Working memory, an important posit in cognitive science, allows one to temporarily store and manipulate information in the service of ongoing tasks. Working memory has been traditionally classified as an explicit memory system – that is, as operating on and maintaining only consciously perceived information. Recently, however, several studies have questioned this assumption, purporting to provide evidence for unconscious working memory. In this paper, we focus on visual working memory and critically examine these studies as well as studies of unconscious (...) perception that seem to provide indirect evidence for unconscious working memory. Our analysis indicates that current evidence does not support an unconscious working memory store, though we offer independent reasons to think that working memory may operate on unconsciously perceived information. (shrink)

Dual process theorists posit the existence of two distinct types of cognitive processing in order to explain domains of higher cognition such as reasoning and decision-making. Such theories typically allude to co-varying clusters of properties as well as an underlying mechanism or system for each processing type. I will argue that a host of empirical findings cast doubt upon the validity of both theses, and that simpler models of higher cognition—that do not appeal to types of processing—might be preferable.

One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...) postulation of (i) a peculiar kind of generic conscious representation that has no independent rationale and (ii) an unmotivated form of unconscious representation that in some cases conflicts with what we know about unconscious representation. (shrink)

In a recent study half of the participants were informed of the occasional occurrence of location regularities in visual stimulus sets, while the other half was not. Evidence was presented to the effect that uninformed participants extracted the patterns from the displays better than the informed participants. The authors interpret their finding as demonstrating that working memory can operate non-consciously. However, inspection of the data suggests that rather than being more effective than the informed participants in extracting patterns, uninformed participants (...) were more strongly affected by the “Broken Patterns” that served as misleading cues. Thus whereas the findings may support the possibility of non-conscious operation of low level WM functions, they nevertheless underscore the importance of conscious awareness as far as higher level functions are concerned. (shrink)

The dynamic constraint relaxation theory predicts crucial roles of the initial diversity and evaluation in creative problem-solving. We reported the experimental evidence supporting these predictions, using an insight problem. The experiments showed that the degrees of making different types of trials and the appropriate evaluation were closely related to individual differences in insight problem-solving, and that evaluation became more appropriate by making the problem-solving goal explicit. The review of the research in related fields showed that these experimental findings were in (...) congruent with the evidence obtained from different types of creative activities. (shrink)

In a recent comment on our paper Implicit Working Memory Guterman argued that a possible interpretation of the results of one of our experiments is that “conscious awareness … enabled the participants to find ways to benefit from the predictability … while nullifying the cost.” Unfortunately, the data do not support this interpretation. Additionally, Guterman seems to have suggested that our results may be explained by non-working memory processes. We argue against this interpretation.

In a response to Hassin’s reply to my comment on his study ), I suggest that the involvement of the central executive reveals itself in the absence of the Pattern variable effect in the Informed group, rather than in the presence of this effect in the uninformed one.

The paper delineates a study of executive functions, construed as procedural working memory, from a motivational perspective. Since WM theories and motivation theories are both concerned with purposive activity, the role of implicit evaluations observed in goal pursuit can be anticipated to arise also in the context of cognitive control, e.g., during the performance of the Stroop task. The role of positive and negative affect in goal pursuit consists in controlling attention resources according to the goal and situational requirements. Positive (...) affect serves to maintain goals and means in the scope of attention, whereas negative affect activates the inhibition of non-functional contents, e.g., distractors and irrelevant objects. Adaptation to conflict proceeds via sequential triggering of negative and positive affect. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the focus on action or reflection changes the scope of contents subjected to implicit control. Therefore, I suggest that the motivational system, to a large extent, plays the role of the Central Executive. The paper opens a discussion and proposes studies on affective mechanisms of cognitive control. (shrink)