In this paper, I will conduct three interrelated analyses. First, I will develop an analysis of various concepts in the history of biology that used to refer to individual-level phenomena but were then reinterpreted by the Modern Synthesis in terms of populations. Second, a similar situation can be found in contemporary evolutionary theory. While different approaches reflect on the causal role of developing organisms in evolution, proponents of the Modern Synthesis refrain from any substantial change by reinterpreting and explaining individual-level (...) phenomena from a population perspective. Finally, I will approach these historical and contemporary debates by arguing for the statistical reading of natural selection, which holds that explanations by natural selection are statistical. My main conclusion is that the historical conceptual reinterpretations belong to a new explanatory strategy developed by the Modern Synthesis based on population thinking. Adopting the statistical point of view has three advantages for the issues discussed in this paper. First, understanding historical conceptual change as part of an explanatory shift fits with the emergence of population biology as a discipline that employs statistical methods. Second, concerning current debates in evolutionary biology, the statisticalist reading can validate the goal of both sides of the dispute. It ascribes an invaluable role to the population statistical explanation of the MS and also commends the study of developmental and organismal causes of adaptive evolution. Finally, the division of explanatory roles in evolutionary biology, embarrassed by statisticalism, can be related to the different interpretations that important biological concepts have undergone throughout history and contemporary biology, i.e., that the division of explanatory roles allows for a division of conceptual interpretations. (shrink)

Abstract: The use of evolutionary explanations to account for proximate phenomena has been labeled by various authors as an explanatory error, the so-called phylogeny fallacy. In this paper, this fallacy will be analyzed in the context of teleosemantics. I will discuss whether teleosemantics projects that rely on the Selected-Effect Theory of Functions (i.e., mainstream teleosemantics) generally commit the fallacy. To frame the discussion, I will present two desiderata that, as argued here, every teleosemantic project must fulfill. The actuality desideratum, motivated (...) by Brentano’s problem, demands for a proximate analysis of the properties that make a system intentional. The historical desideratum, on the other hand, says that a teleological view of intentionality requires a historical dimension in order to understand the causal basis of teleological explanations. While I give some reasons why mainstream teleosemantics might be implicated in the phylogeny fallacy, my main argument aims to highlight an explanatory gap in mainstream teleosemantics: the population perspective on teleofunctions is inadequate to explain the proximate properties of intentional systems. In other words, the account of the historical desideratum in population-evolutionary terms prevents an adequate solution to the actuality desideratum. This is related to two central goals of teleosemantics: The goal of explaining content determination by recourse to natural selection processes makes it impossible to solve another goal of teleosemantics, the so-called problem of representational status. I analyze this situation and argue that inherited information (sometimes interpreted in a teleosemantic sense) plays the role of closing the gap. This leads teleosemantics into a complex situation: in order to close the gap, it must commit the fallacy. At the end of the article, I propose an alternative to fulfill both desiderata, motivated by an evo-devo perspective. I state that lineage explanations have the property of providing historical explanations based on proximate causes. (shrink)