This paper considers whether theism is compatible with moral error theory. This issue is neglected, perhaps because it is widely assumed that these views are incompatible. I argue that this is mistaken. In so doing, I articulate the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible. According to it, these views are incompatible because theism entails that God is morally good, and moral error theory entails that God is not. I reject this argument. Since it is (...) the best argument for thinking that theism and moral error theory are incompatible, I conclude that these views are compatible: one can coherently accept both views. (shrink)

This paper outlines a possible state of affairs in which human moral autonomy and a divine command ethical theory coexist. the theory of human moral autonomy agrees with the divine command theory that moral laws are created by an act of legislation. they disagree on who is the legitimate legislator. the paper argues that a rational agent faced with equally acceptable but incompatible solutions to moral problems or faced with disagreement among agents who insist on exercising their moral autonomy is (...) justified in accepting unconditionally the legitimacy of divine commands legislated by a just, merciful and loving god. (shrink)

It has been alleged against divine command theory that we cannot justify our acceptance of it without giving it up. For if we provide moral reasons for our acceptance of God’s commands, then those reasons, and not God’s commands, must be our ultimate moral standard. Kai Nielsen has offered the most forceful version of this objection in his book, Ethics Without God. My principal aim is to show that Nielsen’s charge does not succeed. His argument crucially relies upon the assumption (...) that the moral judgments one employs to justify acceptance of a normative theory are more fundamental to one’s moral outlook than the theory itself. I argue that this assumption presupposes a questionable foundationalist view of theory justification, and if we instead adopt a coherentist reflective equilibrium stance, we can thoughtfully evaluate DCT without abandoning it. (shrink)

In this article, I look at recent developments in the field of the Philosophy of the relationship between morality, understood in a realist manner, and the primary object of religious belief in the monotheistic religions, God. Some contemporary solutions to the Euthyphro dilemma and versions of moral arguments for the existence of God are discussed.

Philosophers have long wondered whether God exists; and yet, they have ignored the question of whether we should hope that He exists – call this stance aspirational theism. In this article, I argue that we have a weighty pro tanto reason to adopt this stance: theism offers a metaphysical guarantee against gratuitous suffering. On the other hand, few atheist alternatives offer such a guarantee – and even then, there are reasons to worry that they are inferior to the theistic alternative. (...) Given this difference, we have a strong pro tanto, but not all-things-considered, reason to adopt aspirational theism. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the self-abasement account of humility is misguided and present Thomas Aquinas’s approach as a more adequate alternative. Starting out from the recent debate, I delineate and criticize three strategies to model humility. Contrasting these strategies, I argue that humility is best understood as a form of realistic self-insight. Following Aquinas’s ‘secunda secundae,’ I finally discuss why the proposed account is fragmentary, and should be supplemented by the concept of magnanimity.

What does autonomy mean from a moral point of view? Throughout Western history, autonomy has had no less than four different meanings. The first is political: the capacity of old cities and modern states to give themselves their own laws. The second is metaphysical, and was introduced by Kant in the second half of the 18th century. In this meaning, autonomy is understood as an intrinsic characteristic of all rational beings. Opposed to this is the legal meaning, in which actions (...) are called autonomous when performed with due information and competency and without coercion. This last meaning, the most frequently used in bioethics, is primarily legal instead of moral. Is there a proper moral meaning of the word autonomy? If so, this would be a fourth meaning. Acts can only be called moral when they are postconventional (using the terminology coined by Lawrence Kohlberg), inner-directed (as expressed by David Riesman), and responsible (according to Hannah Arendt). Such acts are autonomous in this new, fourth, and to my mind, the only one proper, moral meaning. The goal of ethics cannot be other than forming human beings capable of making autonomous and responsible decisions, and doing so because they think this is their duty and not because of any other nonmoral motivation, like comfort, convenience, or satisfaction. The goal of ethics is to promote postconventional and mature human beings. This was what Socrates tried to do with the young people of Athens. And it is also the objective of every course of ethics and of any process of training. (shrink)

Theories of ethics that attempt to incorporate divine speech or commands as necessary elements in the construction of moral obligations are often viewed as vulnerable to a challenge based on the so-called Euthyphro dilemma. According to this challenge, opponents of theistic ethics suppose that divine speech either informs one of a preexisting set of values and obligations, which makes it inconsequential, or is entirely arbitrary, which makes it irrational. This essay analyzes some of the debates on the nature of divine (...) commands in eleventh-century works of Islamic jurisprudence. I show that Muʿtazilī jurisprudents advanced the view that divine commands were actions performed in time that had concrete manifestations, while Ashʿarīs argued that divine speech in general, and commands in particular, were eternal divine attributes. After exposing certain weaknesses in the Euthyphro-inspired objections to theistic ethics, I argue that the Ashʿarī idea of commands as divine attributes is a promising move for scholars interested in defending a divine command view of moral obligation. (shrink)

