I argue that lying in business negotiations is pro tanto wrong and no less wrong than lying in other contexts. First, I assert that lying in general is pro tanto wrong. Then, I examine and refute five arguments to the effect that lying in a business context is less wrong than lying in other contexts. The common thought behind these arguments—based on consent, self-defence, the “greater good,” fiduciary duty, and practicality—is that the particular circumstances which are characteristic of business negotiations (...) are such that the wrongness of lying is either mitigated or eliminated completely. I argue that all these “special exemption” arguments fail. I conclude that, in the absence of a credible argument to the contrary, the same moral constraints must apply to lying in business negotiations as apply to lying in other contexts. Furthermore, I show that for the negotiator, there are real practical benefits from not lying. (shrink)

This article investigates if and how negotiators' self-efficacy beliefs affect their use of deception in negotiation. Specifically, we propose that self-efficacy can be interpreted as a threat to self-concept, which encourages individuals to temporarily bypass self-regulatory obstacles by morally disengaging their cognitive moral filters, thereby enabling them to use deception in negotiation. We test our hypotheses in three independent experimental studies involving an interactive negotiation simulation, totalizing 460 participants. We find that negotiators with low self-efficacy regarding their negotiation abilities are (...) more likely to use deception than those with high self-efficacy beliefs. Furthermore, we find that moral disengagement mediates the effects of self-efficacy on deception. Our findings suggest that self-efficacy plays a key role in shaping negotiators' ethical behaviors and we identify the psychological mechanism underlying this relationship. (shrink)

A retrospect into ethos, this study examines the impact of individualism, collectivism, ethical idealism and interpersonal trust on negotiators' attitudes toward questionable negotiation tactics in Greece. A thousand survey questionnaires were administered to Greek employees, of which 327 usable responses were collected. Our findings empirically corroborated a classification of three groups of negotiation tactics, namely, pretense, deception and lies. Individualism–collectivism and ethical idealism were found to be related, and interpersonal trust was found to be unrelated, to attitudes toward questionable negotiation (...) tactics. Emphasizing the non-US and non-Western European nature of the empirical data collected, the originality of this research further stems from the development of a comprehensive research framework about questionable negotiation tactics in Greece. (shrink)

This article explores managers’ ethical reasoning for behaviors in price negotiations using evidence from 15 in-depth interviews conducted with sales and purchasing representatives in the chemical industry in Germany. Applying transaction cost economics, we find that negotiators in commoditized market-like exchanges either refer to deontological norms such as not to lie, or they neglect a role for ethics, arguing that distributive negotiation is per se opportunistic. In contrast, exchanges of products with higher asset specificity lead to stronger informational integration which (...) is supported with teleological justifications. Some negotiators use teleological justification to build business on trust rather than on economic safeguards as their firm norms would require. For negotiators, our results suggest considering institutional context and adjusting ethical reasoning to the negotiation situation. Firms need to recognize and find ways to address the potential conflicts of their internal norms with their frontline managers’ attempts to act in the firms’ best economic and ethical interests. (shrink)