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In W. V. O. Quine (ed.), Ontological relativity. New York,Columbia University Press. pp. 26--68 (1968)

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  1. Putting things in contexts.Ben Caplan - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214.
    Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...)
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  • Algebraization of quantifier logics, an introductory overview.István Németi - 1991 - Studia Logica 50 (3-4):485 - 569.
    This paper is an introduction: in particular, to algebras of relations of various ranks, and in general, to the part of algebraic logic algebraizing quantifier logics. The paper has a survey character, too. The most frequently used algebras like cylindric-, relation-, polyadic-, and quasi-polyadic algebras are carefully introduced and intuitively explained for the nonspecialist. Their variants, connections with logic, abstract model theory, and further algebraic logics are also reviewed. Efforts were made to make the review part relatively comprehensive. In some (...)
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  • Inscrutability.Mark Richard - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):165-209.
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  • Intuition, Hypothesis, and Reality.David K. Johnson - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Realism about the external, natural world is an overarching empirical hypothesis. The method of hypothetical realism rejects as an excessive concession to the skeptic these two assumptions of constructivist intuitionism: first, that everything real must be exhaustively inspectable; and second, that our beliefs are to be justified to the point of certainty. We prefer to say that nothing is ever known directly; that all of our contact with the world is mediated by thoughts, words, and percepts construed as signs having (...)
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