The paper is a critique of Alvin Plantinga’s notion that belief in God is properly basic - evidence is not needed to justify such belief - in light of Thomas Aquinas’ religious epistemology. The latter’s epistemology proves that, while evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God based on his Summa Theologica since such belief is evidence itself from his De Veritate, there is sufficient evidence that justifies such belief. First, I argue that Plantinga’s total rejection of evidence (...) as a justification for belief in God renders such belief purely subjective. To rationally ground this purely subjective belief, Plantinga introduces the notion of justification-conferring conditions. Second, following Thomas Aquinas’ thought, Plantinga’s justification negates his claim that belief in God is properly basic because the said justification-conferring conditions seem to function as an evidence for belief in God. I will conclude the work by claiming that although evidence is not a necessary condition for belief in God, it is epistemically sufficient to justify the said belief. (shrink)

This chapter covers contemporary work on disagreement, detailing both the conceptual and normative issues in play in the debates in mainstream analytic epistemology, and how these relate to religious diversity and disagreement. §1 examines several sorts of disagreement, and considers several epistemological issues: in particular, what range of attitudes a body of evidence can support, how to understand higher-order evidence, and who counts as an epistemic “peer”. §2 considers how these questions surface when considering disagreements over religion, including debates over (...) the nature of evidence and truth in religion, epistemic humility, concerns about irrelevant influences and about divine hiddenness, and arguments over exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. Finally, §3 summarizes the contributors’ essays in this volume. (shrink)

With respect to many, if not most issues, there exist significant differences of opinion among individuals who seem to be equally knowledgeable and sincere. Individuals who apparently have access to the same information and are equally interested in the truth affirm incompatible perspectives on, for instance, significant social, political, and economic issues. Such diversity of opinion, though, is nowhere more evident than in the area of religious thought. On almost every religious issue, honest, knowledgeable people hold significantly diverse, often incompatible (...) beliefs. -/- Religious diversity of this sort can fruitfully be explored in many ways — for instance, from psychological, anthropological, or historical perspectives. The current discussion, however, will concern itself primarily with those key issues surrounding religious diversity with which philosophers, especially analytic philosophers of religion, are most concerned at present. Specifically, our discussion will focus primarily on the following questions: How pervasive is religious diversity? Does the reality of this diversity require a response? Can a person who acknowledges religious diversity remain justified in claiming just one perspective to be correct? If so, is it morally justifiable to attempt to convert others to a different perspective? Can it justifiably be claimed that only one religion offers a path into the eternal presence of God? The answers to such questions are not simply academic. They increasingly have great impact on how we treat others, both personally and corporately. (shrink)

We’ve all heard the familiar saying, “ignorance is bliss.” It may also be true that “ignorance is intolerant.” But it seems to be at least sometimes true that intolerance is produced by something else: overconfidence in the truthfulness of one’s own opinions. Awareness of and avoidance of such overconfidence may be a path towards tolerating those with whom one disagrees. And this could be true in religion as well as in other areas of belief. In his 2005 article “On Religious (...) Diversity and Tolerance,” Philip L. Quinn argues that awareness of religious diversity, coupled with various other considerations, leads to a degree of modesty about the truth claims of one’s religion, and that such modesty leads to tolerance of other religions. However, in his 2007 paper “Is Uncertainty a Sound Foundation for Religious Tolerance,” William Lane Craig takes issue with Quinn’s position, arguing that Quinn’s “radical skepticism” about religious beliefs is not warranted and that “doubt” is not a sound foundation for tolerance. In this paper I contend that cognitive humility is warranted, that it is not a form of skepticism, that it does not entail doubt, and that it may contribute significantly to religious tolerance. I defend Quinn’s thesis by offering a version that is based on certain epistemic considerations that help the reader to see Quinn’s argument in a new and strengthened light. I then argue that Quinn’s approach to tolerance has at least one significant advantage over the approach proposed by Craig: acceptability to all religious traditions. (shrink)