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Knowing and telling

Colin Radford

Philosophical Review 78 (3):326-336 (1969)

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A stag hunt with signalling and mutual beliefs.Jelle de Boer - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.details The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 1 citation
(1 other version)Common Knowledge.Harvey Lederman - 2016 - In Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-195.details An opinionated introduction to philosophical issues connected to common knowledge. Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
Backward induction and beliefs about oneself.Michael Bacharach - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):247-284.details According to decision theory, the rational initial action in a sequential decision-problem may be found by backward induction or folding back. But the reasoning which underwrites this claim appeals to the agent's beliefs about what she will later believe, about what she will later believe she will still later believe, and so forth. There are limits to the depth of people's beliefs. Do these limits pose a threat to the standard theory of rational sequential choice? It is argued, first, that (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 3 citations
Moore's problem with iterated belief.Roy Sorensen - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):28-43.details Positive thinkers love Watty Piper's The little engine that could. The story features a train laden with toys for deserving children on the other side of the mountain. After the locomotive breaks down, a sequence of snooty locomotives come up the track. Each engine refuses to pull the train up the mountain. They are followed by a weary old locomotive that declines, saying "I cannot. I cannot. I cannot." But then a bright blue engine comes up the track. He manages (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 9 citations
The Vagueness of Knowledge.Roy A. Sorensen - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (4):767 - 804.details This paper is intended to show how epistemologists can profit from the study of ways in which 'know' is vague. Topics include the kk thesis, Incorrigibility of sense data, A resemblance between infinity and vagueness, Common knowledge, Naive holism, Question-Begging, Epistemic universalizability, The prediction paradox, The completability of epistemology, And harman's social knowledge cases. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
How to fake Munchausen's syndrome.Michael Veber - 2010 - Philosophical Psychology 23 (5):565-574.details Sorensen raises the issue of whether it is logically possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome by way of a fictional exchange between a physician and an insurance company. In this paper, it is shown that it is possible to fake Munchausen's syndrome and to fake faking Munchausen's syndrome. The implications of this on deeper philosophical issues such as Lewis' puzzle of iterated pretence and “internalist” versus “externalist” accounts of faking are discussed. An externalist account of faking is defended and offered as (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

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