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Knowledge and Value

In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2012)

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The Special Value of Epistemic Self‐Reliance.T. Ryan Byerly - 2013 - Ratio 27 (1):53-67.details Philosophers have long held that epistemic self-reliance has a special value. But, this view has recently been challenged by prominent epistemologist Linda Zagzebski. Zagzebski argues that potential sources of support for the claim that epistemic self-reliance has a special value fail. Here I provide a novel defense of the special value of epistemic self-reliance. Self-reliance has a special value because it is required for attaining certain valuable cognitive achievements. Further, practicing self-reliance may be all-things-considered worthwhile even when doing so is (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem.Christoph Jäger - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):201-213.details Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 5 citations
Conceptual Baggage and How to Unpack It.Emilia L. Wilson - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails Our interpretive resources enable us to make sense of, navigate, and communicate about our shared world. These resources not only carve the world up into categories, but also guide how we, individually and collectively, are oriented towards it. In this thesis, I examine how these resources, and the dispositions they guide, may be harmful. A vital kind of interpretive resources are frames, which equip us with unified perspectives on the world. Perspectives are suites of open-ended interpretive (inquisitive, attentional, inferential, evaluative, (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
(1 other version)Frankfurt in Fake Barn Country.Neil Levy - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):529-542.details It is very widely held that Frankfurt-style cases—in which a counterfactual intervener stands by to bring it about that an agent performs an action but never actually acts because the agent performs that action on her own—show that free will does not require alternative possibilities. This essay argues that that conclusion is unjustified, because merely counterfactual interveners may make a difference to normative properties. It presents a modified version of a fake barn case to show how a counterfactual intervener can (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 4 citations
The Value of Understanding.Stephen Grimm - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (2):103-117.details Over the last several years a number of leading philosophers – including Catherine Elgin, Linda Zagzebski, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Duncan Pritchard – have grown increasingly dissatisfied with the contemporary focus on knowledge in epistemology and have attempted to “recover” the notion of understanding. According to some of these philosophers, in fact, understanding deserves not just to be recovered, but to supplant knowledge as the focus of epistemological inquiry. This entry considers some of the main reasons why philosophers have taken understanding (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 67 citations
Pritchard on Virtue Epistemology.Christoph Kelp - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):583-587.details Duncan Pritchard has recently argued against robust virtue epistemology on the grounds that it gets caught up in a fatal double bind: There is a type of case suggesting that the central robust virtue theoretic condition on knowledge is too strong to be necessary for knowledge as well as a type of case suggesting that it is too weak to be sufficient for knowledge. He does concede to the robust virtue epistemologist that his argument will be fully convincing only if (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations

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