Knowledge is a topic, widely discussed both in philosophy and in everyday life of a common man who is not aware of its principles and existing connotations. This paper attempts to explain “knowledge”, significance of “Knowing” by incorporating diverse interdisciplinary, multicultural perspectives on understanding of “Knowledge” and its concepts that we experience “knowingly or unknowingly”. It involves a discussion on wisdom-knowledge interaction, their differences and interdependence; reality and its manifestations in various aspects that talks about the nature of reality in (...) general as a concept; and a brief essay on unexplained mystery of “Sampurna gyana” and “Sarwagya” trying to understand it’s possibility in a world of infinite possibilities. (shrink)

Holophobia can be defined as the 'neurotic' fear that semantic holism, if not instantly extirpated by the most radical means, might be a deadly threat to intentional realism. I contend that Fodor exaggerates the threat that meaning holism poses to intentional realism and to a viable account of narrow content in terms of conceptual roles. He particular, he overestimates the relevance for intentional psychology of Quine's demonstration that a substantial analytic/synthetic distinction is out of reach.I argue that all that is (...) needed to defeat the more radical varieties of meaning holism is a weaker distinction than the full-blown and allegedly inexistent analytic/synthetic distinction - namely, a distinction between what is treated as if it were analytic by a cognitive system and what is treated as if it were synthetic. (shrink)

Vision constitutes an interesting domain, or range of domains, for debate over the extended mind thesis, the idea that minds physically extend beyond the boundaries of the body. In part this is because vision and visual experience more particularly are sometimes presented as a kind of line in the sand for what we might call externalist creep about the mind: once all reasonable concessions have been made to externalists about the mind, visual experience marks a line beyond which lies a (...) safe haven for individualists. Here I want to put a little more pressure on such a view of visual experience, as well as to offer a more constructive, positive argument in defense of the idea of extended vision. (shrink)

Saul Kripke’s modal essentialist argument against materialism remains an obstacle to any prospective Identity Theorist. This paper is an attempt to make room for an Identity Theory without dismissing Kripke’s analytic tools or essentialist intuitions. I propose an explanatory model that can make room for the Identity Theory within the constraints of Kripke’s view; the model is based on ideas from Alan Sidelle’s, “Identity and Identity-like” . My model explains the apparent contingency of some scientific identities by appealing to our (...) epistemic access to the conditions of identity for sensations and brain processes. Pace Kripke, the Identity Theorist can thus explain away the apparent contingency of mind-brain identity claims. (shrink)

Response to Frapolli's contribution in the proceedings of the Granada workshop.

In this paper I discuss the scientific respectability of delusion as a psychiatric category. First, I present the essentialist objection to the natural kindhood of psychiatric categories, as well as non-essentialism about natural kinds as a response to that objection. Second, I present a nuanced classification of kinds of kinds. Third, drawing on the claim that the attribution of delusion relies on a folk psychological underpinning, I present the mind-dependence objection to the natural kind status of delusion. Finally, I argue (...) that even if delusion as a generic kind stands little chance of being vindicated as a non-essentialist natural kind, we stand to gain from a natural kind methodology regarding subtypes of delusion for which there is evidence of genuine causal signatures and mechanisms. (shrink)

I do not think the notion of rigidity in designation can be correct, at least not in any way that can serve to ground a semantics purports both to be fundamental in a semiotical sense and to the best science of the day. A careful examination of both content and the character of our best scientific knowledge not cannot support anything like what the notion of rigidity requires, but actually shows the notion to be, at bottom, incoherent. In particular, the (...) scientific meaning of natural kind terms can be determined only within the context of a fixed scientific framework and not sub specie aeternitatis. Along the way, I provide grounds for the rejection of essentialist views of the ontology of natural kinds. (shrink)

The paper mainly deals with the problem of reference of proper names. Unlike definite descriptions, proper names in themselves possess no exact necessary and sufficient conditions for making successful performance of reference. This is the consequence of the fact that proper names just name their bearers and do not describe them. It is argued that Frege’s theory violates this fact, and therefore can be taken only as a view about the meaning of proper names, not as a theory of reference. (...) Two conceptions of Strawson designed to solve the problem are mentioned – the cluster description theory and the communication chain theory. The second one is refused immediately, as unrealistic view on referential behaviour of proper names. Then Searle’s version of cluster description theory, more elaborate one than Strawson’s, is analyzed. However, it is shown that this conception is unsatisfactory as well, because either it invokes Kripke’s and Donnellan’s objections against any description theory or its explanation of reference of proper names is circular. (shrink)

The nominalist attitude in medieval logic supported a fully extensional conception of the sense of expressions. Many arguments against this approach were raised at that time. I would like to show in this article that there is a extensional conception of notions in current logic, namely in the interpretation of formal theories and the creation models of them and that, and how, traditional arguments against the extensional conception are relevant also for logic today.

I present a definition of expertise that involves both epistemic and political authority. I argue that these two forms of authority require different treatments and defend a political epistemology that articulates a division of cognitive labor between political and epistemic authority.

of (from Philosophy Dissertations Online).

I examine Mark Rowlands' book, 'The Body in Mind'.

The subject of zombies is one of the most discussed and controversial topics of philosophy of mind. In this paper I will first examine the main argument of zombies, providing a summary of the current discussion. Then I will introduce a thought experiment, an epistemic window on a metaphysical scenario. By the thought experiment I will argue that zombies are logically impossible. Further I will discuss another recent epistemic window. Finally I will provide some other logical consideration to prove that (...) intentionality is not reducible to the cognitive functional aspects of the mind and that, moreover, the subjective recognition of semantic contents is necessary in order to consider as sensical the verbal behavior of a zombie. (shrink)

This paper is a study of a distinctively chemical notion of possibility. This is the notion of possibility that occurs in chemical discourses when chemists speak of the possibility or impossibility of achieving a given result through chemical means. This notion pertains to the possibility of processes, not of compounds, so it differs from the kind of chemical possibility mentioned in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations or the kinds discussed in the literature on Putnam's Twin Earth argument. I argue that this process-oriented (...) notion of possibility cannot be reduced in a simple way to physical possibility, and that standard possible worlds semantics does not allow a natural analysis of this notion. I suggest an extension of possible worlds semantics that may overcome this limitation. I finish by pointing out some open questions about chemical possibility. (shrink)