey - 2008 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 21 (1):97-101.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Understanding the Replication Crisis as a Base Rate Fallacy.Alexander Bird - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):965-993.
    The replication (replicability, reproducibility) crisis in social psychology and clinical medicine arises from the fact that many apparently well-confirmed experimental results are subsequently overturned by studies that aim to replicate the original study. The culprit is widely held to be poor science: questionable research practices, failure to publish negative results, bad incentives, and even fraud. In this article I argue that the high rate of failed replications is consistent with high-quality science. We would expect this outcome if the field of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Falsification, the Duhem-Quine Thesis, and Scientific Realism: From a Phenomenological Point of View.Darrin W. Belousek - 1998 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 29 (2):145-161.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • From Past to Present: The Deep History of Kinship.Dwight Read - 2019 - In Integrating Qualitative and Social Science Factors in Archaeological Modelling. Cham: pp. 137-162.
    The term “deep history” refers to historical accounts framed temporally not by the advent of a written record but by evolutionary events (Smail 2008; Shryock and Smail 2011). The presumption of deep history is that the events of today have a history that traces back beyond written history to events in the evolutionary past. For human kinship, though, even forming a history of kinship, let alone a deep history, remains problematic, given limited, relevant data (Trautman et al. 2011). With regard (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations