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  1. Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part I: Rudolf Carnap.Sander Verhaegh - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (11).
    In the years before the Second World War, Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach emigrated to the United States, escaping the quickly deteriorating political situation on the continent. Once in the U. S., the two significantly changed the American philosophical climate. This two-part paper reconstructs Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the impact of their arrival in the late 1930s. Building on archival material of several key players and (...)
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  • Coming to America: Carnap, Reichenbach and the Great Intellectual Migration. Part II: Hans Reichenbach.Sander Verhaegh - 2020 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 8 (11).
    In the late 1930s, a few years before the start of the Second World War, a small number of European philosophers of science emigrated to the United States, escaping the increasingly perilous situation on the continent. Among the first expatriates were Rudolf Carnap and Hans Reichenbach, arguably the most influential logical empiricists of their time. In this two-part paper, I reconstruct Carnap’s and Reichenbach’s surprisingly numerous interactions with American academics in the decades before their move in order to explain the (...)
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  • Carnap and Quine: First Encounters (1932-1936).Sander Verhaegh - 2022 - In Sean Morris (ed.), The Philosophical Project of Carnap and Quine. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-31.
    Carnap and Quine first met in the 1932-33 academic year, when the latter, fresh out of graduate school, visited the key centers of mathematical logic in Europe. In the months that Carnap was finishing his Logische Syntax der Sprache, Quine spent five weeks in Prague, where they discussed the manuscript “as it issued from Ina Carnap’s typewriter”. The philosophical friendship that emerged in these weeks would have a tremendous impact on the course of analytic philosophy. Not only did the meetings (...)
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  • The Behaviorisms of Skinner and Quine: Genesis, Development, and Mutual Influence.Sander Verhaegh - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (4):707-730.
    in april 1933, two bright young Ph.D.s were elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows: the psychologist B. F. Skinner and the philosopher/logician W. V. Quine. Both men would become among the most influential scholars of their time; Skinner leads the "Top 100 Most Eminent Psychologists of the 20th Century," whereas philosophers have selected Quine as the most important Anglophone philosopher after the Second World War.1 At the height of their fame, Skinner and Quine became "Edgar Pierce twins"; the latter (...)
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  • Pasch's empiricism as methodological structuralism.Dirk Schlimm - 2020 - In Erich H. Reck & Georg Schiemer (eds.), The Pre-History of Mathematical Structuralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 80-105.
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  • The Early Formation of Modal Logic and its Significance: A Historical Note on Quine, Carnap, and a Bit of Church.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2018 - History and Philosophy of Logic 39 (3):289-304.
    The aim of the paper is to show that W. V. O. Quine's animadversions against modal logic did not get the same attention that is considered to be the case nowadays. The community of logicians focused solely on the technical aspects of C. I. Lewis’ systems and did not take Quine's arguments and remarks seriously—or at least seriously enough to respond. In order to assess Quine's place in the history, however, his relation to Carnap is considered since their notorious break (...)
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  • The mathematical philosophy of Charles Parsons. [REVIEW]J. M. B. Moss - 1985 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (4):437-457.
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  • Scientific Philosophy and the Critique of Metaphysics from Russell to Carnap to Quine.Sean Morris - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):773-799.
    In his “Wissenschaftslogik: The Role of Logic in the Philosophy of Science,” Michael Friedman argues that Carnap’s philosophy of science “is fundamentally anti-metaphysical—he aims to use the tools of mathematical logic to dissolve rather [than] solve traditional philosophical problems—and it is precisely this point that is missed by his logically-minded contemporaries such as Hempel and Quine”. In this paper, I take issue with this claim, arguing that Quine, too, is a part of this anti-metaphysical tradition. I begin in section I (...)
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  • Inception of Quine's ontology.Lieven Decock - 2004 - History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):111-129.
    This paper traces the development of Quine's ontological ideas throughout his early logical work in the period before 1948. It shows that his ontological criterion critically depends on this work in logic. The use of quantifiers as logical primitives and the introduction of general variables in 1936, the search for adequate comprehension axioms, and problems with proper classes, all forced Quine to consider ontological questions. I also show that Quine's rejection of intensional entities goes back to his generalisation of Principia (...)
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  • Quine and Quantified Modal Logic – Against the Received View.Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2015 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 22 (4):518-545.
    The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified (...)
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