The question of nothingness occupies the thinking of a number of philosophers in the first half of the twentieth-century, with three of the most important responses being those of Henri Bergson, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Surprisingly, however, there has been little discussion of their specific comments on nothingness either individually or comparatively. This paper starts to remedy this by suggesting that, while Bergson dismisses nothingness as a pseudo-problem based in a flawed metaphysical understanding, Heidegger, in What is Metaphysics?, claims (...) that metaphysics entails a covering of being meaning that Bergson’s analysis actually depends on and so brings thinking to a questioning of being. In turn, Heidegger’s insight acts as the transitional point for Sartre who criticizes Bergson’s description of nothingness to show that, following Heidegger, nothingness is a real ontological problem. From this insight, Sartre distinguishes between negativity, nothingness, and nihilation to show that the issue of nothingness is intimately connected to the freedom of human consciousness, which, by distinguishing between ontological and practical freedom, reveals that nothingness has ethical and political significance. By way of conclusion, a number of problems in Sartre’s account are identified. (shrink)

Straipsnyje plėtojama apšvietos idealų kritika, pabrėžiamas sąžiningo proto ir objektyvios saviapgaulės ribotumas ir aiškinamos egzistencijos ir nepamatiškumo sąsajos. Objektyvacija, principingumas, nuoseklus sąžiningumas yra apšvietos paskatinti krypsmai, kurie ir šiandien veikia politinius ir institucinius sprendimus ir visuomenės reguliavimą. Straipsnyje polemiškai analizuojami: a) Hegelio samprotavimai apie apšviestą sąžiningą ir nelaimingą protą, objektyvacijos ribotumą, tarnystę abstraktiems principams, kurie išdėstyti „Dvasios fenomenologijoje“; b) Sartre’o diskusija apie sąžiningą, nuoseklią, principingą saviapgaulę ir žmogaus būties kartu su kitais fenomenas, aiškinami kūriniai „Būtis ir Niekis“ ir „Egzistencializmas – (...) tai humanizmas“; c) aptariamas nepamatiškumas kaip egzistencinio apsisprendimo prielaida ir jo sąsajos su politiškumu ir alternatyvų svarstymu. Straipsnyje aptariamas veiklus, integruotas į visuomenę ir įgalinantis žmogus, kuris kartu su kitais nuolatos peržengia objektyvizmo ir principingumo suvaržymus, atveria kelią alternatyviam dialogui, diplomatijai ir politiškumui. Straipsnio tikslas yra aktualizuoti sąžiningo proto ir apšviestosios saviapgaulės kritiką, kuri taikoma dabarties objektyvistinėms nuostatoms ir tariamai pakankamai pagrįstiems socialinio konstruktyvizmo sprendimams. (shrink)

Existentialist philosophy offers an understanding of how trying to eliminate ambiguities that inevitably mark the human condition only seemingly leads to freedom. This existentialist outlook can also serve to shed light on how democratic politics may similarly show tendencies which aim at overcoming immanent tensions. Such tendencies in democratic politics can be clarified using Sartre’s notion of ignorance – and truth as its counterpart. His concept of ignorance goes beyond merely facts or knowledge and refers to a mode of being. (...) It expresses a subject’s desire to avoid, rather than confront, resistances stemming from the world. Based on a distinction of different forms in which this orientation can manifest itself, this article shows how democratic politics, too, can be threatened by ignorance as a way of doing politics. This ignorance comes in different guises which all express a desire to eliminate tensions that democratic politics cannot overcome without undermining itself. (shrink)

In this book, Gavin Rae analyses the foundations of political life by undertaking a critical comparative analysis of the political theologies of Carl Schmitt and Emmanuel Levinas. In so doing, Rae contributes to key debates in contemporary political philosophy, specifically those relating to the nature of, and the relationship between, the theological, the political, and the ethical, as well as those questioning the existence of ahistoric metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological foundations. While the theological is often associated with belief in a (...) fixed foundation such as God or the truth of a religion, Rae identifies another sense rooted in epistemology. On this understanding, the ontological limitations of human cognition mean that, ultimately, human truth is based in faith and so can never be certain. The argument developed suggests that Levinas’ conception of the political is grounded in theology in the sense of religion, particularly the revelations of Judaism. For this reason, Levinas claims that the political decision is based on how to implement a prior religiously-inspired norm: justice. Schmitt, in contrast, develops a conception of the political rooted in epistemic faith to claim that the political decision is normless. While sympathetic to Schmitt’s conception of theology and its relationship to the political, Rae concludes by arguing that the emphasis Levinas places on responsibility is crucial to understanding the implications of this. The continuing relevance of Schmitt’s and Levinas’ political theologies is that they teach us that, while the political decision is ultimately normless, we bear an infinite responsibility for the consequences of this normless decision. (shrink)