In this dissertation I examine the topics of ethics, religion, and their relationship in the work of Charles Taylor. I take Taylor's attempt to confront modern disenchantment by seeking a kind of re-enchantment as my guiding thread. Seeking re-enchantment means, first of all, defending an `engaged realist' account of strong evaluation, i.e., qualitative distinctions of value that are seen as normative for our desires. Secondly, it means overcoming self-enclosure and achieving self-transcendence, which I argue should be understood in terms of (...) transcending a `lower' mode of selfhood for a `higher' one in concern for `strong goods'. One of the main issues that Taylor raises is whether re-enchantment requires theism for its full adequacy. He advances - often as `hunches' - controversial claims regarding the significance of theism (1) for defending strong evaluative realism and (2) for motivating an ethic of universal human concern. I seek to fill out his hunches in terms of a theistic teleological perspective that is centered on the `telos of communion'. I argue that such a view is important for overcoming the problem of what Bernard Williams calls the `radical contingency' of ethical beliefs, which seems to undermine their normative authority. However, I argue that if a non-theistic view of cosmic purpose (e.g., Thomas Nagel's view) can be regarded as a viable option, then it could also help to address this problem and support a kind of re-enchantment. Taylor also advances the controversial view that (3) there is an ineradicable draw to `transcendence' in human life in connection to the quest for the meaning of life. Here he opposes certain mainstream theories of secularization that see it as a process involving the ineluctable fading away of the relevance of religion. I seek to fill out and defend Taylor's view in this matter. Besides providing a reading of Taylor's work as a whole and advancing further some of the issues he raises, I also examine his general evaluative framework based on his account of strong evaluation. In doing so I show how he provides a distinct and important perspective among contemporary moral philosophers. (shrink)

در سنت برهان‌آوری کلاسیک، برهان‌های اخلاقی برای اثبات خدا اقامه شده است. به موازات این برهان‌ها و هم‌ارز با آنها براهین اخلاقی برای انکار خدا اقامه شده است. این سؤال مطرح می‌شود که آیا وجود برهان‌های اخلاقی در ردّ خدا به معنای بی‌اعتباری براهین اخلاقی در اثبات خداست؟ و آیا این براهینِ ضد باعث نمی‌شود ایمان خداباوران نامعقول باشد؟ ادعای ما این است که طرحی در زمینه بازتعریف برهان یافته‌ایم که می‌تواند سبب برون‌رفت براهین اخلاقی خداباوری از چالش برهان‌های اخلاقی (...) ضد باشد. در این پژوهش هشت برهان اخلاقی الحادی را در تاریخ فلسفه استخراج کردیم و طرح اصلاح ماهیت برهان از سوی ماورودس را بر آنها پیاده کردیم و نشان دادیم که خداباور می‌تواند همچنان از براهین اخلاقی خداباورانه دفاع کند و در باور به وجود خدا معقول باشد. البته توجه داریم که طرح اصلاح ماهیت برهان هزینه‌ای معرفت‌شناختی در پی دارد و آن این که براهین ضد نیز می‌توانند در چشم‌اندازها و دیدگاه‌های مورد پذیرش خود معقول انگاشته شوند. (shrink)

آنچه ما «استدلال انتفاء» می‌خوانیم دومین استدلال از سه استدلالی است که خواجه نصیرالدین طوسی، در کتاب تأثیرگذار تجرید الاعتقاد، بر حسن و قبح عقلی اقامه کرده است. بر پایۀ این استدلال، نفی حسن و قبح عقلی مستلزم نفی حسن و قبح شرعی است. نتیجۀ مورد نظر خواجه و مقدمات استدلال، به دلیل وجود جهات متفاوت معناشناختی، هستی‌شناختی و معرفت‌شناختی، قابلیت تفسیرهای متعدد دارد. صورت‌بندی منطقی معقول‌ترین خوانش استدلال، که آن را خوانش شکاکانه نامیده‌ایم، نشان می‌دهد که نتیجۀ آن انکار (...) حسن و قبحِ شرعیِ معرفت‌شناختی است، که البته مشکلات همین تقریر نیز آن را در ردّ نظریۀ حسن و قبح شرعی معرفت‌شناختی ناتوان ساخته است. از جمله این اشکالات می‌توان این موارد اشاره کرد: خبری دانستن طریق شرع برای اعلام حسن و قبح افعال، ابهام در مفهوم امکان به‌کاررفته در استدلال، استفاده از مقدمات غیربدیهی غیرمستدل، و خلط میان وقوع دروغ‌گویی و امکان دروغ‌گویی در غیر قابل اعتماد دانستن دیگری در اِخبار خود. روشن است که این مقاله در پی دفاع از حسن و قبح شرعی یا ردّ حسن و قبح عقلی نیست و ادعای آن صرفاً ناتمام بودن استدلال انتفاء بر حسن و قبح عقلی است. (shrink)