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The Demarcation between Science and Metaphysics

In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. La Salle, Ill.,: Open Court. pp. 183–226 (1963)

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  1. Institutions as a Philosophical Problem: A Critical Rationalist Perspective on Guala’s “Understanding Institutions” and His Critics.Joseph Agassi & Ian Jarvie - 2019 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 49 (1):42-63.
    The symposium on Francesco Guala’s Understanding Institutions was thought provoking. Five critical papers took issue with Guala’s reconciliation of the game-theoretical view of institutions and the rule-governed view. We offer some critical commentary that adopts a different perspective. We agree that institutions are central to social life and, thus, also to the social sciences; they are also prior to and more fundamental than individuals. We add some historical points on the ways previous philosophers thought about institutions, and we come at (...)
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  • Conventions in the aufbau.Thomas E. Uebel - 1996 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4 (2):381 – 397.
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  • Inductivism and falsificationism reconcilable.Herman Vetter - 1971 - Synthese 23 (2-3):226 - 233.
    Inductivism is understood as the explication of the degree of confirmation as conditional logical probability. Inductivism is not recommendable in the form of Carnap's λ-system, but tenable in the form of Bayesianism. Objections directed at it are either irrelevant or can be taken account of within Bayesianism.
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  • Rational reconstruction as elucidation? Carnap in the early protocol sentence debate.Thomas E. Uebel - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):107 - 140.
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  • Notes on probability and induction.Rudolf Carnap - 1973 - Synthese 25 (3-4):269 - 298.
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  • “A Kind of Metaphysician”: Arne Naess from Logical Empiricism to Ecophilosophy.Thomas Uebel - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (1):78-109.
    ABSTRACT Arne Naess once called himself ?a kind of metaphysician?: did or did he not therewith turn his back on his philosophical mentors in the Vienna Circle? To try to determine the meaning of this self-ascription, this paper first considers in detail two works in which his disagreements with the philosophers of the Vienna Circle found their clearest and most detailed expression. Concentrating on Carnap it will be argued that while some of Naess's criticisms cannot be taken as authoritative, he (...)
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  • Review: Stegmüller on the Relationship between Theory and Experience. [REVIEW]Joseph J. Kockelmans - 1972 - Philosophy of Science 39 (3):397 - 420.
    Stegmüller's most recent publication, Theorie und Erfahrung, is the second of four volumes of a work which appears under the general title Probleme und Resultate der Wissenschaftstheorie und analytische Philosophie,. In this voluminous and daring work the author intends to deliver a systematic, critical account of the most important literature which has appeared on various basic topics of philosophy of science and its underlying assumptions over the past twenty-five years. The work promises to become a classic in the German language (...)
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  • Pseudosentences, Auto-Misunderstanding, and Formalization.Moritz Cordes - 2022 - In Michael Nathan Goldberg, Andreas Mauz & Christiane Tietz (eds.), Missverstehen -- Zu einer Urszene der Hermeneutik. Brill | Schöningh. pp. 45-69.
    In the early Analytic Philosophy, the concept of a pseudosentence was used as a polemical device. To try and formalize a sentence without success was a means to ›debunk‹ it as a pseudosentence. The classical example is Heidegger’s dictum of the nothing which noths. But, according to Carnap, not only did Carnap not understand what Heidegger said, but also Heidegger himself must have misunderstood his own utterances! Does Carnap's diagnosis remain intact if one admits the possibility of a misunderstanding and (...)
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