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Awareness of agency: Three levels of analysis

In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual Questions. MIT Press. pp. 307--24 (2000)

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  1. L’hystérie : ne plus vouloir pouvoir, ne plus pouvoir vouloir.Frédérique De Vignemont - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):197-215.
    L’hystérie se définit comme un déficit fonctionnel sans cause organique. Par exemple, certains patients sont incapables de se mouvoir volontairement, comme s’ils étaient véritablement paralysés, sans que l’on puisse fournir une explication physiologique. À l’inverse, les patients souffrant d’anosognosie sont véritablement paralysés, mais affirment pouvoir bouger. Ces pathologies résultent toutes deux d’un trouble de la conscience de la capacité à agir : les uns croient qu’ils ne peuvent pas agir alors qu’ils le pourraient et les autres croient pouvoir agir alors (...)
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  • Self model and schizophrenia.J. Proust - 1999 - Consciousness and Cognition 8 (3):378-384.
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  • Thinking of oneself as the same.Joëlle Proust - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own (...)
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  • Observing one’s hand become anarchic: An fMRI study of action identification.Dirk T. Leube, Günther Knoblich, Michael Erb & Tilo T. J. Kircher - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):597-608.
    The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one's own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else's actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one's own movement and its visual consequences (...)
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  • Philosophie et psychopathologie.Luc Faucher - 2006 - Philosophiques 33 (1):3.
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