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  1. (2 other versions)Intentionalität und intentionales handeln.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Synthesis Philosophica 20 (2):319-326.
    Diejenigen, die behaupten, der freie Wille sei Illusion, sind im Unrecht. Sie begründen ihre Behauptung auf einem wissenschaftlichen Beweis, der die falsche Ebene der Deskription des intentionalen Handelns testet. Der freie Wille bezieht sich nicht auf subpersonale neuronale Prozesse, Muskelaktivierung oder grundlegende Körperbewegungen, sondern auf kontextualisierte Handlungen in einem System, das größer ist als viele zeitgenössische Geistesphilosophen, Psychologen und Neurowissenschaftler annehmen. In diesem Artikel beschreibe ich die Art von Intentionalität, die mit der Ausübung des freien Willens einhergeht.
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  • From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.
    There are few concepts as relevant as that of intentional action in shaping our sense of self and the interaction with the environment. At the same time, few concepts are so elusive. Indeed, both conceptual and neuroscientific accounts of intentional agency have proven to be problematic. On the one hand, most conceptual views struggle in defining how agents can adequately exert control over their actions. On the other hand, neuroscience settles for definitions by exclusion whereby key features of human intentional (...)
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  • Self-agency and mental causality.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - In Kenneth S. Kendler & Josef Parnas (eds.), Philosophical Issues in Psychiatry: Explanation, Phenomenology, and Nosology. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
    I want to explore one small corner of the concept of mental causality. It’s the corner where discussions about mind-body interactions and epiphenomenalism take place. My basic contention is that these discussions are framed in the wrong terms because they are infected by a mind-body dualism which defines the question of mental causality in a classic or standard way: How does a mental event cause my body to do what it does? Setting the question in this way has consequences for (...)
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  • Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy.Joëlle Proust - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):717-743.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  • Intencionalnost i intencionalno djelovanje.Shaun Gallagher - 2006 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):339-346.
    Oni koji tvrde da je slobodna volja iluzija, u krivu su. Oni temelje svoju tvrdnju na znanstvenom dokazu koji testira pogrešnu razinu deskripcije intencionalnog djelovanja. Kod slobodne volje ne radi se o podosobnim neuronskim procesima, mišićnoj aktivaciji, ili temeljnim tjelesnim pokretima, već o kontekstualiziranim djelovanjima u sistemu koji je veći negoli što to mnogi suvremeni filozofi uma, psiholozi i neuroznanstvenici smatraju. U ovome članku opisujem vrstu intencionalnosti koja ide s vježbom slobodne volje.Those who argue that free will is an illusion (...)
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