This essay reconsiders Paul Ramsey’s “medical indications” policy and argues that his reconstruction of the case of Joseph Saikewicz demonstrates that there is more room for caretakers to decline treatments for “voiceless dependents” than his interlocutors have sometimes thought. It furthermore draws on Ramsey’s earlier work to propose ways that Ramsey might have improved his policy, and argues that the shortcomings of Ramsey’s view arise from his bracketing of age in making determinations about what form of medical care is owed. (...) The reading of Ramsey set forth here suggests Cathleen Kaveny’s depiction of the ‘medical indications’ policy in Ethics at the Edges of Law is too rigid and inflexible, even while it affirms other aspects of her critique. (shrink)

In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life_ (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody’s argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) diminished (...) responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a ‘killing’ rather than a ‘not saving.’ This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody’s discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle. (shrink)

In this article Gilbert Meilaender responds to nine scholars whose papers analyze and interact with a variety of theological and ethical themes that emerge in his writing. Among those themes are the moral limits grounded in our embodied nature, the freedom to transcend those limits, the perfection of that nature by divine grace, the relation between political progress toward a common good and the kingdom of God, the place of religious beliefs in public discourse within a liberal democratic society, the (...) meaning and scope of our responsibility to care for human persons at the beginning and end of life, and the meaning of our creaturely longing to rest in God. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to show how, on a wide variety of issues, Rabbi Moshe Feinstein broke new ground with the established Orthodox rabbinic consensus and blazed a new trail in Jewish medical ethics. Rabbi Feinstein took power away from the rabbis and let patients decide their treatment, he opened the door for a Jewish approach to palliative care, he supported the use of new technologies to aid in reproduction, he endorsed altruistic living organ donation and recognized brain (...) death (thus laying the groundwork for Orthodox Jewish acceptance of heart transplantation), he downplayed the value of social worth in triage decisions, and was a fierce defender of the rights of the fetus. I develop broader theological principles from Rabbi Feinstein's ethical positions and compare them to those of his Jewish and Christian contemporaries. (shrink)

Paul Ramsey and Stanley Hauerwas are arguably the most prominent United Methodist thinkers to date to write extensively on abortion. This article takes up a ripe and illuminating task neglected by the ethicists themselves and the secondary literature: bringing their views on this issue into conversation. More specifically, this article discusses their considerations on the value of unborn human life, the “hard cases,” the church community’s role, and the place of legal reform. The article concludes by placing their remarks in (...) the context of official Catholic teaching, and contending that despite some shortcomings in the two thinkers’ considerations, Christians on different sides of the abortion debate should incorporate these authors’ insights by expressing a “rational account of fetal development” (as per Ramsey), a charitable approach to hard cases, a “theological idiom” (as per Hauerwas), and an appropriate level of political concern. (shrink)

Mr Gardner, a practising gynaecologist who is necessarily involved with abortion, suggests a view of the fetus which is between the positions commonly held: the fetus is a mass of cells, the fetus is a person from the moment of conception. He considers that from the moment of conception there is established a maternal-fetal unity. In that state the previable fetus is not an individual but is on the way to that status. The writer goes on to differentiate between the (...) moral positions of the advocates of abortion and of euthanasia. Already legal safeguards for those antipathetic to abortion have been eroded in practice and so likewise would those be if the Euthanasia Bill were to become law. (shrink)