Two closely related issues are addressed in this thesis. The first of these issues is whether Lockean criteria can withstand criticisms based on cases such as Wiggins' brain bisection case. The problem here is that the memory relation, or in general any relation of psychological continuity, seems to be a many-one relation and hence not suitable as a criterion of identity for persons. The second issue involves the question of what we ought to say about such cases. The problem here (...) is that, intuitively, psychological continuity seems to be a very good criterion of personal identity. When one person is psychologically continuous with a future person, we want to say that the one person has survived--as that future person. ;Several contemporary philosophers have addressed themselves to these issues. In Chapter I of the thesis, I consider the theory of identity suggested by Baruch Brody. He rejects Lockean criteria, and instead uses his own perfectly general theory as a criterion of identity. I argue that the theory he suggests is of limited value, and that the arguments he provides against Lockean criteria are question-begging. In Chapter II, I develop a specific Lockean criterion; in Chapter III, I consider and finally reject particular arguments against this criterion which are based on the brain bisection cases. In this chapter, I consider work by David Wiggins, Bernard Williams, and Roland Puccetti. In Chapter IV, I turn to the defense of Lockean criteria suggested by John Perry and David Lewis. Finally, in Chapter V, I develop my own views on the brain bisection case, and concluding that Lockean criteria of a certain sort remain defensible. (shrink)

This paper explores R. W. Sperry's view that consciousness is ?causally? effective in directing voluntary human behaviour. This view, formulated in the course of his split brain research, presupposes an earlier theory that motor behaviour is the sole output of the brain and that mental phenomena were developed for regulation of overt response. His view of the ?causal? effectiveness of consciousness is shown to be based on a theory of emergent properties like that of Bunge. It is also shown that (...) Sperry, like Bunge, is a materialist; appearances to the contrary are due to occasional use of standard terms such as ?materialism? and ?interaction? in unusual senses. It is argued, with specific reference to Chisholm and Searle, that Sperry's hypothesis is helpful towards elucidating the structure and dynamics of action. It is also argued that it is not, as Sperry thinks, a consequence of his position that moral values are part of brain science. (shrink)

Many have claimed that split-brain patients are actually two persons. I maintain that both the traditional separation argument and the more recent sophistication argument for the two persons interpretation are inadequate on conceptual grounds. An autonomy argument is inadequate on empirical grounds. Overall, theoretical and practical consequences weigh heavily in favor of adopting a one person interpretation.

Traditional scientific views of the conscious self and world we live in are challenged by an unprecedented outburst of emerging new paradigms, theories of consciousness, perceptions of reality, new sciences, new philosophies, epistemologies, and a host of other transformative approaches. This still expanding outburst can be traced, on both logical and chronologic grounds, not to chaos theory, ecology, the new physics, or dozens of other currently ascribed sources, but rather to the cognitive (consciousness) revolution that immediately preceded. These new approaches (...) all share one key feature in common, namely, they all depend, directly or indirectly, upon a refutation and successful overthrow of the long dominant materialist paradigm. This is what was required to shift consciousness from an acausal or "eliminable" status to a functionally indispensable role. Traditional "bottom‐up" micro‐determinism had to be supplemented by a reciprocal, "top‐down" control exerted by mental emergents over lower‐level components. This does not dispose of behaviorism or reductionism, as methodology, but simply incorporates these within a more comprehensive explanatory framework. With the long reign of materialist constraints finally broken, other antireductive views have proliferated but with little regard for what the new paradigm allows. (shrink)

Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will (...) continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion. (shrink)

Science is full of surprises. Fortunately, most of these surprises are small. A scientist, for example, might make an unexpected discoverey, but the discovery simply adds new data in support of an old theory. Or perhaps the discovery will endanger an existing theory, but one which has only local import. In cases like these, the existing theory will be modified, or perhaps even rejected; but the research tradition which surrounds the local theory will remain, by and large, unaffected and will (...) continue on.Small surprises are welcomed within science; they are part of the daily grist. Science needs them in order to advance in an orderly fashion. (shrink)