In the metaphysics of modality, one finds a distinction between two families of modalities: the so-called ‘objective’, ‘real’ or ‘circumstantial’ modalities and the ‘non-objective’, ‘non-real’ or ‘non-circumstantial’ modalities. The guiding thought is that in some intuitive sense the former modalities pertain to contingency in worldly circumstance—how things could have genuinely otherwise been—whereas the latter do not. Moreover the distinction has acquired importance through attempts to elucidate the modality of metaphysical necessity by assigning it a distinctive role within the objective modalities. (...) In this paper I use the resources of higher-order modal logic to explore how one might systematize these ideas. I present a formal tension which shows that one natural way of systematizing them is unstable. And whilst I show that there are ways of stabilizing the guiding picture, even the best of them involves deeply non-trivial departures from how that picture is ordinarily understood. I conclude by revisiting the motivation for the underlying picture of modalities. (shrink)