Descartes appears to hold that everything we believe is the product of a voluntary choice. Scholars have been reluctant to take this particularly radical version of doxastic voluntarism as Descartes’ considered position. I argue that once Descartes’ compatibilist conception of free will as well as his position on the ‘freedom of indifference’ are taken into account, the primary motivations for the rejection of the aforementioned radical version of doxastic voluntarism lose their force. Consequently, we may take Descartes at his word (...) when he maintains that everything we believe, we believe freely – even if we cannot believe anything we wish. (shrink)

Znaczenie epistemiczne aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć w epistemologii Kartezjusza W niniejszym artykule omawiam kwestię dotyczącą roli, jaką Kartezjusz wyznaczył w budowie gmachu wiedzy pewnej temu, co można określić mianem aktualnie jasnych i wyraźnych ujęć. Powyższa kwestia jest od dawna przedmiotem ożywionej dyskusji wśród komentatorów epistemologii Kartezjusza. W współczesnej literaturze historyczno-filozoficznej spotkać można dwie zasadnicze interpretacje na temat funkcji jaką pełnią w systemie Kartezjusza aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia. Pierwszą można nazwać interpretacją psychologiczną, drugą zaś normatywną. Ta ostatnia głosi, że (...) aktualnie jasne i wyraźne ujęcia są całkowicie odporne na wątpienie zanim jeszcze dowiedzie się istnienia Boga i ustali ogólną regułę prawdy. Z tego względu ich pewność nie ogranicza się u Kartezjusza jedynie do pewności psychologicznej, lecz ma charakter normatywny. Opowiadam się za interpretacją normatywną. Przemawiają za nią – moim zdaniem – liczne racje. Ale rodzi ona także pewne trudności. Dlatego po przedstawieniu argumentów przemawiających na jej rzecz i niewątpliwych zalet wynikających z jej przyjęcia, omawiam szczegółowo pewne trudności zarówno tekstowe, jak i merytoryczne, którym musi sprostać ta interpretacja, jeśli mamy ją utrzymać. (shrink)

The treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind can be traced back to the period of Descartes’ youth in which, until rule eight, he has presented some foundations of the theory of truth and error; such as the truth being founded on manifest and distinct intuition and deductive inference which is an adaptation of his analytical geometric theory. However, in rule twelve, he has vaguely addressed how the set of human faculties commits errors. Since this philosopher has also (...) given attention to the matter of errors in Principles of Philosophy and in the treatise Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting One’s Reason and of Seeking Truth in the Sciences and Objections and Replies, in this article an attempt has been made to provide a comprehensive view and critique of Descartes’ theory regarding truth and error, albeit, focusing more on rule twelve of the treatise of Rules for the Direction of the Mind. According to Descartes, two things play an essential role in cognition; understanding and will. One of the differences between these two is that the scope of understanding is limited and it cannot acquire knowledge of everything; however, the scope of the will is unlimited. Now, if there were to be errors in our perception, they must either arise from understanding or will.In his treatises, Descartes has addressed the different dimensions of errors in perception and, overall, has shown the various aspects of error in the theory of cognition. The existence of pre-judgments and differences between the levels of understanding and will, that is, the infinity of the will and finiteness of understanding, are some of the matters that Descartes counts as factors of errors. It is noteworthy that while Descartes considers errors to be the result of the interference of the will in matters that the intellect does not have sufficient knowledge of, that is, clear and distinct knowledge, he considers this error to be true in the domain of judgment or assertions. The present article recounts the reasons for errors and analyzes them based on different works of Descartes, including Rules for the Direction of the Mind but also considers Descartes to be unjustified in some matters and criticizes him regarding those.One of the criticisms aimed at Descartes’ theory of truth is that he states that only manifest and distinct perception is true and what lies beyond it is error. He considers this principle to be demonstrable or innate. After studying the different aspects of this theory, the present article shows that even in the area of mathematics to which Descartes has given serious attention and, in fact, according to him, it is a mark of manifest and distinct thought, it is not acceptable to consider this an innate matter unless Descartes accepts it as an axiom of his philosophical system. The absoluteness of the will is also not a sufficient argument regarding the infiniteness of will which provides another possibility for error; however, attention to the essential property of the will which is indefectible is noteworthy. The theory of considering concepts and realities to be graded which has been studied in different parts of his views especially in proving the creator and regarding infinity is also not provable in Descartes’ philosophical system unless he considers it as an axiom. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that despite undeniable fundamental differences between Descartes’ and Spinoza’s accounts of human action, there are some striking similarities between their views on right action, moral motivation, and virtue that are usually overlooked. I will argue, first, that both thinkers define virtue in terms of activity or freedom, mutatis mutandis, and thus in terms of actual power of acting. Second, I will claim that both Descartes and Spinoza hold a non-consequentialist approach to virtue, by which human (...) actions are evaluated as virtuous or good on the basis of their motivational forces rather than their consequences. I will show further that both philosophers identify virtue qua free action with the highest good (summum bonum), and thus with that which is to be sought for its own sake and not as a means to anything preferable to it. (shrink)