Adolf Grünbaum is one of the giants of 20th century philosophy of science. This volume is the first of three collecting his most essential and highly influential work. The essays collected in this first volume focus on three related areas. They discuss scientific rationality-the problem of what it takes for a theory to be called scientific, and ask whether it is plausible to draw a clear distinction between science and non-science as was famously proposed by Karl Popper. They delve into (...) the debate between determinism and indeterminism, in both science and in the humanities. Grünbaum defends the position of the Humane Determinist, which then leads to a thorough criticism of the current theological approaches to ethics and morality-where Grünbaum defends an explicit Secular Humanism-as well as of prominent theistic interpretations of twentieth century physical cosmologies. The second volume is devoted to Grünbaum's writings on the Philosophy of Physics and Space-Time, and the third to his lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, including his 1985 Gifford Lectures, which are to be published for the first time. (shrink)

There is an apparent conflict in Quine’s work between, on the one hand, his clear commitment to the rational revisability of logic and, on the other, his principle of charitable translation and ‘change of logic, change of subject’ argument. I argue that the apparent conflict is mostly resolved under close exegesis, but that the translation argument normatively rules out collaborative revision and allows only revision by individuals. However, I articulate a Neo-Quinean view that preserves the rational acceptability of collaborative revision. (...) On that view, everything is rationally revisable in some manner or other — it’s just that the logical principles that laypersons find (actually or potentially) obvious and tacitly use to govern their everyday inferences can’t be rationally revised quickly and all at once. Since, in Quine’s view, what most people find obvious resists change, rational changes to laymen’s logic must be gradual. (shrink)

In the paper it is shown that every physically sound Birkhoff – von Neumann quantum logic, i.e., an orthomodular partially ordered set with an ordering set of probability measures can be treated as partial infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic, which unifies two competing approaches: the many-valued, and the two-valued but non-distributive, which have co-existed in the quantum logic theory since its very beginning.

In the paper it is shown that every physically sound Birkhoff - von Neumann quantum logic, i.e., an orthomodular partially ordered set with an ordering set of probability measures can be treated as partial infini te-valued Lukasiewicz logic, which unifies two competing approaches: the many-valued, and the two-valued but non-distributive, which have co-existed in the quantum logic theory since its very beginning.

This paper proposes a logic, motivated by modal interpretations, in which every quantum mechanics propositions has a truth-value. This logic is completely classical, hence violates the conditions of the Kochen-Specker theorem. It is shown how the violation occurs, and it is argued that this violation is a natural and acceptable consequence of modal interpretations. It is shown that despite its classicality, the proposed logic is empirically indistinguishable from quantum logic.

ABSTRACT What do we disagree about when we disagree about logic? On the face of it, classical and nonclassical logicians disagree about the laws of logic and the nature of logical properties. Yet, sometimes the parties are accused of talking past each other. The worry is that if the parties to the dispute do not mean the same thing with ‘if’, ‘or’, and ‘not’, they fail to have genuine disagreement about the laws in question. After the work of Quine, this (...) objection against genuine disagreement about logic has been called the meaning-variance thesis. We argue that the meaning-variance thesis can be endorsed without blocking genuine disagreement. In fact, even the type of revisionism and nonapriorism championed by Quine turns out to be compatible with meaning-variance. (shrink)

Following Lukasiewicz, we argue that future non-certain events should be described with the use of many-valued, not 2-valued logic. The Greenberger - Horne - Zeilinger 'paradox' is shown to be an artifact caused by unjustified use of 2-valued logic while considering results of future non-certain events. Description of properties of quantum objects before they are measured should be performed with the use of propositional functions that form a particular model of infinitely-valued Lukasiewicz logic. This model is distinguished by specific operations (...) of negation, conjunction and disjunction that are used in it. (shrink)

According to logical non-necessitarianism, every inference may fail in some situation. In his defense of logical monism, Graham Priest has put forward an argument against non-necessitarianism based on the meaning of connectives. According to him, as long as the meanings of connectives are fixed, some inferences have to hold in all situations. Hence, in order to accept the non-necessitarianist thesis one would have to dispose arbitrarily of those meanings. I want to show here that non-necessitarianism can stand, without disposing arbitrarily (...) of the meanings of connectives, based on a minimalist view on the meanings of connectives. (shrink)

I can make no sense of a true, literal application of the notion of proper (nontemporal) components or parts to things that occupy no space. Others apparently can, and some construct elaborate theories of propositional structure… Perhaps I am blind to a possibility that other, cognitively better endowed philosophers see. From my unseeing perspective, though, it is more likely that the appearance of sight deceives.

Epistemic Logic is our basic universal science, the method of our cognitive confrontation in reality to prove the truth of our basic cognitions and theories. Hence, by proving their true representation of reality we can self-control ourselves in it, and thus refuting the Berkeleyian solipsism and Kantian a priorism. The conception of epistemic logic is that only by proving our true representation of reality we achieve our knowledge of it, and thus we can prove our cognitions to be either true (...) or rather false, and otherwise they are doubtful. Therefore, truth cannot be separated from being proved and we cannot hold anymore the principle of excluded middle, as it is with formal semantics of metaphysical realism. In distinction, the intuitionistic logic is based on subjective intellectual feeling of correctness in constructing proofs, and thus it is epistemologically encapsulated in the metaphysical subject. However, epistemic logic is our basic science which enable us to prove the truth of our cognitions, including the epistemic logic itself. (shrink)

It, is shown that Birkhoff –von Neumann quantum logic (i.e., an orthomodular lattice or poset) possessing an ordering set of probability measures S can be isomorphically represented as a family of fuzzy subsets of S or, equivalently, as a family of propositional functions with arguments ranging over S and belonging to the domain of infinite-valued Łukasiewicz logic. This representation endows BvN quantum logic with a new pair of partially defined binary operations, different from the order-theoretic ones: Łukasiewicz intersection and union (...) of fuzzy sets in the first case and Łukasiewicz conjunction and disjunction in the second. Relations between old and new operations are studied and it is shown that although they coincide whenever new operations are defined, they are not identical in general. The hypothesis that quantum-logical conjunction and disjunction should be represented by Łukasiewicz operations, not by order-theoretic join and meet is formulated and some of its possible consequences are considered. (shrink)

Trata-se aqui, mais uma vez, de uma questão pertinente. Se estiver ou não de acordo com as posições assumidas por Peter Strawson na filosofia da lógica, com sua crítica à interpretação vigente dos enunciados da linguagem ordinária, com sua defesa do sistema tradicional, não há dúvida de que sua discussão nos coloca diante de um fato incontestável: o do desvio que a lógica atualrepresenta, mesmo a chamada “clássica”, no que diz respeito ao corpo da doutrina tradicional aristotélico escolástico.