The juxtaposition encompassed in the phrase "feminist epistemology" strikes some feminist theorists and mainstream epistemologists as incongruous. To others, the phrase signals the view that epistemology and the philosophy of science are not what some of their practitioners and advocates have wanted or claimed them to be-but also are not "dead," as some of their critics proclaim. This essay explores the grounds for and implications of each view and recommends the second.

I outline a pragmatic account of evidence, arguing that it allows us to underwrite two implications of feminist scholarship: that knowledge is socially constructed and constrained by evidence, and that social relations, including gender, race, and class, are epistemologically significant. What makes the account promising is that it abandons any pretense of a view from nowhere, the view of evidence as something only individuals gather or have, and the view that individual theories face experience in isolation.

This essay focuses on the extent to which the methods of analytic philosophy can be useful to feminist philosophers. I pose nine general questions feminist philosophers might ask to determine the suitability of a philosophical method. Examples include: Do its typical ways of formulating problems or issues encourage the inclusion of a wide variety of women's points of view? Are its central concepts gender-biased, not merely in their origin, but in very deep, continuing ways? Does it facilitate uncovering roles that (...) gender, politics, power, and social context play in philosophy as well as in other facets of life? (shrink)

Experimental psychology has much to offer the current debate about memories of childhood abuse. However, laboratory scientists, with their enormous cognitive authority to define reality for the rest of the population, must be especially conservative when arguing that laboratory results on memory generalize to contested memories of abuse. Researchers must make an effort to untangle the appropriate from inappropriate application of research results to this debate. A crucial untangling strategy for future research on general phenomena involves taking care to pose (...) questions separately. When the research is disseminated, its relevance and its limitations must be carefully communicated. Finally, scientists must attend to their power to define reality for others. (shrink)

In this paper and the next I discuss Peter Singer’s approach to answering the question of how one ought to live with nonhuman animals. In the first paper I situate Singer’s work within the larger historical context of moral concern for animals, looking at previous public consensus on the issue, its breakdown and its re-emergence with Singer in the 1970s. In the second paper, I take a closer look at Singer’s highly influential book, Animal Liberation , and argue that as (...) activist literature, his chapter on animal experimentation for example can be seen as morally persuasive in ways other than simply as an example of of speciesism. How I do this is to place Singer’s work side by side that of 19th century activist Francis Power Cobbe’s, in particular her pamphlet Light in Dark Places , and examine their work against the criticisms from scientists defending the practice of animal experimentation. (shrink)