The goal of this dissertation is to reconstruct, critically evaluate, and apply the pluralism of Paul Feyerabend. I conclude by suggesting future points of contact between Feyerabend’s pluralism and topics of interest in contemporary philosophy of science. I begin, in Chapter 1, by reconstructing Feyerabend’s critical philosophy. I show how his published works from 1948 until 1970 show a remarkably consistent argumentative strategy which becomes more refined and general as Feyerabend’s thought matures. Specifically, I argue that Feyerabend develops a persuasive (...) case against rationalism, or the thesis that there exist normative and exclusive rules of scientific rationality. In Chapter 2, I reconstruct Feyerabend’s pluralism and detail its relationship to his humanitarianism and epistemological anarchism. I understand Feyerabend’s pluralism as the combination of the principles of proliferation and tenacity. I show the evolution and justification of these principles from Feyerabend’s early papers until the late 1970s. In Chapter 3, I defend Feyerabend’s pluralism from its most prominent criticisms. I then clarify that Feyerabend’s pluralism amounts to a conception of the logic of theory pursuit and modify his view using insights from C.S. Peirce, Pierre Duhem, and Michael Polanyi. From Peirce, I show how economic, sociological, and value-laden features of theory pursuit may be used to constrain proliferation and tenacity. From Duhem and Polanyi, I try to show the proper role of tacit knowledge within a Feyerabendian framework. Finally, I show what implications Feyerabend’s pluralism has for models of distributing funds within scientific communities. I contend that it provides a more promising model that the ‘well-ordered science’ proposal advanced by numerous philosophers and social scientists. Specifically, I aim to understand what taking Feyerabend’s pluralism seriously entails for principles of balancing funding allocation decisions and the role of peer-review in evaluating the potential success of research proposals. I conclude by suggesting future lines of research for further analyzing and applying Feyerabend’s pluralism. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Abduction as a method for sociological explanation is increasingly gaining interest, but questions remain as to what exactly it is and how it differs from other methods of inquiry. This paper compares abduction as conceived in Peircean pragmatism with the critical realist concept of retroduction. I argue that abduction in the Peircean sense and retroduction in the critical realist sense refer to different, but complementary, modes of inference. Abductive conclusions provide the starting point for retroductive inferences; the latter inform (...) the tenability of the former. Together, abduction and retroduction contribute to theoretical explanation. (shrink)

Robert Brandom holds that what we mean is best understood in terms of what inferences we are prepared to defend, and that such a defence is best understood in terms of rule-governed social interactions. This manages to explain quite a lot. However, for those who think that there is more to making correct/incorrect inferences than obeying/breaking accepted rules, Brandom’s account fails to adequately capture what it means to reason properly. Thus, in an effort to sketch an alternative that does not (...) rely primarily on peer pressure, I draw on the work of C. S. Peirce. Peirce argued that, when we reason, we manipulate abstract diagrams in order to observe what results. Since some manipulations are barred by the self-same nature of the diagrams, I try to show that this qualitative incompatibility, which I dub “contrapiction,” is a good reason to regard some reasoning as bad. (shrink)

Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of (...) the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains. (shrink)

A constantly changing social reality means economic theories, even if correct today, need to be constantly revised, updated, or abandoned. To maintain an up-to-date understanding of its subject matter, economists have to continuously assess their theories even those that appear to be empirically corroborated. Economics could gain from a method that describes and is capable of generating novel explanatory hypotheses. A pessimistic view on the existence of such a method was famously articulated by Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific (...) Discovery. He wrote ‘there is no such a thing as a logical method of having ideas or a logical reconstruction of this process.’ Herbert Simon responded to Popper and argued the opposite, namely, that there is a model of discovery and its name is abduction. Simon acknowledges his debt to Charles Peirce – the first modern logician to explicitly formulate a theory of abduction – and explains that abduction is a model of discovery that works as a problem-solving heuristic encoded.. (shrink)

Abduction is considered the most powerful, but also the most controversially discussed type of inference. Based on an analysis of Peirce’s retroduction, Lipton’s Inference to the Best Explanation and other theories, a new theory of abduction is proposed. It considers abduction not as intrinsically explanatory but as intrinsically conditional: for a given fact, abduction allows one to infer a fact that implies it. There are three types of abduction: Selective abduction selects an already known conditional whose consequent is the given (...) fact and infers that its antecedent is true. Conditional-creative abduction creates a new conditional in which the given fact is the consequent and a defined fact is the antecedent that implies the given fact. Propositional-conditional-creative abduction assumes that the given fact is implied by a hitherto undefined fact and thus creates a new conditional with a new proposition as antecedent. The execution of abductive inferences is specified by theory-specific patterns. Each pattern consists of a set of rules for both generating and justifying abductive conclusions and covers the complete inference process. Consequently, abductive inferences can be formalised iff the whole pattern can be formalised. The empirical consistency of the proposed theory is demonstrated by a case study of Semmelweis' research on puerperal fever. (shrink)

