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  1. Shaftesbury’s place in the history of moral realism.T. H. Irwin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (4):865-882.
    Whewell and ShaftesburyIn contemporary moral philosophy ‘moral realism’ refers to a position in the metaphysics of morality that is analogous to realism about ordinary objects, and to scientific realism about theoretical entities. It is a realist doctrine in contrast to non-cognitivism, constructivism, fictionalism, and nihilism about moral judgments and moral properties. But while these particular contrasts are characteristic of contemporary philosophy, realism itself is much older. Ross, Prichard, and Sidgwick, for instance, hold realist views in the metaphysics of morals, though (...)
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  • Exciting Reasons and Moral Rationalism in Hutcheson's Illustrations upon the Moral Sense.John J. Tilley - 2012 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 50 (1):53-83.
    One of the most oft-cited parts of Francis Hutcheson’s Illustrations upon the Moral Sense (1728) is his discussion of “exciting reasons.” In this paper I address the question: What is the function of that discussion? In particular, what is its relation to Hutcheson’s attempt to show that the rationalists’ normative thesis ultimately implies, contrary to their moral epistemology, that moral ideas spring from a sense? Despite first appearances, Hutcheson’s discussion of exciting reasons is not part of that attempt. Mainly, it (...)
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  • L’ontologie des vertus dans l’Inquiry de Hutcheson.François-Xavier L. Massé - 2012 - Ithaque 10:19-41.
    Hutcheson fonde sa théorie morale sur un « sens moral ». Ce sens nous permet de faire des distinctions morales. Cette théorie donnera lieu à un débat sur la réalité des valeurs morales. Selon certains commentateurs, nos distinctions morales portent sur des faits moraux réels que l’on peut connaître empiriquement grâce à notre sens moral. Inversement, certains soutiendront que le sens moral ne produit pas de connaissance morale. Les jugements moraux issus de ce sens sont des réponses émotionnelles plus ou (...)
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