After an introduction to set the stage, we consider some variations on the reasoning behind Curry's Paradox arising against the background of classical propositional logic and of BCI logic and one of its extensions, in the latter case treating the "paradoxicality" as a matter of nonconservative extension rather than outright inconsistency. A question about the relation of this extension and a differently described (though possibly identical) logic intermediate between BCI and BCK is raised in a final section, which closes with (...) a handful of questions left unanswered by our discussion. (shrink)

We show the admissibility for BCI of a rule form of the characteristic implicational axiom of abelian logic, this rule taking us from →β to α. This is done in Section 8, with surrounding sections exploring the admissibility and derivability of various related rules in several extensions of BCI.

We study a range of issues connected with the idea of replacing one formula by another in a fixed context. The replacement core of a consequence relation ⊢ is the relation holding between a set of formulas {A1,..., Am,...} and a formula B when for every context C, we have C,..., C,... ⊢ C. Section 1 looks at some differences between which inferences are lost on passing to the replacement cores of the classical and intuitionistic consequence relations. For example, we (...) find that while the inference from A and B to \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$A \land B$\end{document}, sanctioned by both these initial consequence relations, is retained on passage to the replacement core in the classical case, it is lost in the intuitionistic case. Further discussion of these two logics occupies Sections 3 and 4. Section 2 looks at the m = 1 case, describing A as replaceable by B according to ⊢ when B is a consequence of A by the replacement core of ⊢, and inquiring as to which choices of ⊢ render this induced replaceability relation symmetric. Section 5 investigates further conceptual refinements— such as a contrast between horizontal and vertical replaceability—suggested by some work of R. B. Angell and R. Harrop in the 1950s and 1960s. Appendix 1 examines a related aspect of term-for-term replacement in connection with identity in predicate logic. Appendix 2 is a repository for proofs which would otherwise clutter up Section 3. (shrink)

A residuated lattice is said to be integrally closed if it satisfies the quasiequations \ and \, or equivalently, the equations \ and \. Every integral, cancellative, or divisible residuated lattice is integrally closed, and, conversely, every bounded integrally closed residuated lattice is integral. It is proved that the mapping \\backslash {\mathrm {e}}\) on any integrally closed residuated lattice is a homomorphism onto a lattice-ordered group. A Glivenko-style property is then established for varieties of integrally closed residuated lattices with respect (...) to varieties of lattice-ordered groups, showing in particular that integrally closed residuated lattices form the largest variety of residuated lattices admitting this property with respect to lattice-ordered groups. The Glivenko property is used to obtain a sequent calculus admitting cut-elimination for the variety of integrally closed residuated lattices and to establish the decidability, indeed PSPACE-completenes, of its equational theory. Finally, these results are related to previous work on BCI-algebras, semi-integral residuated pomonoids, and Casari’s comparative logic. (shrink)