Three competing ‘methods’ have been endorsed for inferring phylogenetic hypotheses: parsimony, likelihood, and Bayesianism. The latter two have been claimed superior because they take into account rates of sequence substitution. Can rates of substitution be justified on its own accord in inferences of explanatory hypotheses? Answering this question requires addressing four issues: (1) the aim of scientific inquiry, (2) the nature of why-questions, (3) explanatory hypotheses as answers to why-questions, and (4) acknowledging that neither parsimony, likelihood, nor Bayesianism are inferential (...) actions leading to explanatory hypotheses. The aim of scientific inquiry is to acquire causal understanding of effects. Observation statements of organismal characters lead to implicit or explicit why-questions. Those questions, conveyed in data matrices, assume the truth of observation statements, which is contrary to subsequently invoking substitution rates within inferences to phylogenetic hypotheses. Inferences of explanatory hypotheses are abductive in form, such that some version of an evolutionary theory(ies) is/are included or implied. If rates of sequence evolution are to be considered, it must be done prior to, rather than within abduction, which requires renaming those putatively-shared nucleotides subject to substitution rates. There are, however, no epistemic grounds for renaming characters to accommodate rates, calling into question the legitimacy of causally accounting for sequence data. (shrink)

This book examines the philosophical conception of abductive reasoning as developed by Charles S. Peirce, the founder of American pragmatism. It explores the historical and systematic connections of Peirce's original ideas and debates about their interpretations. Abduction is understood in a broad sense which covers the discovery and pursuit of hypotheses and inference to the best explanation. The analysis presents fresh insights into this notion of reasoning, which derives from effects to causes or from surprising observations to explanatory theories. The (...) author outlines some logical and AI approaches to abduction as well as studies various kinds of inverse problems in astronomy, physics, medicine, biology, and human sciences to provide examples of retroductions and abductions. The discussion covers also everyday examples with the implication of this notion in detective stories, one of Peirce’s own favorite themes. The author uses Bayesian probabilities to argue that explanatory abduction is a method of confirmation. He uses his own account of truth approximation to reformulate abduction as inference which leads to the truthlikeness of its conclusion. This allows a powerful abductive defense of scientific realism. This up-to-date survey and defense of the Peircean view of abduction may very well help researchers, students, and philosophers better understand the logic of truth-seeking. (shrink)

Framing systematics as a field consistent with scientific inquiry entails that inferences of phylogenetic hypotheses have the goal of producing accounts of past causal events that explain differentially shared characters among organisms. Linking observations of characters to inferences occurs by way of why-questions implied by data matrices. Because of their form, why-questions require the use of common-cause theories. Such theories in phylogenetic inferences include natural selection and genetic drift. Selection or drift can explain ‘morphological’ characters but selection cannot be causally (...) applied to sequences since fitness differences cannot be directly associated with individual nucleotides or amino acids. The relation of selection to sequence data is by way of downward or top-down causation from those phenotypes upon which selection occurs. The application of phylogenetic inference to explain sequence data is thus restricted to instances where drift is the relevant theory; those nucleotides or amino acids that can be explained via downward causation are precluded from inclusion in the data matrix. The restrictions on the inclusion of sequence data in phylogenetic inferences equally apply to species hypotheses, precluding the more restrictive approach known as DNA barcoding. Not being able to discern drift and selection as relevant causal mechanisms can severely constrain the inclusion and explanations of sequence data. Implications of such exclusion are discussed in relation to the requirement of total evidence. (shrink)

The roles of abductive inference in dynamic heuristics allows scientific methodologies to test novel explanations for the world’s ways. Deliberate reasoning often follows abductive patterns, as well as patterns dominated by deduction and induction, but complex mixtures of these three modes of inference are crucial for scientific explanation. All possible mixed inferences are formulated and categorized using a novel typology and nomenclature. Twenty five possible combinations among abduction, induction, and deduction are assembled and analyzed in order of complexity. There are (...) five primary categories for sorting these inferential procedures: fallacies, non-scientific procedures, quasi-scientific procedures, scientific procedures, and scientific heuristics. (shrink)

