Resumen: Este trabajo se propone examinar algunos límites de la célebre descripción merleau-pontiana del cuerpo vivido en términos de “esquema corporal” y “cuerpo habitual”, teniendo en cuenta referencias alternativas del corpus textual del filósofo a ciertas dimensiones de la experiencia corporal que desbordan tal marco. Tras analizar en primer término estas primeras definiciones que esbozan el perfil de un cuerpo hábil y competente correlativo de un entorno pragmático, consideramos seguidamente instancias de comportamientos no teleológicos ni funcionales y espacialidades no objetivas (...) ni instrumentales para concluir mostrando la relación de estos análisis con la tematización merleau-pontiana más amplia de los horizontes naturales de la experiencia. En un segundo plano evaluamos las críticas de exégetas tales como A. Lingis y J. Butler a ciertos déficits de las tesis merleau-pontianas, y relacionamos estas últimas con desarrollos filosóficos que manifiestan ciertas afinidades específicas, tales como los de E. Levinas y R. Caillois.: This paper intends to examine some of the limitations of the well-known MerleauPontian account of the lived body in terms of "body schema" and "habitual body", by taking into account some alternative references of the philosopher’s textual corpus to certain dimensions of corporeal experience that exceed such frames. After analyzing these former definitions that outline the profile of a skillful and competent body correlative of a pragmatic environment, we consider cases of non-teleological and non-functional behaviors and non-objective and non-instrumental spatialities to end up by showing the relationship between these analyses and the wider Merleau-Pontian account of the natural horizons of experience. Secondarily, we evaluate critiques such as A. Lingis’ and J. Butler’s aiming to certain deficits of Merleau-Pontian theses, and we identify certain relations that these theses hold with philosophical developments showing certain specific affinities, such as E. Levinas’ and R. Caillois’. (shrink)

RESUMEN En este artículo problematizo el protagonismo del comprender en Ser y tiempo, para demostrar que la modificación conceptual que hace Nancy de la relación como remisión a la estructura relacional "ser-a" es el elemento clave para su transformación de la ontología heideggeriana en una ontología de los cuerpos. Para realizarlo, primero evalúo las implicaciones de la interpretación del lenguaje como dóxa en Heidegger. Luego, a partir de Nancy desarrollo la noción de sentido como transitividad del ser, soportada en la (...) estructura "ser-a". En tercer lugar, expongo otra noción de mundo correspondiente a la aperturidad ontológica sin ser apriorística, que atenta contra la preeminencia ontológica del humano y enfatiza la fundamentalidad del ser-con. Finalmente, resalto dos consecuencias de este cambio metodológico: la transformación de la existencia en creación de mundo en lugar de comprensión y de la comunidad como régimen ontológico singular-plural. ABSTRACT In this paper, I problematize the prominence of understanding in Being and Time. In order to demonstrate that the conceptual modification that Nancy does of the relation as "reference" to the relational structure "being-to" is the key element to transform the Heideggerian ontology into an ontology of bodies. To do it, first, I evaluate the implications of the interpretation of language as doxa in the first Heidegger. Then, departing from Nancy, I develop the notion of sense as transitivity of being, supported by the structure "being-to". In third place, I expose another notion of the world, corresponding to the ontological opening without being aprioristic; which works against the ontological preeminence of the human and emphasizes the fundamentality of being-with. Finally, I explain two consequences of this methodological change: the transformation of the existence as creation, instead of comprehension, and of the community as a singular-plural ontological regime. (shrink)

This paper intends to examine some of the limitations of the well-known Merleau- Pontian account of the lived body in terms of "body schema" and "habitual body", by taking into account some alternative references of the philosopher’s textual corpus to certain dimensions of corporeal experience that exceed such frames. After analyzing these former definitions that outline the profile of a skillful and competent body co­rrelative of a pragmatic environment, we consider cases of non-teleological and non-functional behaviors and non-objective and non-instrumental (...) spatialities to end up by showing the relationship between these analyses and the wider Merleau-Pontian account of the natural horizons of experience. Secondarily, we evaluate critiques such as A. Lingis’ and J. Butler’s aiming to certain deficits of Merleau-Pontian theses, and we identify certain relations that these theses hold with philosophical developments showing certain specific affinities, such as E. Levinas’ and R. Caillois’. (shrink)