This paper casts doubts on John Broome's view that vagueness in value comparisons crowds out incommensurability in value. It shows how vagueness can be imposed on a formal model of value relations that has room for different types of incommensurability. The model implements some basic insights of the ‘fitting attitudes’ analysis of value.

According to an influential tradition in value analysis, to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude – a fitting object of favoring. If it is fitting to favor an object for its own sake, then, in this view, the object has final value. If it is fitting to favor an object for the sake of its effects, then its value is instrumental. Disvalue is connected in the analogous way to disfavoring, i.e., to con-attitudes. For a history (...) of this fitting-attitudes analysis, or FA-analysis for short, see the following text. The label itself was coined rather recently, though, in Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen. (shrink)

According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value (FA-analysis), to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This (...) move allows to formally model probability and probability relations in essentially the same way as value and value relations. One of the advantages of the model is that we get a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilities, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between different types of incommensurability. It also becomes possible to draw a clear distinction between incommensurability and vagueness (indeterminacy) in probability comparisons. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's fitting-attitude analysis of comparative value, it is possible to analyse both standard and non-standard value relations in terms of the standard preference relations and two levels of normativity. In a recent article, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz's analysis violates a principle of value–preference symmetry, according to which for any value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation. Gustafsson has proposed an alternative analysis which respects this principle and which allegedly accounts for the idea that (...) originally motivated Rabinowicz's analysis, namely, that in some cases different preference relations between a pair of items are equally permissible. The goal of my article is to show that the arguments offered by Gustafsson in favour of his account do not succeed. In particular, I argue that Gustafsson faces a dilemma: either he abandons the principle of value–preference symmetry or he cannot make conceptual room for multiple permissible preferences. (shrink)

According to Wlodek Rabinowicz's (2008) fitting-attitude analysis of value relations, two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to strictly prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite strict preference. Rabinowicz’s account is subject, however, to one important objection: if strict preferences involve betterness judgements, then his analysis contrasts with the intuitive understanding of parity. In this paper, I examine Rabinowicz’s three responses to this objection and argue that they do not (...) succeed. I then propose an alternative solution. I argue that the objection can be avoided if we ‘relativize’ Rabinowicz’s account and define parity in terms of opposite strict preferences between two items that are only relatively permissible, rather than permissible simpliciter. I argue that this account of parity can be defended if we take seriously the distinction between sufficient and decisive reason for a preference relation. I also show that, on the basis of this distinction, we can arrive at a more extensive taxonomy of value relations than the one proposed by Rabinowicz. (shrink)

Comment pouvons-nous analyser des relations de valeur non standards, comme la parité axiologique, en termes d’attitudes appropriées? Wlodek Rabinowicz suggère que deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est à la fois permissible de préférer l’une à l’autre et permissible d’avoir la préférence contraire. Dans un article récent, Johan Gustafsson soutient toutefois que l’analyse de Rabinowicz viole un principe de symétrie entre valeurs et préférences, selon lequel il existe pour toute relation de valeur une relation de préférence (...) correspondante (et vice-versa). À la lumière de ce principe, Gustafsson propose une analyse alternative, selon laquelle deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est requis d’entretenir ces choses en parité préférentielle. Dans cet article, j’examine en détail les arguments avancés par Gustafsson contre l’analyse de Rabinowicz et je montre qu’aucun d’eux n’est convaincant. (shrink)

According to the fitting-attitude analysis of value , to be valuable is to be a fitting object of a pro-attitude. In earlier publications, setting off from this format of analysis, I proposed a modelling of value relations which makes room for incommensurability in value. In this paper, I first recapitulate the value modelling and then move on to suggest adopting a structurally similar analysis of probability. Indeed, many probability theorists from Poisson onwards did adopt an analysis of this kind. This (...) move allows to formally model probability and probability relations in essentially the same way as value and value relations. One of the advantages of the model is that we get a new account of Keynesian incommensurable probabilities, which goes beyond Keynes in distinguishing between different types of incommensurability. It also becomes possible to draw a clear distinction between incommensurability and vagueness in probability comparisons. (shrink)

This dissertation is about the partiality problem for fitting attitude (FA) analyses of value. More specifically, it is about whether and how the problem might be resolved. In Chapter 1, I set the stage by offering a short introduction to the topic and a rationale for investigating it. I then give a more detailed account of FA analyses of value in Chapter 2, including a brief outline of their history and appeal, before explaining more thoroughly just what the partiality problem (...) is for such analyses in Chapter 3, where I distinguish between several different versions of the problem, identify two broad strategies for resolving it and put forward six evaluation criteria in terms of which the plausibility of a resolution can be assessed. According to FA analyses of value, what it is for something to have value is, roughly, for it to be fitting to have a certain sort of attitude toward it. To have a positive value, such as being good, is to be something that it is fitting to favor (to have a pro-attitude toward); to have a negative value, such as being bad, is to be something that it is fitting to disfavor (to have a con-attitude toward); and to have a relational or comparative value like being better than, worse than, equally good as or equally bad as something else is to be something that it is fitting to favor more than, disfavor more than, favor equally much as or disfavor equally much as the other thing. The partiality problem is, roughly, that there are situations in which two things seem to have equal value, which, if things are as they seem and FA analyses of value are correct, means that it is fitting to respond to them equally – to be impartial between them. However, in these situations, there are some people for whom it does not seem fitting to respond in that way because they stand in a certain relationship to one of the bearers of value. For these people, it seems that the fitting response is an unequal or partial response, not an impartial one. If such intuitions about fitting partiality and value are veridical, then how can FA analyses of value be correct? The rest of the dissertation is then a critical, in-depth study of a wide range of responses to the partiality problem. In Chapter 4, I examine the first of the two response strategies, which is to deny the veracity of at least one of the intuitions that generate the problem without making any changes to the FA analyses themselves. I then turn to the second strategy, which is to try to accommodate the intuitions by revising the FA analyses in some suitable manner. In Chapters 5–13, I consider the possibility and plausibility of solving the problem by revising the FA analyses on the basis of: the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties (Chapter 5), the notion of basic value (Chapter 6), the notion of agent-relative value (Chapter 7), the notion of an impartial observer (Chapter 8), the distinction between moral and non-moral fittingness (Chapter 9), a sui generis notion of fittingness (Chapter 10), the distinction between pro tanto and overall fittingness (Chapter 11), the distinction between actions and attitudes (Chapter 12) and the notions of evaluative distance and perspective (Chapter 13). My assessment is that none of these responses is entirely plausible. Thus, in Chapter 14, I conclude that although the partiality problem may not be irresolvable, it is yet to receive a fully plausible resolution. I also discuss the ramifications of this conclusion. (shrink)