Some claim that digital phenotyping will revolutionize understanding of human psychology and experience and significantly promote human wellbeing. This paper investigates the nature of digital phenotyping in relation to its alleged promise. Unlike most of the literature to date on philosophy and digital phenotyping, which has focused on its ethical aspects, this paper focuses on its epistemic and methodological aspects. The paper advances a tetra-taxonomy involving four scenario types in which knowledge may be acquired from human “digitypes” by digital phenotyping. (...) These scenarios comprise two causal relations and a correlative and constitutive relation that can exist between information generated by digital systems/devices on the one hand and psychological or behavioral phenomena on the other. The paper describes several modes of inference involved in deriving knowledge within these scenarios. After this epistemic mapping, the paper analyzes the possible knowledge potential and limitations of digital phenotyping. It finds that digital phenotyping holds promise of delivering insight into conditions and states as well producing potentially new psychological categories. It also argues that care must be taken that digital phenotyping does not make unwarranted conclusions and is aware of potentially distorting effects in digital sensing and measurement. If digital phenotyping is to truly revolutionize knowledge of human life, it must deliver on a range of fronts, including making accurate forecasts and diagnoses of states and behaviors, providing causal explanations of these phenomena, and revealing important constituents of human conditions, psychology, and experience. (shrink)

We examine Charles S. Peirce's mature views on the logic of science, especially as contained in his later and still mostly unpublished writings. We focus on two main issues. The first concerns Peirce's late conception of retroduction. Peirce conceived inquiry as performed in three stages, which correspond to three classes of inferences: abduction or retroduction, deduction, and induction. The question of the logical form of retroduction, of its logical justification, and of its methodology stands out as the three major threads (...) in his later writings. The other issue concerns the second stage of scientific inquiry, deduction. According to Peirce's later formulation, deduction is divided not only into two kinds but also into two sub-stages: logical analysis and mathematical reasoning, where the latter is either corollarial or theorematic. Save for the inductive stage, which we do not address here, these points cover the essentials of Peirce's latest thinking on the l.. (shrink)

We distinguish three aspects of medical diagnosis: generating new diagnostic hypotheses, selecting hypotheses for further pursuit, and evaluating their probability in light of the available evidence. Drawing on Peirce’s account of abduction, we argue that hypothesis generation is amenable to normative analysis: physicians need to make good decisions about when and how to generate new diagnostic hypothesis as well as when to stop. The intertwining relationship between the generation and selection of diagnostic hypotheses is illustrated through the analysis of a (...) detailed clinical case study. This interaction is not adequately captured by the existing probabilistic, decision-theoretic models of the threshold approach to clinical decision-making. Instead, we propose to conceptualize medical diagnosis in terms of strategic reasoning. (shrink)

Contemporary bioethics pays considerable attention to the ethical aspects of dementia care. However, ethical issues of sexuality especially as experienced by institutionalized persons with dementia are often overlooked. The relevant existing ethics literature generally applies an implicit philosophical anthropology that favors the principle of respect for autonomy and the concomitant notion of informed consent. In this article we will illustrate how this way of handling the issue fails in its duty to people with dementia. Our thesis is that a more (...) inclusive philosophical anthropology is needed that also heeds the fate of this growing population. Drawing on the tradition of phenomenology, we will chalk out an anthropological framework that rests on four fundamental characteristics of human existence: the decentered self, human embodiment, being-in-the-world and being-with-others. Our aim in this article is thus to tentatively put forward a broader perspective for looking at aged sexuality in institutionalized people with dementia. Hopefully the developed framework will mark the beginning of a new and refreshed ethical reflection on the topic at hand. (shrink)

The view that argumentation is a desired reasoning practice in the classroom is well reported in the literature. Nonetheless, it is still not clear what type of reasoning supports classroom argumentation. The paper discusses abductive reasoning as the most adequate for students’ arguments to emerge in a classroom discussion. Abductive reasoning embraces the idea of plausibility and defeasibility of both the premises and the conclusion. As such, teachers’ role becomes the one of guiding students through formulating relevant hypotheses and selecting (...) the most plausible one according to criteria. Argumentation schemes are proposed as useful tools in this process.L'idée que l'argumentation est une pratique de raisonnement souhaitée en classe est bien documentée dans la littérature. Néanmoins, il n'est toujours pas clair quel type de raisonnement soutient l'argumentation en classe. Dans cet article on discute du raisonnement abductif comme étant le plus adéquat pour que les arguments des élèves émergent dans une discussion en classe. Le raisonnement abductif emploie l'idée de plausibilité et de la révocabilité des prémisses et de la conclusion. En tant que tel, le rôle des enseignants consiste à guider les élèves à formuler des hypothèses pertinentes et à sélectionner le plus plausible selon des critères. Les schèmes d'argumentation sont proposés comme des outils utiles dans ce processus. (shrink)

