The purpose of this contribution is to examine the current state of the de Broglie-Bohm theory (dBB) in light of Bohm’s vision as he explicitly set it out in his book Quantum theory [In Bohm, D., Quantum theory, Courier corporation, (1961b)]. In particular, two programmes that differ in many crucial respects are currently being pursued. On the one hand, the Bohmian mechanics school, founded by Dürr Goldstein and Zanghì, considers the theory to be Galilean invariant, regards particles’ motion as determined (...) by a nomological entity, the universal wave function, upholds the quantum equilibrium hypothesis and explains probabilities in terms of typicality. On the other hand, the Pilot-wave school advocated by Valentini considers the theory to be based on Aristotelian dynamics, regards the wave function as a physical field displaying a contingent nature, and explains quantum equilibrium as the result of a process of relaxation from quantum non-equilibrium. Looking at Bohm’s work [In Bohm, D., Quantum theory, Courier corporation, (1961b)], it is clear that his intention was to construct a theory that was empirically different from standard quantum mechanics, so that it would be testable and falsifiable. Only this way could he defend dBB from the criticism that accused the theory of being 'metaphysical'. These methodological concerns about the falsifiability of the theory constitute, in my opinion, a strong reason for regarding Valentini's programme as methodologically valuable, even if it might turn out to be wrong. Indeed, the programme of the Pilot-wave school aims to be falsifiable with respect to standard quantum mechanics and can in principle defend the empirical status of particle trajectories. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the case of Einstein׳s special relativity vs. Hendrik Lorentz׳s ether theory can be decided in terms of empirical evidence, in spite of the predictive equivalence between the theories. In the historical and philosophical literature this case has been typically addressed focusing on non-empirical features. I claim that non-empirical features are not enough to provide a fully objective and uniquely determined choice in instances of empirical equivalence. However, I argue that if we consider arguments proposed (...) by Richard Boyd, and by Larry Laudan and Jarret Leplin, a choice based on non-entailed empirical evidence favoring Einstein׳s theory can be made. (shrink)

In der vorliegenden Arbeit wird über die verschiedenen Aspekte der sogenannten FitzGerald-Lorentz-Kontraktion berichtet. Nach einem kurzen Abriß der Entwicklung der Ätherkonzeption wird eine Beschreibung des Michelson-Morley Versuchs gegeben und seine Rolle in der Entstehungsgeschichte der speziellen Relativitätstheorie diskutiert. Anschließend wird die Kontraktionshypothese vorgestellt und die Frage erörtert, ob die Kontraktion „wirklich“ oder nur „scheinbar“ ist. Einige Gedankenexperimente werden vorgestellt, die zeigen, daß die Kontraktion bewegter Körper kein bloßer Schein ist. Ferner wird die noch bei Einstein unklare Beantwortung nach der Frage (...) der Sichtbarkeit der Längenkontraktion durch die Analyse der Begriffe „Beobachten“ und „Sehen“ aufgehellt. Abschließend wird auf die Frage nach der Falsifizierbarkeit der Kontraktionshypothese eingegangen, die von Popper aufgeworfen wurde. (shrink)