Subramanian has produced a new biography of Haldane taking into account archival material that has only become public during the last decade. He has been able to provide a more complete picture of Haldane’s personal life than earlier biographers, such as his difficult schooldays at Eton and the deterioration of his first marriage. He has also highlighted the extent to which Haldane was kept under constant secret surveillance by British intelligence services because of his politics. However, the book is less (...) successful in its account of Haldane’s scientific work including what he contributed to modern evolutionary theory, the Fisher–Haldane relationship, Haldane’s role in the Lysenko controversy, and what he achieved after emigration to India in 1957. (shrink)

The discussion with Rao and Nanjundiah about the history of interactions between J. B. S. Haldane and Ernst Mayr is further extended in this note. The nature of the dispute about beanbag genetics is explicated as consisting of two separate issues, one about the role of mathematical analysis in evolutionary biology, and the other about the value of single-locus genic models.

Ernst Mayr and J. B. S. Haldane, major contributors to the ‘modern synthesis’ in evolutionary theory, set an example of how scientific disagreements need not come in the way of friendship. After getting acquainted, they kept discussing issues related to evolution until just before Haldane’s death in 1964. Their dissimilar backgrounds meant that they adopted different approaches. A major disagreement emerged regarding the right way to look at the role of genes in evolution. Mayr felt that the elementary models of (...) population genetics were oversimplifications and therefore inadequate for representing evolutionary processes, though he was not consistent in his attitude. Haldane, on the other hand, maintained that the mathematical treatment of simple models had an important role to play. The Mayr-Haldane interactions illustrate divergent viewpoints concerning the utility of mathematics in biology. (shrink)

William Keith Brooks was an American zoologist at Johns Hopkins University from 1876 until his death in 1908. Over the course of his career, Brooks staunchly defended Darwinism, arguing for the centrality of natural selection in evolutionary theory at a time when alternative theories, such as neo-Lamarckism, grew prominent in American biology. In his book The Law of Heredity, Brooks addressed problems raised by Darwin’s theory of pangenesis. In modifying and developing Darwin’s pangenesis, Brooks proposed a new theory of heredity (...) that sought to avoid the pitfalls of Darwin’s hypothesis. In so doing he strengthened Darwin’s theory of natural selection by undermining arguments for the inheritance of acquired characteristics. In later attacks on neo-Lamarckism, Brooks consistently defended Darwin’s theory of natural selection on logical grounds, continued to challenge the idea of the inheritance of acquired characteristics, and argued that natural selection best explained a wide range of adaptations. Finally, he critiqued Galton’s statistical view of heredity and argued that Galton had resurrected an outmoded typological concept of species, one which Darwin and other naturalists had shown to be incorrect. Brooks’s ideas resemble the “biological species concept” of the twentieth century, as developed by evolutionary biologist Ernst Mayr and others. The late-nineteenth century was not a period of total “eclipse” of Darwinism, as biologists and historians have hitherto seen it. Although the “Modern Synthesis” refers to the reconciliation of post-Mendelian genetics with evolution by natural selection, we might adjust our understanding of how the synthesis developed by seeing it as the culmination of a longer discussion that extends back to the late-nineteenth century. (shrink)

Different types of explanations coexist in present-day biology. Functional explanations describe mechanisms, whereas evolutionary explanations provide answers to the question “why?” mostly by appealing to the past and present action of natural selection. But the relations between these two types of explanations, as well as the relative insights they offer, vary from one domain of research to another. We will illustrate this complex landscape of biological explanations with three examples involving aging, the sex ratio, and the phenomenon of genomic imprinting. (...) We will show that the two types of explanations have recently often progressed towards each other. In consequence, they cease to be “pure” functional or evolutionary explanations and become explanations that may be alternatively considered as functional or evolutionary. (shrink)

Researchers often pursue proof of concept research, but criteria for evaluating such research remain poorly specified. This article proposes a general framework for proof of concept research that k...

Clade selection is unpopular with philosophers who otherwise accept multilevel selection theory. Clades cannot reproduce, and reproduction is widely thought necessary for evolution by natural selection, especially of complex adaptations. Using microbial evolutionary processes as heuristics, I argue contrariwise, that (1) clade growth (proliferation of contained species) substitutes for clade reproduction in the evolution of complex adaptation, (2) clade-level properties favoring persistence – species richness, dispersal, divergence, and possibly intraclade cooperation – are not collapsible into species-level traits, (3) such properties (...) can be maintained by selection on clades, and (4) clade selection extends the explanatory power of the theory of evolution. (shrink)

Phylogenies are increasingly being used to investigate human history, diversification and cultural evolution. While using phylogenies in this way is not new, new modes of analysis are being applied to inferring history, reconstructing past states, and examining processes of change. Phylogenies have the advantage of providing a way of creating a continuous history of all current populations, and they make a large number of analyses and hypothesis tests possible even when other forms of historical information are patchy or nonexistent. In (...) common with approaches taken in other historical sciences, phylogenetics is a way of reconstructing past and processes using the traces left in the present day. Trees, based on DNA, language, cultural traits, or other evidence, are now sprouting all over the academic landscape. The increasing use of phylogenetic analysis to understand human cultural evolution has been embraced by some, and scorned by others. The purpose of this article is not to review methods and applications of phylogenetic analyses, nor to consider the growing field of cultural phylogenetics, but, more broadly, to explore how we interpret phylogenies as narratives about human diversification. The first half of the article deals with meaning: phylogenies are often interpreted as histories, but a bifurcating tree is at best an abstract representation of history, and its connections to past events and processes is dependent on the data used, the assumptions made in the analysis, and the degree to which nodes in the tree (where one lineage splits into two) can be connected to change and movement in real populations. The second half of the article explores the purpose of phylogenies: a tree does not have to be a literal history of human lineages in order to be useful for investigating processes of human diversification. Phylogenies should not be read as accurate records of history, but as a way of exploring plausible explanations for current patterns of diversity. Phylogenies provide important information that can be used to test ideas about human diversity, and can help to guard against errors of inference arising from statistical artifacts. (shrink)

One of the major benefits of interdisciplinary research is the chance to swap tools between fields, to save having to reinvent the wheel. The fields of language evolution and evolutionary biology have been swapping tools for centuries to the enrichment of both. Here I will discuss three categories of tool swapping: conceptual tools, where analogies are drawn between hypotheses, patterns or processes, so that one field can take advantage of the path cut through the intellectual jungle by the other; theoretical (...) tools, where the machinery developed to process the data in one field is adapted to be applied to the data of the other; and analytical tools, where common problems encountered in both fields can be solved using useful tricks developed by one or the other. I will argue that conceptual tools borrowed from linguistics contributed to the Darwinian revolution in biology; that theoretical tools of evolutionary change can in some cases be applied to both genetic and linguistic data without having to assume the underlying evolutionary processes are exactly the same; and that there are practical problems that have long been recognised in historical linguistics that may be solved by borrowing some useful analytical tools from evolutionary biology. (shrink)