This paper presents a detailed reconstruction of Theophrastus’ account of human ontogeny, which is built around Aristotle’s notoriously difficult claim in Generation of Animals II 3 that “νοῦς alone enters from without.” I argue that this account (which is known to us via quotes from Theophrastus’ de Anima II and On Motion I) provides a viable alternative to the traditional trilemma between naturalist traducianism, creationism, and pre-existence, as well as offering an attractive but so far unappreciated interpretation of Aristotle’s account (...) of human ontogeny. More specifically, I argue that the extant evidence poses a challenge to the two dominant interpretations of “νοῦς from without” in the last decades: a dialectical one, according to which Aristotle ultimately rejects this claim, and a naturalizing one (often inspired by Alexander of Aphrodisias) that obliterates the essential difference between νοῦς and the other parts of the soul. (shrink)

Whereas several zoological Aristotelian works have been preserved, Aristotle is reported to have written only one short botanical treatise. Such reports seem to conflict with his self-described ambition to study plants as well as animals. Even though this treatise is now lost, the available evidence suggests that Aristotle had valid reasons to find the subject-matter of plants much less interesting, as their activities amount to a subset of what animals do. When studying attributes common to both plants and animals in (...) the transmitted corpus, Aristotle systematically focuses on the case of the most complex animals and, once an explanatory model has been found, proceeds to apply it to the remaining cases with less details. I argue that this procedure, although it runs counters to the intuition that one ought to start with the most simple case, corresponds to a general scientific method. Consequently, most of Aristotle’s botany is found to be already encapsulated in the main results of his study of animals. (shrink)