Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Psychophysics of Order and Anisotropy: Comment on Riemer.Sean Enda Power - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 38:198-204.
    Riemer’s recent paper on the perception of time discusses a neglected yet important topic in the psychological literature: the consequences for psychology (and psychophysics) from the ‘anisotropy’ of time. The paper presents an argument that there are unique kinds of challenges for psychophysics from such temporal anisotropy: (a) Challenges because the psychological experience of time has temporal anisotropy and the physical concept of time does not have temporal anisotropy. (b) Challenges for experimental research which are unique to temporal anisotropy. -/- (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceiving External Things and the Time‐Lag Argument.Sean Enda Power - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (1):94-117.
    We seem to directly perceive external things. But can we? According to the time‐lag argument, we cannot. What we directly perceive happens now. There is a time‐lag between our perceptions and the external things we seem to directly perceive; these external things happen in the past; thus, what we directly perceive must be something else, for example, sense‐data, and we can only at best indirectly perceive other things. This paper examines the time‐lag argument given contemporary metaphysics. I argue that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances.Oliver Rashbrook - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):584-610.
    A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that ‘a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession’. I show that we can distinguish between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. I diagnose the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption I call the ‘Seems→Seemed’ claim. I then show that commitment to this assumption comes at a price: if we accept it, we either (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations