Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is defined as the conscious, and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of individual patients. The greater the level of evidence the greater the grade of recommendation. This pioneering explicit concept of EBM is embedded in a particular view of medical practice namely the singular nature of the patient-physician relation and the commitment of the latter towards a specific goal: the treatment and the well being of his or her client. Nevertheless, (...) in many European countries as well as the United States, this integration of the best evidence from systematic research with clinical expertise and patient values appears to be re-interpreted in light of the scarcity of healthcare resources. The purpose of this paper is double. First, to claim that from an ethical perspective EBM should be a guideline to clinical practice; and second, that in specific circumstances EBM might be a useful tool in macro-allocation of healthcare resources. Methodologically the author follows Norman Daniels' theory of democratic accountability to justify this assumption. That is, choices in healthcare must be accountable by democratic procedures. This perspective of distributive justice is responsible for the scope and limits of healthcare services. It follows that particular entitlements to healthcare — namely expensive innovative treatments and medicines —may be fairly restricted as long as this decision is socially and democratically accountable and imposed by financial restrictions of the system. In conclusion, the implementation of EBM, as long as it limits the access to drugs and treatments of unproven scientific results is in accordance with this perspective. The use of EBM is regarded as an instrument to facilitate the access of all citizens to a reasonable level of healthcare and to promote the efficiency of the system. (shrink)

We live in an era where our health is linked to that of others across the globe, and nothing brings this home better than the specter of a pandemic. This paper explores the findings of town hall meetings associated with the Canadian Program of Research on Ethics in a Pandemic , in which focus groups met to discuss issues related to the global governance of an influenza pandemic. Two competing discourses were found to be at work: the first was based (...) upon an economic rationality and the second upon a humanitarian rationality. The implications for public support and the long-term sustainability of new global norms, networks, and regulations in global public health are discussed. (shrink)

The history of the documentation of health inequality is long. The way in which health inequality has customarily been documented is by comparing differences in the average health across groups, for example, by sex or gender, income, education, occupation, or geographic region. In the controversial World Health Report 2000, researchers at the World Health Organization criticized this traditional practice and proposed to measure health inequality across individuals irrespective of individuals’ group affiliation. They defended its proposal on the moral grounds without (...) clear explanation. In this paper I ask: is health inequality across individuals of moral concern, and, if so, why? Clarification of these questions is crucial for meaningful interpretation of health inequality measured across individuals. Only if there was something morally problematic in health inequality across individuals, its reduction would be good news. Specifically, in this paper I provide three arguments for the moral significance of health inequality across individuals: (a) health is special, (b) health equity plays an important and unique role in the general pursuit of justice, and (c) health inequality is an indicator of general injustice in society. I then discuss three key questions to examine the validity of these arguments: (i) how special is health?, (ii) how good is health as an indicator?, and (iii) what do we mean by injustice? I conclude that health inequality across individuals is of moral interest with the arguments (b) and (c). (shrink)

Jecker makes three major points in her article, “A Broader View of Justice” (2008). First, she argues that justice in healthcare relates to justice in the broader social conditions of society as th...

This essay contends that individual liberty, understood as the permissibility of making choices about one’s own health care in support of one’s own good and the good of one’s family utilizing private resources, is central to the moral foundations of a health care system. Such individual freedoms are important not only because they often support more efficient and effective health care services, but because they permit individuals to fulfill important moral duties. A comparative study of the health care systems in (...) Hong Kong and mainland China is utilized to illustrate the conceptual and moral concerns at stake. Both regions have implemented two-tier health care systems with a public tier of basic health care services together with a second tier of privately purchased health care. As we document, Hong Kong permits patients and doctors significantly greater opportunities to choose private health care of typically higher medical quality than their mainland counterparts. As a result, individuals are able to obtain higher quality health care while also fulfilling important moral duties for themselves and their families. In this sense, Hong Kong’s health care system is morally superior to mainland China’s. In each case, Confucianism’s concerns regarding equality are partly satisfied through the provision of public health care services on the basic tier, while appropriate use of private resources in support of oneself and one’s family is permissibly exercised on the private tier. Although it is true that inequalities in health care access and outcome are inevitable within a system that permits such individual freedoms, we argue that such inequalities are morally justifiable in terms of Confucian ethical thought. (shrink)

The use of aggregated quality of life estimatesin the formation of public policy and practiceguidelines raises concerns about the moralrelevance of variability in values inpreferences for health care. This variabilitymay reflect unique and deeply held beliefs thatmay be lost when averaged with the preferencesof other individuals. Feminist moral theorieswhich argue for attention to context andparticularity underline the importance ofascertaining the extent to which differences inpreferences for health states revealinformation which is morally relevant toclinicians and policymakers. To facilitatethese considerations, we present (...) an empiricalstudy of preferences for the timing andoccurrence of health states associated withhormone replacement therapy (HRT). Sixteenwomen between the ages of 45 and 55 wereenrolled in this pilot study. Theirpreferences regarding five health statesassociated with HRT (menopausal symptoms, sideeffects of HRT, breast cancer, myocardialinfarction, and osteoporosis) were assessed inquantitative terms known as utilities. Twostandard methods, the visual analog scale (VAS) and the standard gamble (SG), were used toassess utility and time preference (calculatedas a discount rate). The wide variability ofresponses underlines the importance oftailoring health care to individual women'spreferences. Policy guidelines whichincorporate utility analysis must recognize thenormative limitations of aggregatedpreferences, and the moral relevance ofindividual conceptions of health. (shrink)

This article adopts a population-level bioethics approach to analyzing the ethical implications of novel deep-brain stimulation (DBS) technologies. I claim that a microlevel focus on costs and benefits is necessary but insufficient to address the concerns of social justice and health equity that attend the potential utilization of DBS technologies. A macrosocial, population-based analysis notes two ethically significant trends regarding novel health technologies: (1) that they are the prime mover of hyperinflationary health cost trajectories, and (2) that even where they (...) improve overall population health such technologies may expand health inequalities. Such an expansion could exacerbate what Powers and Faden have identified as “densely-woven patterns of disadvantage,” and therein could contravene mandates of social justice. Such concerns of justice and equity are sharpened by the fact that those populations that bear the highest risk of suffering the injuries and illnesses for which DBS technologies might be warranted are among the most disadvantaged groups in American society. Accordingly, ethical analysis of DBS technologies must include an assessment of the evidence suggesting that in their capacity to improve health and compress health inequalities, whole-population approaches that address the upstream factors that shape distributions of neuropsychiatric injuries and illness may be preferable to acute health interventions. However, the article warns against the false-choice fallacy, and notes that whole-population policies and acute care interventions can be simultaneously endorsed. The article concludes by suggesting that the ethical issue of relative priority between these approaches is best framed via a population-level analysis. (shrink)