Charles S. Peirce luokitteli 1865 päättelyn lajit deduktioon, induktioon ja hypoteesiin, joista viimeksi mainittua hän luonnehti päättelynä vaikutuksista syihin tai päättelynä selitykseen. Hypoteesi on Peircelle induktion ohella tietoa laajentava päätelmä. 1890-luvun lopun kirjoituksissaan hän alkoi kutsua hypoteettista päättelyä uusilla nimillä ”retroduktio” ja ”abduktio”. Tässä vaiheessa Peirce kuvasi abduktiota tieteellisen päättelyn ensimmäisenä askeleena, mahdollisten arvausten esittämisenä, jonka tulokset on asetettava induktion kautta testeihin. Hänen tunnetuin kaavionsa abduktion loogiselle muodolle on vuodelta 1903: The surprising fact C is observed; But if A were (...) true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to think that A is true. Toisin sanoen abduktio päättelee yllättävästä tosiseikasta hypoteettiseen teoriaan, joka selittäisi tämän faktan. Peircen ajatukset tulivat laajemmin tunnetuiksi, kun kuusiosainen Collected Papers ilmestyi 1931-35. Maailmansodan jälkeen hänen ehdotuksiaan on tulkittu kolmessa suunnassa. Hansonin mukaan abduktio on keksimisen logiikkaa. Laudanin mukaan abduktiossa on kyse ohjeesta työskennellä kiinnostavan hypoteesin parissa. Harmanin mukaan abduktio on päättelyä parhaaseen selitykseen. Monet loogikot, tekoälyn tutkijat ja tieteenfilosofit käyttävät termiä ”abduktio” suoraviivaisesti IBE:n synonyyminä, kun taas varovaisemman kannan ottavat mm. Aliseda, Magnani ja Douven. Toisaalta tätä rinnastusta on eri syistä pidetty harhaanjohtavana abduktion todellisen luonteen ja tehtävän perusteella. Myös monet Peirce-tutkijat ovat ottaneet intohimoisesti kantaa asiaan vedoten mestarin monitulkintaisiin kirjoituksiin. Esimerkiksi Minnamaier esittää, että abduktion samaistaminen IBE:n kanssa hämärtäisi Peircen erottelua induktion ja abduktion välillä. Campos argumentoi, että abduktio tulisi rajata selittävien hypoteesien generoimiseen, joten valikointi hypoteesien välillä ei kuulu sen tehtäviin. Gaultierin mukaan skeeman johtopäätös ei ole suositus testata A:n totuutta, vaan selvittää, onko A todellakin mahdollinen selitys C:lle. Sen sijaan Nyrupin mukaan jättää avoimeksi, tukeeko onnistunut selitys hypoteesin totuutta, joten abduktiossa on kyse hypoteesin työstämisestä. Peircen kirjoituksista puolen vuosisadan aikana kuitenkin löytyy aineksia kaikille kolmelle abduktion päätulkinnalle. Abduktio on ainoa menetelmä uusien ideoiden generoimiseksi. Abduktio auttaa tunnistamaan testaamisen arvioisia hypoteeseja. Joissakin tapauksissa, kuten havainnoissa ja historiallisissa päätelmissä, abduktio on ”pakottavaa” tai ”täysin varmaa”, joten sillä voi olla tekemistä myös hypoteesien oikeuttamisen kanssa. Vaikka Peirce päätyi esittämään, ettei abduktiivisiin päätelmiin liity mitään todennäköisyyksiä, hän kuitenkin myöhäisissäkin töissään antoi abduktiolle selkeän loogisen muodon. Lisäksi abduktion ja IBE:n yhteyttä puolustaa käsikirjoitus ”The Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents”, jossa Peirce antaa kriteerejä ”abduktiolle eli hypoteesien valinnan prosessille”. Näitä kriteerejä ovat selitysvoima, testattavuus, varovaisuus, laajuus ja yksinkertaisuus. Samantapaisia metodologisia sääntöjä ovat muotoilleet ne tutkijat, jotka ovat kehitelleet eteenpäin IBE:n muotoja. Vastaus otsikon kysymykseen on siis ”kyllä ja ei”. Vaikka Peirce keksi termin ”abduktio”, hänellä ei ole loputonta yksinoikeutta määrätä sen käytöstä. Hän ajatuksensa ovat inspiroivia tavalla, joka voi johtaa abduktion tutkimisessa erilaisiin suuntiin. Näitä linjoja on tarpeetonta oikeaoppisesti pitää toisilleen vastakkaisina. Keksimisen logiikka on kiehtova aihe, mutta samalla tavoin on aihetta analysoida sitä, miten keksittyjen selityshypoteesien paremmuutta voidaan vertailla ja millaisilla ehdoilla voisimme olla oikeutettuja hyväksymään parhaan toistaiseksi löydetyistä selityksistä. Kaikki nämä loogis-metodologiset tutkimuslinjat tekevät omalla tavallaan oikeutta Peircen filosofian suurille oivalluksille. (shrink)