It is commonly believed thatgeriatric medicine generates a distinctive setof ethical problems. Implicated are such issuesas resource allocation, competence and consent,advance directives, medical futility anddeliberate death. It is also argued that itwould be unjust to allow the elderly to competewith younger populations for expensive andscarce health care resources because theelderly “have already lived,” and that treatingthem the same as these other populations woulddiminish the available resources unfairly,prolong a life of inevitably failing health andresult in increased health care expenditures.In fact, however, (...) this perception of ethicaluniqueness is mistaken. Differences in medicalconditions, demographics and aetiology shouldnot be allowed to obscure the fact that ethicalissues in geriatric medicine are essentiallythe same as those faced in any other area ofhealth care, and that the solutions that areadopted in the geriatric context must beconsistent with the ethical principles that arefollowed elsewhere. The paper argues that theroot of the mistaken perception lies in theabandonment of the Hippocratic mandate ofmedicine and in an unreflective adherence tothe belief that medical advances are inevitablybeneficial. It is suggested that a return topatient-centred medicine and the use of ethicsimpact analyses before introducing medicaladvances may be ethically appropriate. (shrink)

There is always a debate around consent in the context of research. Given the expansion of different approaches to qualitative research within dementia care, there is increasing consideration around consent in this context; particularly in research concerning the experiences of living with dementia and the care of persons with dementia. Specifically there is a drive to directly involve persons with dementia as they offer specific expertise concerning living with dementia. Additionally, capacity legislation strengthens the case for ensuring that persons with (...) dementia are actively enabled to make their own decisions for as long as possible. This paper discusses an approach and method that can enable more persons who are living with dementia to participate in some types of research should they want to. Currently, most researchers rely on an extension of the traditional competency-based informed consent method and/or proxy consent or assent. However, related to the development of so-called person-centred and participatory research in dementia, there are now a number of academic publications on approaches and practical methods of ‘inclusionary’ consent. This paper considers the broader contextual influences on inclusionary consent and outlines the key aspects of such approaches based on the development of one specific method for including persons with dementia in consent processes. The method is based on the premise that, for persons with a dementia, informed consent becomes increasingly redundant and consequently exclusionary to them as persons. And even where capacity is said to no longer exist, persons with dementia are often able to make choices and make known their preferences about participating in research where the consent process is made specifically dementia-sensitive. Ethics committees can facilitate researchers both by supporting them when they need to and want to include persons with dementia in gerontological research and by challenging them to ensure that participation is genuine and starts with process consent. (shrink)

There are two contrasting views on the decision-making for life-sustaining treatment in advanced stages of dementia when the patient is deemed incompetent. One is to respect the patient's precedent autonomy by adhering to advance directives or using the substituted judgement standard. The other is to use the best-interests standard, particularly if the current judgement on what is best for the incapacitated patient contradicts the instructions from the patient's precedent autonomy. In this paper, I argue that the protracted clinical course of (...) dementia over many years requires the extended perspective of a progressive decision-making process—extended in both social space and time. The ongoing debate between these two competing views has missed this perspective by focussing on an exclusive disjunction between the competent former self and the incompetent current self. Drawing on theories of situated cognition in cognitive science, I will show that the cognition of a demented patient can be viewed as extended and embodied by her supportive social environment. As the disease progresses, the content of the mind of a demented person becomes partially constituted by such external resources along with her diminishing intrinsic mind. With this understanding, medical decision-making for a demented patient can be construed as a temporally and socially extended practice. A collective decision-making body consisting of the patient, her family and surrogates, and the clinician, should make progressive decisions as a whole over years of the disease course. Finally, I will provide a practical example of how this proposal can be applied in clinical practice. (shrink)