1. Does Hegel’s The Science of Logic (Hegel 2010) have any relation to or relevance for what is now known as ‘the science of logic’? Here a negative answer is as likely to be endorsed by many conte...

The work of Hugh MacColl (1837–1909) suffered the same fate after his death as before it:despite being vaguely alluded to and in part even commended, on the whole it has remained an unknown quantity. Even worse, those of his ideas which have played a decisive role in the history of logic have been credited to his successors; this is especially the case with the definition of strict implication and the first formal development of formal modal logic. This paper takes an (...) initial step towards a rectification of this unfortunate misrepresentation, presenting a bibliography of MacColl’s most significant publications with particular regard to their reception. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that in the development of modern logic towards its actual shape at least two directions or traditions have to be distinguished. These traditions may be called, following the mo...

Greek antiquity saw the development of two distinct systems of logic: Aristotle’s theory of the categorical syllogism and the Stoic theory of the hypothetical syllogism. Some ancient logicians argued that hypothetical syllogistic is more fundamental than categorical syllogistic on the grounds that the latter relies on modes of propositional reasoning such asreductio ad absurdum. Peripatetic logicians, by contrast, sought to establish the priority of categorical over hypothetical syllogistic by reducing various modes of propositional reasoning to categorical form. In the 17th (...) century, this Peripatetic program of reducing hypothetical to categorical logic was championed by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. In an essay titledSpecimina calculi rationalis, Leibniz develops a theory of propositional terms that allows him to derive the rule ofreductio ad absurdumin a purely categorical calculus in which every proposition is of the formA is B. We reconstruct Leibniz’s categorical calculus and show that it is strong enough to establish not only the rule ofreductio ad absurdum, but all the laws of classical propositional logic. Moreover, we show that the propositional logic generated by the nonmonotonic variant of Leibniz’s categorical calculus is a natural system of relevance logic known as RMI$_{{}_ \to ^\neg }$. (shrink)

Although the existence of correspondence between George Boole (1815?1864) and William Stanley Jevons (1835?1882) has been known for a long time and part was even published in 1913, it has never been fully noted; in particular, it is not in the recent edition of Jevons's letters and papers. The texts are transcribed here, with indication of their significance. Jevons proposed certain quite radical changes to Boole's system, which Boole did not accept; nevertheless, they were to become well established.

The approach used by Boole in Mathematical analysis of logic to develop propositional logic was based on the idea of ?cases? or ?conjunctures of circumstances?. But this was dropped in Laws of thought in favor of one which Boole considered to be more satisfactory, that of using the notion of ?time for which a proposition is true?. We show that, when suitable clarifications and corrections are made, the earlier approach? which accords with modern logic in eschewing the extraneous notion of (...) time?is indeed a viable one. (shrink)