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  1. A Merely Logical Distinction.J. Colin McQuillan - 2016 - Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):387-405.
    Throughout his career, Immanuel Kant objects that Leibniz and Wolff make the distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition into a “merely logical” distinction. Although it is not clear that anyone in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition actually holds this view, Kant’s objection helps to define the “real” distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition that he defends in his inaugural dissertation in 1770. Kant raises the same objection against Leibniz and Wolff in the Critique of Pure Reason, but replaces the “real” distinction he (...)
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  • Leibniz's Naturalized Philosophy of Mind.Larry M. Jorgensen - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    This book is a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz’s philosophy of mind. The main argument of this book is easy to state: Leibniz offers a fully natural theory of mind. In today’s philosophical climate, in which much effort has been put into discovering a naturalized theory of mind, Leibniz’s efforts to reach a similar goal 300 years earlier will provide a critical stance from which we can assess our own theories. But while the goals might be similar, the content of Leibniz’s (...)
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  • Self-Representationalism and the Neo-Russellian Ignorance Hypothesis: A Hybrid Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Tom McClelland - 2012 - Dissertation, Sussex
    This thesis introduces the Problem of Consciousness as an antinomy between Physicalism and Primitivism about the phenomenal. I argue that Primitivism is implausible, but is supported by two conceptual gaps. The ‘–tivity gap’ holds that physical states are objective and phenomenal states are subjective, and that there is no entailment from the objective to the subjective. The ‘–trinsicality gap’ holds that physical properties are extrinsic and phenomenal qualities are intrinsic, and that there is no entailment from the extrinsic to the (...)
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  • Ideas and Confusion in Leibniz.Shane Duarte - 2009 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (4):705-733.
    According to Margaret Wilson, Leibniz is inconsistent when it comes to the question of whether one can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities, and this because he sometimes conceives of sensible qualities as sensations and sometimes conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities. When he conceives of them as sensations, he denies that we can have distinct ideas of sensible qualities; when he conceives of them as complexes of primary qualities, he asserts that we can. In this paper I (...)
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  • Von Menschen und Tieren – Leibniz über Apperzeption, Reflexion und conscientia.Sebastian Bender - 2013 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 67 (2):214-241.
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  • Leibniz on Rational Decision-Making.Markku Roinila - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Helsinki
    In this study I discuss G. W. Leibniz's (1646-1716) views on rational decision-making from the standpoint of both God and man. The Divine decision takes place within creation, as God freely chooses the best from an infinite number of possible worlds. While God's choice is based on absolutely certain knowledge, human decisions on practical matters are mostly based on uncertain knowledge. However, in many respects they could be regarded as analogous in more complicated situations. In addition to giving an overview (...)
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  • Leibniz's Alleged Ambivalence About Sensible Qualities.Stephen Puryear - 2012 - Studia Leibnitiana 44 (2):229-245.
    Leibniz has been accused of being ambivalent about the nature of sensible qualities such as color, heat, and sound. According to the critics, he unwittingly vacillates between the view that these qualities are really just complex mechanical qualities of bodies and the competing view that they are something like the perceptions or experiences that confusedly represent these mechanical qualities. Against this, I argue that the evidence for ascribing the first approach to Leibniz is rather strong, whereas the evidence for imputing (...)
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  • Leibniz on Perceptual Distinctness, Activity, and Sensation.Larry M. Jorgensen - 2015 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 53 (1):49-77.
    Leibniz explains both activity and sensation in terms of the relative distinctness of perception. This paper argues that the systematic connection between activity and sensation is illuminated by Leibniz’s use of distinctness in analyzing each. Leibnizian sensation involves two levels of activity: on one level, the relative forcefulness of an expression enables certain expressions to stand out against the perceptual field, but in addition to this there is an activity of the mind that enables sensory experience. This connection of mental (...)
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